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INTRODUCTION
It is clear that this is a concerted effort.... If they can't get it in one
place, they try it anotherplace. This is about shutting us down, there
can be no mistake.
-Carol M. BrownerAdministrator
U.S. Environmental
ProtectionAgency'
[T]he agency has headed in the wrong direction, for the wrong reasons, and in a manner which can impose unnecessary costs on American industry and, ultimately, the consumers and taxpayers of this
country. The agency needs to recognize that there are simply not
enough available financial resources to "fix" every perceived environmental problem.
-Report by the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on
2
Appropriations

The Republican Party's recapture of both houses of Congress for the first time in five decades portends a fundamental

1. John H. Cushman, Jr., G.O.P.'s Plan for Environment Is Facinga Big
Test in Congress, Votes Planned on Curbing Regulatory Powers, N.Y. TIMEs,

July 17, 1995, at Al.
2. H.R. REP. No. 104-201, at 51 (1995) (explaining the legislation containing EPA appropriations for fiscal year 1996).
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change in the way America is governed. The next few years
will determine whether this fundamental change will take firm
hold, institutionalizing the conservative agenda set forth in the
Contract with America,3 or whether it will be dismissed as an
anomalous and short-lived departure. Whatever its fate in the
electoral context, the conservative agenda has already had a
profound effect on many Democrats and their President, who
have hastened to embrace its more popular aspects. Now is
clearly the time-and arguably past the time-for a robust
public debate on the implications of these changes.
Two central tenets of the conservative agenda are the
devolution of authority to state and local governments and federal regulatory retrenchment.'
Proponents herald these
themes as a return to the federalism the Framers intended;
opponents attack them as a cynical rollback of essential protections at the behest of American industry.5 The crusade by
state and local government officials against unfunded federal
environmental mandates is among the most important arenas
for this debate. The unfunded mandates movement raises
squarely the appropriate division of responsibility for environmental and other social welfare problems among the nation's
three levels of government.
While the rebellion over unfunded mandates has percolated in the states for over two decades, it reached national
prominence only three years ago.6 But so powerful is its raw
3.

CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH,

REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (Ed
Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) [hereinafter CONTRACT].

4. See, e.g., id. at 125-41 (proposing the Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act, which purports to limit government-imposed mandates and
regulations).
5. See, e.g., Cesar V. Conda, An Environment for Reform, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 23, 1995, at A18 (proposing a strategy for the Republican party to respond to issues on the environment); Bob Herbert, Health & Safety Wars,
N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1995, at A13 (warning that Sen. Bob Dole and Rep. David
McIntosh are on a campaign to "rid big business of the inconvenience of federal regulations aimed at protecting the health and safety of Americans").
6. See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY COMMIN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERALLY INDUCED COSTS AFFECTING STATE AND LOCAL GovERNMENTS, M-193, at 1-9 (1994) [hereinaier ACIR FEDERALLY INDUCED

COSTS] (explaining the growth of regulatory federalism and the evolution of
the mandate issue). In a chapter entitled "The Mandate Relief Issue Comes of
Age," ACIR reports that "[bly 1993, the term %refunded federal mandates' had
become the rallying cry for one of the most contentious intergovernmental issues." Id. at 1. For histories of the unfunded mandates movement, see also
Art Levine, Easing of State-Local Regulatory Burden Leaves Some Pleased,
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political energy that members of the 104th Congress introduced the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) as
S. 1 and H.R. 5V The bills were enacted within the first 100
days of the Republican majority's ascendance.8 President Clinton hastened to accept the legislation; indeed, Republicans and
Democrats spent considerable time during the floor debate arguing over which party was more sincere in its commitment to
relieve subnational governments from the plague of federal Big
Brotherism9
By itself, the UMRA will not accomplish real change over
the long run because its major enforcement mechanism-a
point of order on the floor against any legislation that proposes
an unfunded mandate-is waivable by a simple majority vote.'0
This procedure may well serve to make legislators conscious of
what they are doing when they vote to hand down mandates
without raising taxes, but it will not force them to control
themselves in the face of compelling political reasons to proceed."
Whether or not the UMRA proves the silver bullet envisioned by its supporters, the litany of complaints about federal
environmental policies used to justify its passage will arise repeatedly as Congress reauthorizes the major federal environOthers Grumbling, 16 NATI J. 1464 (1984) (expounding upon the differing
views that, on the one hand, state and local authority is being eroded and, on
the other hand, federal regulatory relief has gone too far); W. John Moore, Financing Federalism, 20 NAT'L J. 2384 (1988) (discussing the juxtaposition of
economics and politics in any effort to assist struggling communities);
Rochelle L. Stanfield, Thanks a Lot for Nothing, Washington, 26 NATL J. 726
(1994) (offering highlights of a session in which four leaders of the National
League of Cities explain their discontent with unfunded mandates); David S.
Broder, Money and Mandates, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1995, at A17 (explaining
the bipartisan movement to enact a measure to protect states, counties and
cities from the costs imposed by federal policies). For a discussion of how the
unfunded mandates movement targets environmental regulation, see David L.
Markell, The Role of Local Governments in Environmental Regulation: Shoring Up Our FederalSystem, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 885 (1993).
7. S. 1, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 5, 104th Cong. (1995).
8. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 109
Stat. 48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.CA.).
9. See, e.g., Ann Devroy & Helen Dewar, HailingBipartisanship, Clinton Signs Bill to Restrict Unfunded Mandates, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1995, at
A10 (describing the partisan bickering).
10. 2 U.S.C.A. § 658d (West Supp. 1996) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
11. Twenty-eight states have tried similar approaches without much success from either a local government or an objective perspective. JANET M.
KELLY, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, STATE MANDATES: FISCAL NOTES,
REIMBURSEMENT, AND ANTI-MANDATE STRATEGIES, at v (1992) [hereinafter
STATE MANDATES].
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mental statutes. 2 Combined with other retrenchment initiatives, including EPA budget cutbacks13 and pending regulatory
reform legislation, 4 the unfunded mandates movement poses
an immediate and serious threat to stable and effective environmental protection. The threat is particularly acute because
the active participation of state and local elected officials gives
retrenchment a credibility it would never achieve if regulated
industries were its only visible supporters.
This Article considers the efforts that have been made to
respond to the movement against unfunded federal environ-

12. As discussed in detail in Part V below, Congress has already responded to these complaints in its recent reauthorization of the Safe Drinking
Water Act. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, P.L. 104-182, §
110 Stat. 1613 (1996) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j). Reauthorization of virtually every other major environmental statute is also long overdue
and Republicans have promised fundamental changes. See Environmental
Laws Face Revisions, 53 CONG. Q. 1698 (1995) (summarizing the pending reauthorizations of environmental statutes).
13. See, e.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., E.P.A. Is CancelingPollution Testing
Across the Nation:Budget Cuts Are Blamed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1995, at Al
(describing EPA cutbacks in enforcement); Final EPA Report on Proposed
Budget Cuts Outlines Stark "RealWorld" Consequences, 1995 Daily Env't Rep.
(BNA) 140 (July 21, 1995) (enumerating the threats to various initiatives). In
the final analysis, the Clinton administration managed to avoid the most severe budget cuts and riders restricting or eliminating the EPA's regulatory
authority, although 1996 EPA finding was reduced by $700 million, or approximately 10%, below 1995 levels. See, e.g., Clinton Signs Omnibus AppropriationsBill, Immediately Waives EnvironmentalProvisions, 27 Env't. Rep.
(BNA) 8 (May 3, 1996) (explaining the mixed results from the Omnibus Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996). As this Article went to press, the
House and Senate had agreed on an appropriations bill that allocated approximately $6.7 billion to the EPA for fiscal year 1997, and President Clinton
was expected to sign the legislation. Budget: House, Senate Pass Bill Giving
EPA $6.7 Billion; Clinton Plans to Sign Measure, 1996 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA)
A-11 (Sept. 26, 1996). This appropriation marks a slight increase above 1996
levels, but was about $400 million below the president's request. Society and
Politics Budget: Congress Clears EPA Funding Bill, GREENWIRE, Sept. 25,
1995, available in WESTLAW, File No. 7.
14. S. 343, 104th Cong. (1995) (Senate regulatory reform legislation sponsored by then-Majority Leader Robert Dole); H.R. 926, 104th Cong. (1995)
(House-passed legislation requiring cost-benefit analysis and regulatory
flexibility); H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. (1995) (House-passed risk assessment legislation). Although this legislation foundered in the Senate and is unlikely to
be passed in the 104th Congress, it remains a priority for Republicans and
conservative Democrats and will almost certainly be pursued in the next Congress. See, e.g., Margaret Kriz, Risky Business, 27 NAT'L J. 417 (1995)
(describing the content and politics of the legislative debate over regulatory
reform legislation during the 104th Congress; Ben Wildalvsky, Carrying On,
28 NAT'L J. 991 (1996) (exploring why regulatory reform legislation foundered
during the 104th Congress).
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mental mandates, concludes that these efforts will not be successful in resolving state and local officials' legitimate problems, and proposes an alternative framework for sorting environmental responsibilities among the three levels of
government. Environmental mandates are defined for these
purposes as enforceable federal requirements imposed on local
governments when they act in their capacity as potential polluters, or regulatees.
Unfunded environmental mandates
therefore include restrictions on the way local governments
deliver essential public services such as drinking water, solid
waste management, and sewage treatment. They do not include the states' performance as regulators implementing federal requirements. Although the states must comply with a
series of complex conditions when they administer and implement federal environmental programs, the threshold decision
to participate is voluntary and does not fall within any conventional definition of an enforceable mandate used in the literature or the popular debate. 5
Part I of the Article considers the nature and the scope of
unfunded mandates in both legal and policy terms. Part II
places the current movement against such mandates in a historical context. It concludes with a consideration of contemporary "new (new) Federalist" political theory which advocates a
restoration of subnational governments' traditional powers.
Part Ill explores some procedural solutions to the problems
raised by unfunded mandates that have been suggested by the
three branches of the federal government, explaining why each
has proved incomplete or ineffective. These solutions include
the recent congressional entry, the UMRA, and the fiscal notes
and studies it will spawn,16 executive orders issued or endorsed
15. Provisions delegating implementation and enforcement to state governments are a central feature of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(1994); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (1994); the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926, 6946, and 6991c (1994);
and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994). In characterizing the states'
participation in delegated environmental programs as "voluntary," I do not
mean to imply that there is not an element of coercion involved-especially
because the alternative to accepting a voluntary delegation is federal preemption of state law. The bottom line of such programs, however, is that the
states can decline to participate, while local governments are not given any
option to decline to comply with environmental mandates imposed at the federal or, for that matter, state level.
16. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C.A. § 658 (West Supp. 1996) (requiring Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimates of the costs that would be imposed by pending
legislation containing intergovernmental and private sector mandates); id. §
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by the last three Presidents,17 and the Supreme Court's efforts
to expand and later restrict doctrines of federalism.1 8 Part IV
proposes five substantive principles for resorting environmental responsibilities among the three levels of government
as an alternative to the procedural solutions that have been
tried thus far. Finally, Part V considers the most prominent
environmental program that local governments love to hatemandates imposed under the Safe Drinking Water Act.19 It
explores the implications of the current breakdown in intergovernmental relations and explains how these five sorting
principles can be used to develop more effective solutions.
I.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

Mandates go to the heart of what governing is all about-autonomy
and money... What is a mandate, anyway?... Most states employ a
cost-based definition.... The problem with a cost-based definition is
that it necessarily reduces important arguments about mandates to
money ... A better approach is a penalty-based definition. Rather
than ask "will it cost money?" a penalty-baseddefinition asks "must I
comply?" The latter is much easier to answer decisively than the former.
-Janet M. Kelly, Advisor,
NationalLeague of Cities"

States and localities describe unfunded federal mandates broadly as
all federal laws and regulations that apply to state and local governments without full federal funding. This definition, however, fails to
account for expenditures that would be made even absent federal
mandates, and expenditures that should be borne by the states and lo-

1532 (requiring federal agencies to estimate the costs of intergovernmental
mandates imposed by their rules); id. §§ 1551, 1552 (authorizing the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to prepare studies and reports
concerning existing mandates).
17. Enhancing the Intergovernmental Partnership, Exec. Order No.
12875, 3 C.F.R. § 669 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) [hereinafter
Intergovernmental Partnership] (issued by President Clinton); Federalism
Considerations in Policy Formulation and Implementation, Exec. Order No.
12612, 3 C.F.R. § 252 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) [hereinafter
Federalism] (issued by President Reagan and continued under President
Bush, but repealed by President Clinton).
18. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S.
528 (1985); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Part III.C.
infra (discussing Garcia'sprogeny).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1994), amended by P.L. 104-182, § 110 Stat.
1613 (1996).
20. Janet M. Kelly, Issue: State Mandates to Local Governments, ISSUES
& OPTIONS, July 1993, at 1.
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calities as a matter of sound policy, regardlessof the source of the requirement.
-Robert W. Adler, Senior Attorney,
NaturalResources Defense Council,
Inc. 21

The federally-funded U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) has served for the past four
decades as the chief intellectual guardian of federalist princ-

iples at the national level, producing a series of lengthy reports
that are the primary source of research and analysis on these
R acknowledged that "there is
issues. 22 In a 194A
1994 report, ACIR

no universally accepted definition of a governmental mandate
and surprisingly little consensus on the matter," adding that
"some of the most costly federal financial impacts on states
and
localities do not fit the standard definition of a federal mandate

closely, if at all."2 3 In large measure, definitional confusion and
controversy arise from the paradigm that is at the heart of the
unfunded mandates movement: the federal government should
pay for any mandates it imposes and refrain from imposing

mandates it is unwilling to finance. 4 With the fiscal stakes

21. Federal Mandate Reform Legislation: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. 207 (1994) (statement of Robert
W. Adler, Senior Attorney, National Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
22. ACIR is composed of 26 members drawn from Congress, federal
agency and department heads, governors, mayors, county elected officials, and
private citizens. It was established in 1959 as a permanent, bipartisan commission designed to provide a forum for discussion and study of "emerging
public problems that are likely to require intergovernmental cooperation" and
to "recommend... the most desirable allocation of governmental functions."
42 U.S.C. § 4272 (1994). As a practical matter, ACIR serves as the primary
think tank for all of the organizations that represent elected and appointed
state and local officials in national policy debates, including the National Governors' Association, the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of
Mayors, and the National Association of Counties, all of whom repeatedly refer to ACIR's work to provide substantive justification for their political activities. The recent addition of EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner to the
Commission confirms the importance of environmental issues to its mission.
For a description of the role ACIR has played historically, see Rochelle L.
Stanfield, It's Back-But Does Anyone Know?, 26 NATL J. 1373 (1994).
23. ACIR FEDERALLY INDUCED COSTS, supra note 6, at 3.
24. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASS'N OF COUNTIES, THE AMERICAN COUNTY
PLATFORM AND RESOLUTIONS 130 (1994-1995) (urging Congress "to enact legislation that would relieve counties and cities of all obligations to carry out
any new mandate" if no federal funding is offered); NATIONAL LEAGUE OF
CITIES, NATIONAL MUNICIPAL POLICY § 1.06(D) (1994) (proposing a reimbursement program); U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, OFFICIAL POLICY
RESOLUTIONS 52 (1992) (opposing unfunded federal mandates). All three platforms emphasize that funding should serve as the quid pro quo of all new and
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raised this high, it is not surprising that federal participants in
the debate are reluctant to agree on a definition with the broad
scope suggested by representatives of aggrieved subnational
governments.
The restrictive effects of this paradigm were on full display
when the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, Congress's major
response to state and local grievances, was enacted in the
spring of 1995. ACIR's director of governmental policy research estimated at the time that only nine of the twenty-seven
mandates approved by Congress from 1981 to 1990 would fall
within the new law's definition; nearly all were environmental
rules.25 The UMRA's definition of "intergovernmental mandate" reads, in pertinent part:
The term "Federal intergovernmental mandate" means.... any provision in legislation, statute, or regulation that... would impose an
enforceable duty upon State, local, or tribal governments, except...
a condition of Federal assistance... or... a duty arising from participation in a voluntary Federal program, except as provided in subparagraph (B) .... 26

The concept of a mandate as an "enforceable duty" that is
not undertaken voluntarily encompasses most of the environmental laws and regulations cited by local governments during
their campaign for unfunded mandates relief. These include
monitoring and treatment requirements imposed under the
Safe Drinking Water Act,2 7 sewage treatment and disposal requirements imposed under the Clean Water Act, 28and municipal solid waste disposal requirements imposed under the Solid
existing federal mandates.
25. Devroy & Dewar, supra note 9, at A10. This estimate is based on the
UMRA's explicit exclusion of civil rights laws and its limited application to
conditions imposed on recipients of federal funding. Id; see also David Hosansky, Loopholes May Diminish Power of Mandates Legislation, 53 CONG. Q.
683, 683-84 (1995) (stating that environmental mandates consistently would
fall under the scope of the bills).
26. 2 U.S.C.A. § 658(5) (West Supp. 1996). The UMRA only covers duties
arising from voluntary participation in federal programs if the program provides $500 million or more in annual funding. According to the Conference
Report that accompanied the final legislation, this definition excludes all but
the nine largest social welfare programs. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-76, at 2829 (1995).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-1 to -6 (1994), amended by P.L. 104-182, § 110 Stat.
1613 (1996); National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 141
(1995); National Primary Drinking Water Regulations Implementation, 40
C.F.R. § 142 (1995); National Secondary Drinking Water Regulations, 40
C.F.R. § 143 (1995).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994); Secondary Treatment Regulation, 40 C.F.R. §
133 (1995).
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Waste Disposal Act.29 This formulation, however, eliminates
from consideration other federal laws, regulations, and administrative policies that indirectly make it more difficult and expensive for local governments to implement such enforceable
environmental duties.
Although it is tempting to use the UMRA definition to circumscribe the larger policy debate over unfunded mandates,
the daunting task of developing a convincing rationale for
sorting environmental responsibilities nevertheless demands
sidestepping the limitations of the funding paradigm and undertaking a more open inquiry into the implications of federal
regulation. For example, the federal government often attaches conditions to the receipt of aid by state and local governments. The two most common conditions are crosscutting
requirements, which demand the application of certain generic
rules (e.g., prohibitions of discrimination) to programs funded
with federal assistance, and crossover sanctions, which
threaten the termination or reduction of aid provided under
one program unless the requirements of another program are
satisfied.3 ° While the curtailment of federal funding for municipal environmental programs may limit the utility of this
approach, a creative Congress could use even relatively small
amounts of funding to inspire compliance with new require29. 42 U.S.C. § 6944 (1994); Criteria for Classification of Solid Waste Dis-

posal Facilities and Practices, 40 C.F.R. § 257 (1995); Criteria for Municipal
Solid Waste Landfills, 40 C.F.R. § 258 (1995).
30. These terms are used throughout the political science literature on
intergovernmental relations to categorize federal regulatory activity. The two
other categories commonly used are direct orders, which are the functional
equivalent of the UMRA's enforceable duties, and partial preemptions, which
establish federal standards for program administration but delegate administrative authority to the states if they adopt equivalent standards. See, e.g.,
THOMAS J. ANTON, AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY: How THE
SYSTEM WORKS 184-87 (1989) (describing each instrument of regulation);
PARRIS N. GLENDENING & MAVIS MANN REEVES, PRAGMATIC FEDERALISM 76-

83 (1984) (discussing types of intergovernmental regulations and what they
require of the state and local governments); U.S. ADVISORY COMMN ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS, FEDERAL REGULATION

OF STATE AND

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: THE MIXED RECORD OF THE 1980S, at 7-8 (1993)
[hereinafter ACIR MIXED RECORD] (describing the four types of regulation
and listing those used by 36 major regulations); DAVID B. WALKER, THE
REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM, SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHINGTON 8, 139, 238-40
(1995) (discussing each of the four types of conditions the federal government
attaches to the receipt of aid); Michael Fix & Daphne A. Kenyon, Introduction
to COPING WITH MANDATES: WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES? 1, 3-4 (Michael
Fix & Daphne Kenyon eds., 1990) [hereinafter COPING WITH MANDATES]
(defining and describing types of unfunded mandates).
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ments and, incidentally, to circumvent the UMTRA process.
To the above collection of federal regulatory techniques,
the ACIR has added the more subtle concept of so-called
"federally-induced costs" that encompass actions taken by the
federal government, whether in statutes, regulations, other
administrative decisions, or litigation, that indirectly cause local governments to spend money. 1 Although this concept goes
well beyond the UMRA definition of mandate-as-enforceableduty, simply combing the books for outright, direct orders
eliminates from consideration more subtle policies that have a
profound and unavoidable impact on municipalities. A prime
example of federally-induced costs is adoption of tax policies
that foreclose innovative and cost-effective methods of financing municipal environmental projects. 32 A second example is
lengthy delays in the promulgation of regulations that can
make compliance both difficult and more expensive over the
long run. Such delays can mean that local governments are
unable to plan the installation of new pollution control technologies and end up buying one type of equipment, only to find
their investment superseded by subsequent requirements. 33 A
final example is the imposition of liability for the handling and
disposal of municipal solid waste under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

ACIR FEDERALLY INDUCED COSTS, supra note 6, at iii-iv.
32. See, e.g., Robert G. Harvey & Michael H. Levin, What You Can Do If
You Don't Have Cash-FinancingEnvironmental Compliance, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1984 (1994) (examining a variety of financing options by which local
governments can cover costs of complying with environmental controls and
discussing tax considerations that may limit the range of available options for
a given project); Taxation: IRS Says Plants Treating Toxic PollutantsShould
Not Qualify for Tax Exempt Bonds, 1994 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) 83 (May 3,
1994) (discussing proposed IRS regulations to make sewage plants that treat
toxic, priority, and non-conventional pollutants ineligible for tax-exempt facility bond financing). Tax issues have affected efforts to privatize municipal
services, an alternative that is increasingly attractive to local government officials overwhelmed by the highly technical environmental requirements that
apply to such facilities. See Mary Buckner Powers, BureaucratsBegin Leaning Toward Privatization of Infrastructure, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Nov.
21, 1994, at 46, 47-48 (noting that unavailability of tax-exempt bonds and
state revolving loan funds to private owners may discourage privatization, but
suggesting that private operators can take more risks than public operators
and can effectively compete with public financing).
33. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, EPA 230-R-93-007, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANDATES: FIVE CASE STUDIES 18 (1993)
(reporting that uncertainty as to standards makes budget planning difficult
and compliance unnecessarily expensive).
31.
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(CERCLA or Superfund)3 4 This liability is most often asserted
by other potentially responsible parties in "contribution" lawsuits brought to apportion cleanup costs."
Before the UMRA's passage, the National League of Cities
(NLC) argued for combining all of the above concepts into the
most expansive possible definition of a "mandate" as any action
that "prevent[s] the locality from exercising its own discretion
in administrative decisions and limit[s] the ability of the local
government to respond to change." 36 State and local governments are unlikely to win acceptance of such an allencompassing and subjective definition in the context of any
reform that conditions the validity of a mandate on whether
Congress and the President provide federal funding. After all,
to fall within this definition, state and local officials could contend that they were considering whether to exercise their discretion to take action when the federal government decided to
impede them. As the debate over federal environmental mandates continues, however, state and local officials may well find
that true relief from their predicament depends on allowing
themselves and other participants in the debate-especially
federal regulators and environmentalists-to escape the funding paradigm and view the ramifications of mandates from a
larger perspective.
Before considering how to frame a more comprehensive
and acceptable working definition of mandate, however, the
second component of the equation must be considered: when is
a mandate "unfunded"? As noted earlier, all of the unfunded
federal environmental mandates challenged by local governments concern the delivery of essential public services, including safe drinking water, sewage treatment, and garbage disposal.37 Since local governments provided such services long
before the national government ever considered regulating
them, defining an "unfunded" mandate in this context raises
the extremely difficult problem of distinguishing between the
costs of providing the service itself, which clearly should be
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
35. For a description of the lawsuits, see generally Rena I. Steinzor &
David Kolker, To Pay or Not to Pay: Local Governments' Stake in Legislation
to Reauthorize Superfund, 25 URB. LAW. 627, 644-55 (1993).
36. STATE MANDATES, supra note 11, at 1-2. This definition may include
government inaction that prevents a locality from exercising discretion and
limits its ability to respond to change.
37. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (identifying those mandates).
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paid at the local level, and the incremental or marginal costs
added by federal regulation.
One way to assess this increment is to evaluate the public
health rationale for federal regulation. If a mandate imposes
costs that are not justified by public health concerns in the
particular locality, it is unfunded in the sense that local governments would not choose to implement it during the course
of providing essential services to their constituents. Put another way, unjustified regulation is almost always unfunded
regulation.
There are, however, some important further complications.
Many (if not most) regulatory requirements are not clearly
unjustified, or at least they are justified in some contexts. Assessing the legitimacy of a regulation on the basis of whether a
local government would choose to implement the regulation on
its own has the potential to cause needless confusion and even
damage to public health, since a local government might choose
not to implement such a regulation for one of two distinct reasons. First, it might conclude that the regulation is not based
on legitimate and important public health concerns, and it may
or may not be correct in that judgment. Second, it might conclude that the regulation, while grounded in public health concerns, is simply unaffordable because of other priorities. Delegating the power to define public health priorities exclusively
to local governments is a far more controversial proposition
than simply acceding to the demand that a mandate be labeled
"unfunded," although local governments obviously hope that
obtaining the "unfunded" label will have the same effect.
The JMRA assigns the unenviable task of parsing these
distinctions to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) which
must prepare estimates of the "direct cost of all [flederal intergovernmental mandates" contained in legislation when such
costs would exceed $50 million in the first fiscal year in which
38
any such mandate takes effect.
The UMRA defines "direct costs" as the difference between
the costs of complying with the mandate and the amounts local
governments would otherwise spend "to comply with or carry
out all applicable Federal, State, [and] local . . . laws and
regulations in effect at the time of the adoption of the Federal

38. 2 U.S.C A4§ 658c (West Supp. 1996). The estimate requirement also
applies if the Director of the CBO believes that such costs will accrue in any of
the four fiscal years following the initial year. Id.
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mandate... or ... to comply with or carry
out State [and] local
39
... programs... for the same activity."
This convoluted series of instructions requires the CBO to
first calculate the costs imposed by federal regulatory requirements. This exercise has always been more of an art than a
science, especially where new and unproved technologies are
involved and the crucial details of implementing regulations
have yet to be worked out. Assuming moderate success with
this admittedly difficult task, the CBO must then subtract the
costs that subnational governments would have spent anyway
not only under existing laws and regulations but also under
existing administrative programs. It is mind-boggling to contemplate the seemingly endless stream of possibilities such an
exercise might entail when executed at the national level with
respect to regulations affecting literally tens of thousands of
individual jurisdictions. Although the UMRA is easy to caricature, the instructions to the CBO nevertheless represent a
principled, if impractical, effort to isolate the costs local governments should incur in any event from the incremental costs
imposed upon them by federal mandates.
In the end, the importance of determining the extent to
which a mandate is unfunded may pale in comparison to
making a compelling policy argument either against its enactment or in favor of a less burdensome alternative. 40 To meet
that challenge, local governments and all other participants in
the debate need a working definition of mandate that is not
constrained by the necessity to either calculate or compensate
costs.

This Article employs the following definition: a mandate is
a federal statute, regulation, administrative or court order, or
otherwise binding policy that directs, requires, prohibits, or restricts the actions of a state or local government in providing
municipal services to its citizens. Administrative failures to
39. Id. § 658(3).
40. The importance of challenging mandates on policy as opposed to cost
terms is recognized by the more thoughtful municipal advocates. Consider
the following advice given by Janet Kelly the leading academic advising the
National League of Cities on mandates issues, in a 1992 report:
Thinking of a mandate as a policy and following it through the policy
cycle provides an opportunity to formulate responses that are much
more creative than contesting cost. If mandates are treated as a policy, the aim of the policy and what it is designed to accomplish are
more important considerations than the policy's cost.
STATE MANDATES, supra note 11, at vii.
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act, including delays in regulations and the issuance of administrative orders, are mandates when they significantly impede
the ability of state or local governments to implement direct
orders or affirmative requirements concerning the same subject. Laws imposing liability are mandates when they concern
the delivery of essential public services such as the management of municipal solid waste or sewage treatment.4'
II. THEORIES OF FEDERALISM
The truth is that for all the high-toned arguments, federalism and
"the genius of the states" are almost always invoked more as tactics
than as principles. Indeed, liberals and conservativeshave shifted to
and fro on federalism, depending on theirneeds at a given moment.
42
-E.J. Dionne, Jr.
"[B]ack to 1900" is a serviceable summation of the conservatives'goal,
which is to reverse many resultsof the liberalproject first formulated
around the turn of the century. That project was to concentratepolitical power in Washington, and Washington power in the presidency
(andlater also in the Supreme Court)in order to correct the incompetence of the people and the anachronistic--orworse-nature of their
local allegiancesand institutions.
Today the nation is in revolt against what Joyce and Schambra call
"liberalism'scampaign of civil eradication."
43
-George Will

The past, present, and future meaning of federalism in
America has long fascinated political scientists and legal
scholars. In recent years, this debate has achieved new levels
of intensity, with some commentators attributing the country's
fundamental problems to an imbalance in power between
Washington and the states.'" The Reagan administration

41. Mandates do not include laws or regulations that offer local governments the opportunity to receive a federal delegation of authority to implement or enforce their requirements. Because state and local participation in
such programs is voluntary, they cannot fairly be considered mandates, no
matter how rigorous those conditions may be.
42. E.J. Dionne, Jr., The New, New, New Federalism,WASH. POST, Mar.
7, 1995, at A17.
43. George F. Will, Making States' Rights Respectable Again, WASH.
POST, Jan. 1, 1995, at C7.
44. See, e.g., id. (tracing the accumulation of power in Washington and
discussing the recent revolt against central government, in favor of local organization); see also David S. Broder, Frayed Federalism, WASH. POST, Aug.
15, 1993, at C7 (noting the current deteriorated relationship between national
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popularized the so-called "new Federalism"-a political doctrine that calls for radical downsizing of the federal government and the return of power to the states.4 5 The new Republican majority in Congress has reinvigorated
this theme under
46
the rubric the "new (new) Federalism."
The movement against unfunded federal mandates can be
viewed as the indispensable negative component of the new
(new) federalism because it expresses the subnational governments' refusals to take any more orders from Washington as
they concurrently urge Congress and the President to turn over
to them affirmative responsibilities for governing. In essence,
state and local governments argue that they should not be
compelled to carry out, much less pay for, any more bright
ideas that originate at the federal level. The ramifications of
restoring autonomy to determine and implement domestic priorities to state and local governments is well beyond the scope
of this Article. Instead, it assesses one of the more important
subtexts of the unfunded mandates movement, a subtext that
in some ways is no less controversial.
Most federal environmental mandates control municipal
conduct that is essentially indistinguishable from the same
conduct in the private sector. Complaints about regulations to
ensure the delivery of safe drinking water supplies, to prevent
the fouling of rivers by sewage treatment plant discharges, or
to contain the land disposal of solid waste apply with equal
force to private sector conduct. Whether these policies are
sound or necessary may be debatable. Why they represent inappropriate incursions on state and local autonomy and therefore threaten the new (new) federalism is less clear. True, local
governments are elected democratically and deliver essential
public services without earning a profit. There are numerous
checks and balances on their conduct that do not similarly constrain the conduct of private industry. However, to expect local
and local governments and the growing awareness in Washington of the damage caused by federal demands); Carroll A. Campbell, Jr., The ImperiousFeds,
WASH. POST, July 29, 1994, at A25 (arguing that the federal government may
no longer impose inflexible unfunded mandates and expect state and local
taxpayers to pay for them).
45. For a description of Reagan's "new Federalism" initiatives, see
WALKER, supra note 30, at 152-62
46. See, e.g., CONTRACT, supra note 3, at 73, 133 (proposing ways to restore state authority over welfare policy and mandates); see also Dionne, supra note 42 (explaining that although House Republicans and others purport
to be in favor of greater state control, appeals to devolution are used more for
tactical than for principled reasons).
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governments to form objective judgments with regard to their
own industrial practices, given the seduction of cutting corners
in a tax averse society, is to risk irreversible damage to human
health, the environment, and even municipal credibility over
the long run.
At the heart of the municipal protest against unfunded
federal environmental mandates is a demand to be taken more
seriously-to play a more influential role in the formulation of
public policy. Municipal officials believe that unfunded mandates allow federal politicians to take credit for popular social
initiatives while leaving the dirty job of raising taxes to pay for
47
such programs to the lower end of the political food chain.
They are convinced that the cumulative burden of federal
mandates-so easy to conceive and impose in Washington, so
difficult to implement in the field-has hijacked their ability to
govern, consuming such a large percentage of available local
revenue that they cannot develop a coherent set of programs of
their own.4 8 Without a more compelling rationale for federal
environmental regulation and a better method for sorting pollution control responsibilities between the three levels of government, the resistance of local governments to the federal
government's regulatory efforts will intensify and could undercut some of our most important environmental programs.
The resurgence of federalism as a viable political ideology
began with President Reagan, who worked hard to advance the
so-called "new federalism" because it provided a principled rationale for the major goal of his administration: eliminating big
government in Washington. 49 The Reagan "new federalist"
rhetoric also disguised a far more complicated agenda that had
47. See, e.g., COPING WrrH MANDATES, supra note 30, at 1, 4-7 (discussing
concerns about mandates, including distribution of intergovernmental resources, mandates as an authority issue, and effectiveness of regulation); Edward I. Koch, The Mandate Millstone, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall 1980, at 42,
43-44 (suggesting that federal legislators can vote to pass legislation that
sounds good without facing its effects when implemented).
48. See, e.g., Gregory S. Lashutka, Local Rebellion: How CitiesAre Rising
Up Against Unfunded Federal Mandates, COMMONSENSE, Summer 1994, at
66, 69-71 (arguing that prioritizing should be done at the local level, that laws
need to be flexible and that Congress's "tunnel vision" prevents it from seeing
the effects of regulations on individual communities).
49. By attributing the popularization of federalism to President Reagan, I
do not mean to demean the interest of other presidents-especially Richard
Nixon-in the subject, but rather to suggest that Reagan, the consummate
communicator, was the first of the modern presidents to popularize the idea
that devolution was the solution to the nation's ills.
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as one of its primary goals radical deregulation, especially in
the areas of public health, safety, and the environment.
Gauging the real implications of the Reagan era and evaluating the outcome of the current self-proclaimed Republican
revolution require keeping the distinctions between the new
federalism and regulatory retrenchment firmly in mind. It was
the failure of the Reagan deregulatory campaign, and the
backlash it provoked in Congress, that produced even more
centralization of power in Washington and gave rise to the current rebellion over unfunded mandates. This history suggests
that to avoid another destructive turn of the pendulum, a more
sensible reordering of governmental responsibility needs to occur.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
It perhaps goes without saying that the United States
began as a union of distinct, smaller states and that the Constitution was a compromise between those who wished to preserve the states' individual autonomy and those convinced that
a strong central government was the best way to navigate an
increasingly complex world."0 Debates over the proper roles of
the national and subnational governments are endemic
to a
5
federalist system and as old as the American republic. '
50.

See,

e.g.,

JOSEPH

F.

ZIMMERMAN,

CONTEMPORARY

AMERICAN

FEDERALISM: THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL POWER 14-54 (1992) (describing the
development of national-state relations); GLENDENING & REEVES, supra note
30, at 9-11, 36-37 (discussing the meaning of federalism and the Connecticut
Compromise); Martin Diamond, What the Framers Meant by Federalism, in
AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 39, 39-48 (Laurence J. O'Toole,

Jr. ed., 2d ed. 1993) (positing American federalism as a compromise between
nationalists and true federalists); Martha Derthick, American Federalism:
Madison's Middle Ground in the 1980s, 47 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 66-67 (1987)
(describing the ongoing quest for an acceptable balance of national and local
control); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2-10 (1988) (discussing
the compromise). But see RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS'
DESIGN 48-76, 178-192 (1987) (arguing that the Founders intended to preserve broad state autonomy and authority over domestic matters).
51. As Alice Rivlin has written:
To the Founding Fathers, the division of responsibility between the
states and the federal government was a crucial issue with high
emotional and intellectual content. Most of them believed that the
states should retain a large measure of autonomy. Their experience
with the English crown made them nervous about lodging too much
power in any central government. Life under the Articles of Confederation, however, demonstrated that the national government could
not function effectively if its powers were too narrow or if it depended
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Political scientist Daniel Elazar points out that the word
"federalism" is derived from the Latin foedus, meaning covenant. "By definition, federal relationships emphasize partnership between individuals, groups, and governments; cooperative relationships that make the partnership real; and
negotiations among the partners as the basis for sharing
power."52 Other political scientists begin with less optimistic
definitions of the theory underlying federal relationships.
David Walker, author of a recent book advocating the return of
power to the states as a solution to the most important problems that plague the country, writes:
[F]ederalism is a governmental system that includes a central government and at least one major subnational tier of governments; that
assigns significant substantive powers to both levels initially by the
provisions of a written constitution; and that succeeds over time in
sustaining a territorial division of powers
by judicial, operational,
53
representational, and political means.

As Walker's definition of federalism implies, the system
requires constant realignment of power not only among the
three levels of government, but also between the three
branches of government-executive, legislative, and judicial.
Still another pair of prominent political scientists, John
Dilulio and Donald Kettl, emphasize the mutual interdependence of the three levels of government:
By "federalism" the Framers of the Constitution meant a political
regime in which local units of government have a specially protected
existence and can make some final decisions over some governmental
activities.
... [T]aken together, the relevant Articles of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights established a unique political regime in which sovereignty-supreme or ultimate political authority-resided in no one
level of government (e.g., the national government) and no one unit of
government (e.g., the national legislature or the state legislatures
acting in concert). Instead, in what Madison aptly described as
America's "compound republic," the national government and the

on state contributions for revenue.
ALICE M. RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE
STATES &THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 82-83 (1992).
52. Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION AMONG
STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 65, 69 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991)
[hereinafter COMPETITION AMONG STATES]. "Cooperative federalism" is a
term of art in the political science literature. For a history and analysis of
this mode of intergovernmental relations, see id. at 65-86; GLENDENING &
REEVES, supra note 30, at 59-60; WALKER, supra note 30, at 92-128.
53. WALKER, supra note 30, at 20.
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states were not to be constitutionally or politically independent of one
another--everr'

At its best, then, the federal system is a benign and cooperative partnership and, at its worst, a compound republic
riven by tension and even antagonism, but unified by the force
of 200 years of common experience.
The Civil War settled the issue of whether the states had
enough autonomy to desert the Union and reaffirmed the importance of Washington as the central and centralizing influence. Political scientists have characterized the relationship
between national and subnational governments before the New
Deal as "dual federalism": national and subnational governments essentially ran their affairs on separate tracks, with
clearly delineated areas of responsibility. 55 State and local
governments played a dominant role in this duality, serving as
what Walker has nostalgically called the "senior operational
partners" of the federal system.5 6 In fact, local governments
had exclusive responsibility for primary and secondary education, public higher education, public welfare, public hospitals,
police, fire protection, and local sanitation. In contrast, the
federal government's domestic role was confined to such innovative areas as antitrust, fair trade practices, and the regulation of railroads and radio.57
From the Great Depression through the New Deal, World
War II, the post-war period of economic expansion, and into the
War on Poverty and Great Society programs, the balance of
power and resources gradually shifted 180 degrees.5 8 The Federal government created national institutions to govern everything from farm policy to higher education, from inner-city
housing to social welfare programs, and from interstate high-

54. JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR. & DONALD F. KETTL, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, CPM REPORT 95-1, FINE PRINT: THE CONTRACT WITH AMERICA,
DEVOLUTION, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE REALITIES OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM

1-2 (1995) (footnote omitted).
55.

See, e.g., GLENDENING & REEVES, supra note 30, at 58-59 (explaining

dual federalism); RIVLIN, supra note 51, at 8, 83-84 (noting that state and local governments retained control of most services until the 1930s, after which
government began to expand and power began to shift disproportionately to
Washington); WALKER, supra note 30, at 23-24, 67-91 (discussing the history
of dual federalism).
56. WALKER, supra note 30, at 91.
57. Id. at 84.
58. For a general description of this evolution, see RIVLIN, supra note 51,
at 85-100, and WALKER, supra note 30, at 92-150.
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way systems to environmental protection.5 9 Federal grants
and, with them, federal power proliferated.60 By the late
1950s, the federal government was spending more on domestic
programs than the combined total of state and local government expenditures, and this trend continues to this day.6 1
The drive to expand Washington's fiscal control was
matched by an equally energetic effort to govern the details of
domestic life through regulation. This trend is commonly referred to as "regulatory federalism."62 In 1984, the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations wrote:
Over the past two decades, however-and since 1969 in particularthere has been a dramatic shift in the way in which the federal government deals with states and localities. Although the upward climb
in grant subsidies persisted during most of this era, federal policymakers also turned increasingly to new, more intrusive, and more
compulsory regulatory programs to work their will ....

59. RIVLIN, supra note 51, at 87-98.

60. By the end of the 1970s, no fewer than 500 programs for making categorical (or special purpose) grants had been established, "each with detailed
rules, formulas for matching and distributing the money, bureaucracies
charged with carrying out and overseeing the program, and beneficiaries and
professional groups with an interest in perpetuating and enlarging the grant."
RIVLIN, supra note 51, at 98; see also WALKER, supra note 30, at 206-48
(blaming the federal deficit on the proliferation of government programs
spurred by "the public's appetite for government programs and antipathy to
paying for them."). Additionally, in 1972, Congress enacted general revenue
sharing, a "no-strings-attached" form of federal aid to the states and local
governments, expanding the dependence of subnational governments, especially small and poor communities, on federal largesse. RIVLIN, supra note 51,
at 99-100; WALKER, supra note 30, at 234, 236.
61. RIVLIN, supra note 51, at 86. The ratio between the amounts of
money spent by the national and subnational governments should not be confused with the ratio between their respective number of government employees. In 1992, the number of federal civilian employees was 3.1 million, compared to 4.6 million state employees and 11.1 million local government
employees. Gareth G. Cook, Devolution Chic: Why Sending Power to the
States Could Make a Monkey out of Uncle Sam, WASH. MONTHLY, April 1995,
at 9, 10; see also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 319 (114th ed. 1994) (listing the total number of federal, state,
and local employees during each year from 1980 to 1992).
62. WALKER, supra note 30, at 29. Many of the regulations so resented by
state and local governments were a direct result of the enactment of statutes
preempting state and local authority over various aspects of domestic policy.
Between 1970 and 1990, the number of preemptive statutes enacted by Congress doubled, with between 100 and 110 new statutes enacted each decade,
in contrast to an average of 20-30 a decade between 1900 and 1960. U.S.
ADVISORY COMMN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL STATUTORY
PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY: HISTORY, INVENTORY, AND
ISSUES 7-9 (1992).
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In the intergovernmental sphere... regulation and subsidy are
less like different parts of a dichotomy than opposing ends of a continuum. At one extreme is the general support grant with just a few
associated conditions or rules; 63at the other is the costly, but wholly
unfunded, national "mandate."

Given the interplay between subsidy and regulation, with
the former used to facilitate acceptance of the latter, it was entirely predictable that state and local outrage over regulation
would rise in direct proportion to the diminution of federal assistance. This trend has characterized the last two decades of
American federalism.
In 1980, President Reagan came to Washington pledging
to change government as we then knew it. The Reagan "new
federalist" revolution had four major facets: (1) cutting the size
of the federal bureaucracy; (2) cutting the levels of federal aid
provided to state and local governments; (3) devolving responsibility for social programs to the states; and (4) deregulation,
especially in the areas of public health, occupational safety and
health, and the environment.' By claiming to have the states'
interest in more authority at heart, and by promising to dismantle the federal bureaucracies that had stolen that authority, the administration created political cover for withdrawing
large amounts of federal funding from subnational governments and for rolling back regulation that its major industrial
65
supporters found offensive.
Reagan's new federalism, then, was the label applied to an
agenda that was far more complex than restoring the balance
of authority between national and subnational governments.
The label provided a simple and publicly appealing description
for fulfilling much more pragmatic and less popular political
63. U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
REGULATORY FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACT AND REFORM 1, 4 (1984).

64. See RIvLIN, supra note 51, at 101-02 (discussing the Reagan administration's cuts in federal grants to the states); WALKER, supra note 30, at 15253 (explaining Reagan's strategies to reduce the federal government's intergovernmental role); see also ANTON, supra note 30, at 217-22 (discussing Reagan proposals to devolve to the states responsibility for AFDC, Food Stamps,
and some 44 other federal programs).
65. See, e.g., ANTON, supra note 30, at 217-22 (examining Reagan federalism initiatives and concluding they were based more on budget reduction than
on structural reform); Timothy J. Conlan, Federalism and Competing Values
in the Reagan Administration,in AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
265, 265-80 (Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 1985) (examining instances in
which the Reagan administration abandoned its federalist objectives in favor
of reducing the federal budget and deregulating the private sector).
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goals. As the administration wore on, close observers of its deregulatory initiatives increasingly
questioned the purity of its
66
commitment to devolution.
In the end, the Reagan administration was far more successful in cutting grants and dismantling bureaucracy than in
devolving authority and deregulating. The administration
sharply cut aid to states and local governments; while Congress resisted further deep cuts, the rate of growth in categorical grants was far slower than in earlier decades, and general
revenue sharing was eliminated in 1986.67 The Reagan ad66. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Defending the State: A Skeptical Look at
"Regulatory Reform" in the Eighties, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 517, 526 (1990)
(discussing the Reagan administration's failure to follow its expressed rhetorical commitment to delegate more authority to the states). In a particularly
ironic and revealing twist, federalism was abruptly abandoned when the
chemical industry discovered that the inevitable result of a federal rollback
was the creation of an annoying patchwork of state laws, some of which were
far more stringent than what it could expect from the Reagan administration,
which quickly stepped back into the breach. See, e.g., Business's War against
the States, FORTUNE, Dec. 12, 1983, at 49, 49, 52:
Ask a businessman about centralized government and you're likely to
get an earful about its dangers and a paean to federalism ....Yet in
the capital this autumn, business pleas for the feds to take over various state functions have been as numerous as falling leaves. Even
the Reagan administration, which only yesterday was touting its New
Federalism, has turned a sympathetic ear to some of these demands
...
Lately the chemical industry has sought a uniform federal requirement that labels be affixed to containers of toxic substances
identifying the chemical composition of their contents and recommended antidotes. The standard would supersede a patchwork of
state requirements.... The Reagan Administration's proposal.., is
expected to be promulgated around Thanksgiving.
Id.; see also Michael Wines, Chemical Industry FearsPendulum's Swing Back
to the 50 States, 14 NATL J. 1927, 1927, 1954 (1982):
The nation's chemical industry, one of the chief beneficiaries of the
Reagan Administration's deregulation crusade, apparently wonders
now whether it is getting too much of a good thing....

[W]ith federal oversight dwindling, the states are stepping up
their regulatory roles-and the prospect of dealing with "50 little
EPAs" instead of one.., has clearly become an industry worry.
Id.
67. RIVLIN, supra note 51, at 101-02; WALKER, supra note 30, at 157-58
(describing cuts made in Reagan's first year in office); id. at 234 (describing
the demise of general revenue sharing in 1986). It is also important to distinguish between the level of funding provided throughout the period for welfare
programs and the level of funding provided for such non-welfare programs as
environmental and natural resource protection. Even though federal aid for
social welfare programs has grown on a per capita basis since 1980, federal
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ministration's sustained attack on the federal bureaucracy also
significantly reduced the number of federal employees and exacerbated the gap between private and public sector earnings.
These results in turn produced what some political scientists
have called the "hollow government," connoting an incompetent
and demoralized workforce incapable of implementing the
complex maze of laws, regulations, and programs for which it
was responsible. 8 However, the major Reagan devolutionary
initiatives-the so-called 'Big Swap" and the 'Turnback" proposals-died in the face of concerted resistance from members
of Congress and many prominent governors who feared the
implications of its suggestion that the states should assume
full responsibility for the Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC),
Food Stamps, and forty-four other smaller social welfare programs in exchange for federal assumption of responsibility for
Medicaid. 9 The administration's efforts to expunge ambitious
federal regulatory programs also foundered early on, hoisted
on the petard of impolitic appointees like James Watt and Ann
Gorsuch Burford, as well as an increasingly activist Demo70
cratic Congress.
Yet perhaps the most significant long-term effect of the
Reagan revolution was the federal deficit. By 1989, it had
soared to $2.8 trillion (three times the 1980 figure); by 1993,
federal debt had reached nearly $4 trillion. 7' The strain of
aid levels for non-welfare programs, including environmental and natural resource programs, fell from 16% in 1978 to 9% in 1991. CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE MEMORANDUM, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF UNFUNDED
FEDERAL MANDATES AND THE COST OF THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT 5, 8
(1994) [hereinafter CBO SAFE DRINKING WATER MEMORANDUM].
68. WALKER, supra note 30, at 156; see also Murray L. Weidenbaum,
Regulatory Reform under the Reagan Administration, in THE REAGAN
REGULATORY STRATEGY 15, 34-35 (George C. Eads & Michael Fix eds., 1984)
(reporting a 16% decline in the number of federal regulators-defined as the
number of people working full-time in federal regulatory agencies-in the period between 1980 and 1984).
69. ANTON, supra note 30, at 219-22; RIVLIN, supra note 51, at 123-25;
WALKER, supra note 30, at 326.
70. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 30, at 8, 158-61 (explaining that Reagan's deregulatory accomplishments did not extend beyond his first two years
in office); George C. Eads & Michael Fix, Introduction to THE REAGAN
REGULATORY STRATEGY 1, 1-3 (George C. Eads & Michael Fix eds., 1984)
(summarizing the first two and a half years of the Reagan administration's
regulatory relief program); Timothy J. Conlan, And the Beat Goes On: Intergovernmental Mandates and Preemption in an Era of Deregulation, 21
PUBLIUS 43, 55 (1991) (discussing the Reagan administration's failure to halt
increases in regulatory legislation).
71. WALKER, supra note 30, at 163.
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dealing with the political and economic pressure caused by the
deficit accelerated the end of so-called "cooperative federalism,"
producing a "coercive" or "fend-for-yourself" federalism that
persists to this day.7 2 Federal politicians continued to enact
ambitious social programs but gave up any pretense of providing substantial aid for the implementation of such mandates at
the state and local levels.
In no area are the implications of the failed Reagan deregulatory agenda and the deficit-induced tensions in intergovernmental relations more evident than in environmental protection. Rather than inspiring a thoughtful reexamination of
the relationship between the three levels of government, the
Reagan Revolution polarized the debate into one between environmentalists and "polluters," provoking a backlash in Congress that produced a heyday for ambitious legislation. State
and local governments were lost in the shuffle of those battles,
only to emerge in the next decade as a major subject of regulations implementing the many mandates that Congress
launched.
Within the space of three years, Congress passed expansive reauthorizations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,73 the Safe Drinking Water Act,74 the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA, or Superfund),7 5 and the Clean Water Act.76 However, instructing an Agency to regulate and enabling it to
regulate wisely and effectively are two very different things,
and Congress systematically refused to put its money where its
mouth was. The EPA's budget barely kept pace with inflation
and its rule-making efforts fell further and further behind rigorous statutory schedules. 77 The EPA's travails were mirrored
72. Id. at 31, 163; see also John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive
Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOc. SC.

139, 147-50 (1990)

(arguing that the sharp increase in the federal deficit in the 1980s and concurrent loss of revenue to liberal reformers weakened state and federal cooperation and spurred more federal mandates).
73. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616,
§ 98 Stat. 3221 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
74. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, §
100 Stat. 642 (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 42 U.S.C.).
75. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, § 100 Stat. 1613 (codified in scattered titles of the United States
Code).
76. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 100 Stat. 7 (codified in
scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
77. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFIcE, GAO/RCED Doc. NO. 88-
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at the state level. While the federal government effectively occupied the field in crafting regulatory standards for clean air,
clean water, and the management of solid waste, it depended8
on state governments to implement and enforce those rules.
Funding for state programs dropped steadily and was not replaced by state legislatures.7 9 Thus, the problem was compounded: the EPA eked out scores of new regulations, only to
turn them over to a state bureaucracy that staggered under the
load.
In the nine years following President Reagan's departure
from office, these trends have continued. George Bush served
as a benign caretaker of the Reagan revolution, failing to take
radical action to devolve more authority to the states, to roll
back regulation, or to reduce the deficit."0 Like Reagan, he
failed to resolve the growing tensions between fervent, probusiness advocates of deregulation within his administration
101, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: PROTECTING HUMAN HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH IMPROVED MANAGEMENT 20 (1988) ("[In

spite of increasing responsibilities brought about by new legislation and
emerging environmental problems, budget amounts have experienced little
change over the last four years in terms of constant dollars."); Hollow Government: EPA's Budget Blues, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, May 1991, at 8. This article
notes:
[EPA's] operating budget, which covers all the agency's programs except sewage treatment plant construction grants and Superfund, has
not increased in constant dollars from its fiscal 1979 level of $1.7 billion ....
Yet during this same period, EPA has seen a tremendous
expansion of its responsibilities, including new duties for hazardous
waste treatment and transportation, underground storage tanks, asbestos cleanups and the regulation of drinking water contaminants.
Id. These grim analyses are particularly noteworthy because they were written before passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, which dramatically expanded the Agency's responsibilities and imposed another series of
tight rule-making deadlines that have not been met. See, e.g., George Lobsenz, Budget Cuts Mean Missed Deadlines for EPA's Air Quality Program, 8
ENV'T WK. 8105, 8105 (1995) (discussing the EPA's claims that deep cuts in its
toxic air and acid rain programs would prevent it from meeting deadlines for
regulation imposed by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments).
78. For citations to the provisions in major federal environmental laws
that delegate implementation and enforcement authority to state governments, see supra note 15.
79. For an excellent description of the cuts and their implications at the
state level, see James P. Lester, A New Federalism?EnvironmentalPolicy in
the States, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S, TOWARD A NEW AGENDA
51, 52-68 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter
Environmental Policy in the States]; James P. Lester, New Federalism and
EnvironmentalPolicy, 16 PUBLIUS 149, 149-65 (1986).
80. WALKER, supra note 30, at 162-68; Michael deCourcy Hinds, U.S.
Adds Programs with Little Review of Local Burdens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
1992, at Al.

HeinOnline -- 81 Minn. L. Rev. 122 1996-1997

1996] UNFUNDEDENVIRONMENTAL MANDATES

123

and activist Democrats in Congress. While much has been
made of Bill Clinton's victory over Bush, he too has found it
difficult to make lasting changes given his own instinct to compromise, the pressures of the deficit, and Americans? growing
antipathy to big government in Washington."'
Early in his administration, President Clinton wrote a
multi-billion dollar "economic stimulus" package designed to
revitalize the cities, raising high and, in retrospect, absurd
hopes that the balance between federal mandates and federal
funding was about to be restored. 2 Despite the punishment
municipal officials had endured over twelve years of Republican rule and despite what should have been their better judgment about the limits of federal largesse in a deficit-ridden
environment, national municipal leaders allowed themselves
one last flirtation with the inflated expectations of a bygone era
and fervently supported the legislation. When Republican fiscal conservatives torpedoed the proposal, the stage was set for
the unfunded mandates movement-a crusade that in the view
of most municipal officials was the only rational response to
their deteriorating relationship with Washington.
In 1994, with a brilliant repackaging of the most fervent
Reagan rhetoric, Republicans took back control of the national
legislature for the first time in fifty years and also won a majority of seats in the statehouses of some thirty states.83 The
81. See, e.g., Michael Kelly, Bill Clinton's Climb, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 20 (discussing President Clinton's career).
82. See, e.g., Neal R. Peirce, The GOP Senators'Pork in a Poke, 25 NAT'L
J. 1006 (1993) (criticizing Republican efforts to defeat President Clinton's economic "stimulus package"); Eric Pianin, Democrats Abandon Effort on Clinton
Stimulus Bill, Separate Initiative on Business Taxes Is Losing Ground, WASH.
POST, Apr. 22, 1993, at Al, A28 (discussing Republicans' successful efforts at
defeating President Clinton's emergency spending bill). The demise of the
stimulus package had symbolic importance far beyond the actual aid it would
have provided. See, e.g., William Claiborne, Many Big-City Mayors Are Bailing Out, Officials Cite Frustrationwith Deep Urban Problems, Fiscal Crises,
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1993, at A15:
The uphill struggle against intractable urban problems has taken its
toll on big-city mayors this year: at least 15 large cities are losing
their top officials ....
Tie last straw for some mayors may have been the defeat earlier
this year of President Clinton's economic stimulus package, for which
cities compiled a list of 4,400 ready-to-go urban infrastructure projects that would have brought them $7.2 billion and 200,000 new jobs.
83. See, e.g., Dan Balz, GOP and the White House Confront an Era of New
Relations, Turning Agenda into Action Poses Urgent Test for Congress, WASH.
POST, Nov. 14, 1994, at Al (discussing GOP agenda); Federalism, Too, WALL
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Contract with America is in many ways an eerie reprise of the
most popular Reagan rhetoric. It hails federalism as the centerpiece of a revolution that would restore the health of the
nation by cutting big government, turning power and responsibility back to the states, and deregulating in the areas important to American industry.84 Like its predecessor, this new
revolution's invocation of federalism masks a far more complicated agenda. For example, in a direct parallel to events in the
early eighties, the Contract calls for blanket federal preemption of state product liability law at the same time that it
promises to get the federal government off the backs of the
states in other areas.8 5 In sum, the track record of government
over the last two decades vindicates E.J. Dionne's observation
that proponents of federalism more often invoke it as a tactic
than as a principle.8 6 The fact remains, however, that this period of upheaval in our national politics has produced more
thoughtful, if less well-known, analyses of the state of our federalist system, as well as recommendations for restoring comity between the three levels of government.

B. NEW (NEW) FEDERALIST THEORY
New (new) federalist political theory holds that the solution to much of what ails the country is to reorganize the way
responsibility for the domestic agenda is distributed among the
three levels of government. Proponents of the theory cover the
entire political spectrum and have worked to develop their arguments over the course of two decades.8" New (new) federalist
ST. J., Jan. 3, 1995, at A8 (asserting that the goal of many new generation Republicans is to shift power and authority away from the federal government).
84. See, e.g., Albert R. Hunt, FederalismDebate is as Much About Power
as About Principle,WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1995, at A19 (claiming that new GOP
Congress's policy measures would be held out as a "watershed" in transferring
power back to state and local governments); Will, supra note 43, at C7
(implying that the Republican electoral victories in 1994 indicate a "national
revolt" against centralized government).
85. CONTRACT, supra note 3, at 146-48. At the behest of major manufacturers, the Reagan administration also supported federal preemption of state
tort laws imposing liability for defective products. For a noble if unintentionally humorous effort to rationalize this position as consistent with Reagan
New Federalism and the return of power to the states, see C. Boyden Gray,
Regulation and Federalism,1 YALE J. ON REG. 93, 96 (1983) ("[S]tate product
liability laws have created such significant burdens on interstate commerce
that preemptive federal legislation was necessary to provide consistent nationwide treatment of product liability disputes.").
86. Dionne, supra note 42, at A17.
87. See, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM
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theory does not support a wholesale abandonment of a strong
federal role in regulating the environment. Instead, it advocates the continuation of programs that allocate responsibility
among the three levels of government on the basis of principles
similar to those proposed in Part IV below.8 8
For example, Alice M. Rivlin posits that the United States
is enmeshed, for the foreseeable future, in a period of economic
stagnation; this period is characterized by working people losing economic ground so consistently that they can no longer
believe in the "American dream" of offering their children a
better future.89 Rivlin argues that the major reason for this
THE STATES (3d ed. 1984) (discussing the American political system in the
context of a "partnership" of governments and individuals); GLENDENING &
REEVES, supra note 30, at 170-212 (discussing "dynamic federalism"); David
R. Beam et. al., Federalism: The Challenge of Conflicting Theories and Contemporary Practice,in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 247

(Ada W. Finifter ed., 1983) (critiquing traditional theories of federalism and
suggesting need for new "functional theory"); Martha Derthick, Federal Government Mandates, Why the States Are Complaining,BROOKINGS REV., Fall
1992, at 51, 53 (discussing new "common tax method" as a means to revitalize
state governments). For an excellent dialogue concerning the content and
implications of new (new) federalist theory, see SAMUAL H. BEER ET AL.,
CENTER FOR NAT'L POLIcY, FEDERALISM: MAKING THE SYSTEM WORK (1982).

88. As discussed in Part IV, a strong federal role in setting environmental
standards is justified by (1) the effects of transboundary pollution; (2) economies of scale in the scientific, administrative, and legal work that must be
done to formulate sensible regulation; and (3) considerations of equity and
equal protection for disadvantaged Americans. On the other hand, the federal
government should defer to subnational governments (1) when it is necessary
to tailor regulation to local conditions, and (2) in order to provide local governments with sufficient autonomy to establish priorities for the use of limited
resources by freeing them from excessive and unnecessary regulatory controls.
89. RIVLIN, supra note 51, at 1-2. Rivlin contends that a growing understanding of the ramifications of a constricting economy has left middle and
lower income Americans frustrated and hopeless, producing, in turn, a disillusioned and volatile electorate. Id. at 6. She argues that the widening gap in
income between the richest Americans and the vast majority of the population
is among the most troubling symptoms of this stagnation. Id. at 58-61, 70-72.
Rivlin currently serves as Director of the Office of Management and
Budget in the Clinton administration. She wrote her book before she joined
the Clinton administration and the credibility of her ideas is by no means dependent on her current political role. Indeed, political scientists John Dilulio
and Donald Kettl report that Rivlin's ideas were specifically embraced by
prominent Republican conservative William J. Bennett, who has hailed the
emerging "consensus" on devolution across the political spectrum. But, DiIulio and Kettl quickly add, Bennett's pronouncement may be premature because "the devolution is in the details." Although Rivlin's ideas may seem
similar to those of many prominent Republicans, there are significant differences, the most important of which is Rivlin's advocacy of universal health
care coverage guaranteed at the federal level and steadfast Republican oppo-
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economic stagnation is that the national government is grossly
overextended because it has inserted itself into areas such as
education, crime, and welfare that were once, and should again
be, the province of subnational governments.9" She contends
that the federal government's intrusiveness is no longer justified by the incompetence of subnational governments which
have reformed themselves and are now capable of assuming a
more equal partnership role.9" Delegating the primary responsibility for economic development to state and local governments will restore the nation's 92
capacity to find grassroots,
"bottom up" solutions to stagnation.
A second, more conservative perspective is put forth by
David B. Walker in his 1995 book The Rebirth of Federalism,
Slouching Toward Washington. Walker focuses on the "spend,
spend, borrow, borrow" ethic of the 1980s that produced a fatal
combination of high expectations about what government could
achieve and an unwillingness to pay new taxes either to reduce
the deficit or to fund new programs. 93 Politicians understandably believe that lowering taxes is expedient and raising
them is unthinkable. They have tremendous difficulty delivering the bad news about the effects of budget cuts to their constituents. Wherever possible, Walker observes, federal politicians seek to escape the dilemma by handing off the
responsibility for financing popular new programs to state and
local governments.9 4 The gap between public expectations and
willingness to pay has so overburdened federal and state bureaucracies that they can no longer credibly administer even
the most popular programs. 95
Having made their diagnoses, Rivlin and Walker prescribe
similar cures. Rivlin calls her prescription "dividing the job."
She advocates a massive turnback of responsibility for "the
Productivity Agenda"-public infrastructure, job training, edusition to such proposals. DIIULlo & KETTL, supra note 54, at 12.
90.
91.

Id. at 2, 9.
Id. at 102-07; see also WALKER, supra note 30, at 9-10, 249-83

(arguing real solutions to regional problems must come from regional entities); Mavis Mann Reeves, The States as Polities: Reformed, Reinvigorated,
Resourceful, 509 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 83 (1990) (arguing that
states have developed new capabilities to undertake governance and policymaking). For a contrary view about the states' competence in relationship to
the federal government, see Cook, supra note 61, at 9.
92.

RIVLiN, supra note 51, at 11-13.

93. WALKER, supra note 30, at 168, 206-48.
94. Id. at 151-70, 240-41, 302-03.
95. Id. at 151-70, 206-48, 311.
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cation, housing, rural services, and economic development-to
state and local governments. This move would leave the federal government free to concentrate on international relations
and those aspects of domestic policy that clearly require a national solution. 6 Rivlin would finance this turnback through
the national imposition of so-called "shared taxes"; the revenue
collected by the new taxes would be distributed according to
need among the states. 7 Walker basically agrees with Rivlin's
proposals to devolve broad areas of social policy to the states,
although he does not advance a specific proposal for generating
new funding at any level of government.98
In their 1995 book, Fine Print:The Contract with America,
Devolution, and the Administrative Realities of American Federalism, John Dilulio and Donald Kettl also accept that devolution is bound to occur, either for the reasons espoused by
Rivlin and Walker or because of the political imperatives that
allowed Republicans to recapture Congress in 1994. However,
they urge abandonment of the naive notion that true reform
can accompany more drastic cutbacks in the resources devoted
to government at the federal, state, and local levels:
Some evidence suggests that the anti-government, anti-Washington
consensus is 3,000 miles wide but only a few miles deep ....

[Hiow

many contemporary Americans really do not want government in
general, or the national government in particular, to act on reducing
crime, encouraging family values, and all the rest? Unless we have
misplaced or completely misread the last half-century's worth of public opinion data, and unless the $3 trillion worth of government
Americans have voted for themselves is a mirage, the only reasonable
answer is "a minority" ....

Whatever form devolution takes, the question remains
whether this liberating realignment should embrace the central demand of the unfimded mandates movement: should the
federal government abandon any effort to regulate the conduct
of state and local governments unless it is willing to pay the
full cost of compliance? Or, narrowing the question one important step further, is there a role for the federal government in
policing the delivery of public services by state and local governments when such operations could have an adverse impact
on the environment and public health?
Both Rivlin and Walker place environmental protection in
96.

RIVLIN, supra note 51, at 16-19, 116-22.

97. Id. at 16-19, 126-52.
98. WALKER, supra note 30, at 301-28.

99. DJIULIO AND KETrL, supra note 54, at 59, 61, 64.
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the category of problems that require federal solutions, largely
on the basis that it causes transboundary pollution that
crosses state lines. 10 0 Rivlin also argues that the federal government must provide leadership on international environmental issues and cannot do so without keeping its own house
in order.' 0' Walker decries unfunded mandates and specifically
lists the Safe Drinking Water Act as an example of a costly and
unwarranted burden on local governments. 0 2 On the other
hand, he supports the basic divisions proposed by Rivlin, commenting that "sihared Federal-state programs [should] continue in the areas of the environment . . . [and] natural resources ... ."103 Of course, as DiIulio and Kettl have emphasized, recognizing the need for shared programs does not answer the difficult question of4 how responsibility for specific
problems should be allocated.10
In a more detailed analysis, Jerry Mashaw and Susan
Rose-Ackerman suggest five standards for justifying federal intervention in an area of domestic policy. 05 First, federal regulation is justified when "interstate externalities" (for example,
transboundary pollution) exist. Second, economies and diseconomies of scale in administration should be evaluated, although such considerations can cut both ways: at times, only
the federal government will have the resources to gather sufficient information and, at other times, effective implementation
will require information that is best gathered and analyzed at
the local level. Third, a strong federal role is necessary in areas where the states can fall prey to "prisoners' dilemmas" that
trap them in destructive competition with each other. Fourth,
federal regulation is justified where uniform standards provide
benefits to regulated industry (for example, large national
100. RrVLIN, supra note 51, at 12, 119; see WALKER, supra note 30, at 327
(listing the environment and natural resources among those areas in which
states and the federal government should share responsibility).
101. RIvLIN, supra note 51, at 24-25.
102.

WALKER, supra note 30, at 302.

103. Id. at 327.
104.

DIIULIO AND KETTL, supra note 54, at 9.

105. Jerry L. Mashaw & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY 115-22 (George C. Eads & Michael Fix eds., 1984); see also SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA 159-73 (1992). A similar set of criteria were proposed
by David Osborne in Mandate for Change, a book credited as a 'blueprint" for
the Clinton administration. David Osborne, A New FederalCompact: Sorting
Out Washington's Proper Role, in MANDATE FOR CHANGE 244-45 (Will Mar-

shall & Martin Schram eds., 1993).
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firms) by easing the burden of compliance. Finally, in an interesting twist on traditional public choice theory, the authors
argue that state governments are more easily captured by narrow special interest groups and that a strong federal role is often necessary to guarantee a full range of public participation
in the regulatory process." 6 With some important variations,
these standards are consistent with the five sorting principles
for allocating environmental responsibility that are proposed in
Part IV below.
Given the current national political climate, it is inevitable
that ambitious devolution will occur in many areas of domestic
policy. As responsibility for social welfare programs shifts to
the states, with reductions in federal fiscal support provided
for such programs, state financial and governmental resources
will be taxed to their limits. To accomplish a reordering of government on this grand scale--dividing the job, devolving responsibility, freeing the national government to deal with international problems, and re-engaging state and local
governments in solving the major social issues of the day-the
technically complex and important problems posed by municipal pollution should stay on the federal, as well as the state
and local lists. The federal government must approach the
business of regulating in a more sensible and sensitive way or
it will continue to be dogged by municipal anger and resistance. But leaving counties, cities, and towns to their own devices risks turning the clock back to a time when we did not
appreciate either the magnitude of the problems caused by the
pollution they produce or the difficulty of finding the best solutions. Application of the sorting principles proposed below
would result in a shared system of environmental regulation
that would stand in sharp contrast to the unequivocal devolution of federal authority proposed by scholars in other contexts.

106. This last argument directly challenges the central assumption of the
municipal crusade against unfuded federal mandates that making decisions
at a level of government that is closer to the people will restore democracy
and accountability to policy-making. For a fuller discussion of the implications of this vein of public choice theory on the sorting of environmental responsibilities between the three levels of government, see infra notes 270-273
and accompanying text.
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III. NEW (NEW) FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
What happens along the Mississippi River... if they choose not to
clean up the municipal sewage because the Federal Government will
not pay 100 percent? .. . An unfunded mandate upstream is untreated
sewage downstream.
07
-Rep. George Miller (D-CA.)'
Federalism is rooted in the knowledge that our political liberties are
best assured by limiting the size and scope of the national government.
-Executive Order 12,612, issued by
PresidentRonald Reagan'08
The Court today surveys the battle scene of federalism and sounds a
retreat.... I would prefer to hold the field and, at the very least, render a little aid to the wounded... [Sitate autonomy is a relevant factor in assessing the means by which Congress exercises its powers.
This principle requires the Court to enforce affirmative limits on federal regulation of the States to complement the judicially crafted expansion of the interstatecommerce power.
-Justice O'Connor,dissentingin
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
TransitAuthority' 9

Over the past two decades, all three branches of the federal government have attempted to restore a healthier balance
of power between federal and subnational governments. As the
rising decibels of the unfunded mandates debate indicate,
though, none has had either significant or lasting success. The
latest and most significant entry in the quest for effective solutions, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(UMRA), '11 was enacted because state and local governments
believed they could not secure effective relief from either the
President or the Supreme Court. As discussed below, however,
there is every reason to expect that the UMRA will prove a disappointment to its supporters and that the quest will continue.
The federal government's failures are the result of two

107. 141 CONG. REC. H345-01, H355 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1995).
108. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. § 252 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (1994).
109. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528,
579, 586-87 (1985).
110. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 109
Stat. 48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).

HeinOnline -- 81 Minn. L. Rev. 130 1996-1997

19961 UNFUNDEDENVIRONMENTAL MANVDATES

131

First, all three
closely related threshold assumptions.
branches define the "problem" of modern federalism as a matter of correctly calibrating the internal structure and processes
of American government. As a result, they pay only lip service
to the substantive issues at stake in any given dispute between
the three levels of government. The question becomes whether
there should be across-the-board limits on congressional and
presidential authority rather than the appropriate question:
whether there are compelling reasons why a particular level of
government is best suited to grapple with a specific problem, be
it welfare, crime, or environmental protection. Second, because
they define the problems of modern federalism in procedural
terms, all three branches have crafted generic solutions designed to restrain the behavior of the federal government without regard to the details of the problem before it. These restrictions have proven all too easy to evade as Congress and
the President continue to centralize authority over specific aspects of domestic policy.
Ultimately, the search for more enduring solutions to the
unfunded mandates problem will require Congress, the executive branch, and state and local governments to eschew procedural solutions and instead undertake the difficult job of formulating and applying sorting principles like those discussed
in Part IV,below. Only by developing a more compelling substantive rationale for dividing responsibility can cooperation be
restored in an era when federal largesse is not available to
tranquilize intergovernmental tensions.
A. CONGRESS
From the state and local perspective, asking Congress to
resolve the problem of unfunded federal mandates is a dubious
proposition, requiring an institution that craves public recognition to relinquish a key piece of its authority to launch
popular initiatives. Overwhelmed by the prospect of crafting
tailored reforms for the federal regulatory programs that im-'
pose the most troubling mandates, state and local strategists
decided to settle for across-the-board procedural solutions. In
effect, the UMRA... requires Congress to exercise self-restraint
unless it decides not to do so. The statute is unlikely to deter
the imposition of new mandates. To the extent that it appears
effective, its success will almost certainly be attributable to a
111.

Id.
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general antipathy to new regulation rather than
the fiscal note
12
process that is at the heart of its provisions.'
State and local government reluctance to tackle unfunded
mandates on a program-specific basis is understandable, if
self-defeating. As illustrated by the examples presented in
Part V, programmatic reforms require the development of a detailed critique of existing regulatory requirements. If the goals
served by mandates are popular ones-and, as discussed below, environmental protection remains a popular, even politically sacred, goal-proponents of change must suggest equally
effective alternatives. The most obvious solution is to obtain
federal funding for the mandate. That possibility, though, is
increasingly remote in the current political climate. Other
possible solutions include shifting the cost burden to industry
or persuading Congress to modify or circumscribe the mandate.
All of these alternatives provoke their own intractable controversies and can take a very long time to accomplish legislatively.
The difficulty of achieving specific programmatic reforms
is compounded by the fact that unfunded environmental mandates apply to services performed by both the public and private sector. Alleviating the burden on local governments alone
would establish a troubling double standard. Removing the
burden across-the-board means reducing environmental protection without any countervailing federalist justification.
Given these political and practical realities, the temptation to
support a relatively noncontroversial, generic approach to the
problem, especially one that could be packaged as a single
piece of legislation, proved irresistible.
The UMRA was a quick, almost painless, political fix. The
legislation was introduced in the opening days of the 104th
Congress by a newly elected Republican leadership eager to
implement the Contract with America." 3 It was put on an extraordinarily fast track, approved by large margins in the Senate (86-10) and House (360-74) within a month after introduction, and referred from conference six weeks later to be passed
by even larger margins (the Senate vote was 91-9 and the
112. 2 U.S.C.A. § 658c (West Supp. 1996) (providing for the preparation of
fiscal notes).
113. S. 1, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 5, 104th Cong. (1995). The CONTRACT
specifically promised to pass unfunded mandates legislation, although the
version it proposed would have "cap[ped] mandates cost below its level for the
preceding year." CONTRACT, supra note 3, at 133.
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House vote was 394-28).114 A disoriented and isolated liberal
Democratic minority put up only token resistance on the House
floor, losing vote after vote on amendments designed to narrow
the scope of the bill." 5 In the Senate, the opposition was led by
Robert Byrd, a legendary master of parliamentary procedure,
who tied up the Senate floor debate for several days but ultimately gave
way to the overwhelming political popularity of
16
the issue.'
The most serious challenge to the legislation's rapid progress was raised by companies providing services such as garbage collection, recycling, and disposal who were afraid local
governments would use the UMRA to win exclusive exemptions
from costly environmental requirements, thus making it impossible for the private sector to compete with municipal providers."' The bill's sponsors neutralized these concerns by expanding its coverage to incorporate so-called "private sector"
mandates, instantly
creating multiple new constituencies for
8
the legislation.11

The UMRA may have achieved such overwhelming and
114. David Hosansky, Unfunded Mandates Law, 53 CONG. Q. 1089, 108990 (1995).
115. David Hosansky, House Passes "Contract"Priorityto Curb Mandates
on States, House Version, 53 CONG. Q. 361, 361 (1995).
116. David Hosansky, ChippingAway at Opposition, Senate Passes Mandates Bill, 53 CONG. Q. 276, 279 (1995); David Hosansky, Mandates Legislation Caught in a Shifting Current,53 CONG. Q. 207, 207 (1995).
117. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S1652 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Lieberman) (stating that the legislation disadvantages the private sector
and that it should be amended to eliminate the disparate treatment).
118. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 658c(b) (West Supp. 1996) (applying fiscal note
requirements to private sector mandates), 658d(a)(1) (establishing a point of
order for a failure to publish a fiscal note regarding both intergovernmental
and private sector mandates). The implications of the UMRA's private sector
provisions are beyond the scope of this Article, although the subject could assume growing importance if the Act is implemented aggressively. Privatization is a promising solution to many of the mandates problems cited by local
governments because it shifts responsibility for mastering technically complex
environmental regulations to private sector companies that specialize in delivering a single service, such as garbage disposal, sewage treatment, or
drinking water treatment. See infra note 264 and accompanying text
(discussing privatization of services traditionally provided by local governments). Such companies generally favor more demanding regulation because
they believe it gives them a competitive advantage. To the extent that concerns about UMRA cost estimates result in the drastic weakening of regulation, or result in other policies that protect municipal providers at the expense
of private sector providers, the private sector will resume its political protest,
even if it must part company with the local government lobby which represents its potential customers.
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rapid political success because state and local governments
persuaded Congress that its ways were in error and their cause
was just. After all, the 104th Congress is widely touted as representing a watershed in American history, willing to make
profound and even revolutionary changes in the way the nation
is governed."19 But it is far more likely that the legislation
passed quickly because it will not have any significant effect on
public policy until and unless Congress decides that it should.
It was, in short, a promise of future repentance that miraculously sufficed to quell a present rebellion.
Symbolic law has obvious benefits to a society that is unwilling to come to grips with a problem, but it represents a defeat for those who care whether the problem is actually
solved. 2 ° The defeat lies not only in the ineffectiveness of the
symbolic law, but also in its use to justify resistance to other
efforts to address the problem.' 2 If, as argued below, the
UMRA proves to be a symbolic law, its most unfortunate effect
may well be to complicate the search for better solutions.
The UMRA includes two basic approaches to procedural
reform: (1) fiscal note provisions requiring the preparation of
cost estimates for various types of legislative and regulatory
119. See, e.g., David Broder, A Congress for the History Books, NEW
ORLEANs TIMES-PICAYuNE, Sept. 20, 1995, at B7 (characterizing the 104th

Congress as "one of the most significant [Congresses] in the last halfcentury."). Many of these initiatives, however, ultimately floundered legislatively and, by the end of the second session, the Republican majority compromised its more radical principles for the sake of getting several popular
initiatives passed. Helen Dewar and Eric Pianin, PragmatismDrives Frenzy
of Legislation: Chastened GOP LeadersDrop IdeologicalBattles, WASH. POST,
Aug. 4, 1996, at Al.
120. Lawrence Friedman has written of the "Victorian compromise" that
prevailed in 19th century American law. During this period, draconian laws
to punish immoral behavior were on the books but were rarely enforced,
serving instead as a well-understood symbol that such behavior, while inevitable and widespread, should remain underground. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 585-88 (2d ed. 1985); Lawrence M. Friedman,
Notes Toward a History of American Justice, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 111, 120-21
(1974).
121. John Dwyer has also used the metaphor of "symbolic" legislation to
describe congressional enactment of environmental laws that are so stringent
that they cannot be implemented as written. John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of
Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 233 (1990). As Dwyer would almost surely acknowledge, however, Congress intended to take decisive action
regarding such problems as air pollution even if it suspected that the remedies it had chosen would be very difficult to implement, while Friedman's
point is that society sometimes leaves laws on the books counting on the fact
that they will never be used.
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activities, and (2) point of order provisions establishing an enforcement mechanism against future unfunded mandates on
the House and Senate floor. 2 Each approach raises distinct
problems considered separately below.
1. Fiscal Note Provisions
The UMRA requires House and Senate authorizing committees to identify any "mandate" contained in a bill they re123
port and to submit such legislation to the CBO for analysis.
The statute defines a "mandate" as an "enforceable duty" im124
posed on subnational governments or the private sector.
Mandates also include legislation, statutes, or regulations that
would "reduce or eliminate" appropriations that support compliance with enforceable duties. 125 In theory, then, the UMRA
applies to virtually any federal effort to regulate the conduct of
the private sector, whether or not the requirement also applies
to state, local, or tribal governments.
Once a committee has identified a mandate, the committee
report that accompanies the legislation must contain a
"qualitative, and if practicable, quantitative assessment of
costs and benefits anticipated from the Federal mandates."1 26
It must also analyze its potential effect on the "competitive
balance" between the public and private sector. 27 The report
must state whether the committee intends to fund the mandate, identify existing and new sources of funding, or, if necessary, explain why the mandate should remain unfunded.'2 8
None of these provisions is likely to result in much more than
self-serving paperwork; the fiscal notes prepared by the CBO
trigger the real action.
The CBO is required to prepare estimates for "intergovernmental" mandates that would exceed $50 million in "direct
costs" annually in any of the five fiscal years following the date

122. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 658 (West Supp. 1996) (definitions), 658c (fiscal notes),
658d (points of order), 1532 (regulatory fiscal notes), 1552 (study of existing
mandates).
123. Id. § 658b(b).
124. Id. § 658(5)(A)(i), (5)(B), (7)(A).
125. 2 U.S.C.A. § 658(5)(A)(ii), (7)(B) (West Supp. 1996). Subsection
(5)(A)(ii) includes special rules for enforcing immigration laws that obviously
are not relevant here.
126. Id. § 658b(c)(2).
127. Id. § 658b(c)(3) (Supp. 1996).
128. Id. § 658b(d).
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when the mandate would become effective; 129 for "private sector" mandates, the threshold is doubled, to $100 million in annual direct costs. 3 ° For both intergovernmental and private
sector mandates, estimates must include a statement of the total amount of the direct costs of mandate compliance. 3 '
As discussed in Part I above, the UMRA's definition of
"direct costs" is both convoluted and vague, but it basically requires a three-step estimation process. 3 2 First, the CBO must
ascertain the total costs the mandate would impose.'3 3 This
estimate must be developed in the absence of regulations specifying how the mandate is to be implemented; it must incorporate the mandate's likely effect on the full spectrum of public
and private actors that comprise the regulated community; and
it must assume that any conceivable steps to lower costs can
and will be taken. Second, the CBO must quantify the increment within the total estimated cost that would be spent, regardless of the mandate, as a result of state and local laws,
regulations, or "programs" in effect when the mandate is
adopted.3 4 This increment would be subtracted from the total
to produce a second estimate of the mandate's "direct" cost.
Third, the CBO must evaluate whether the legislation as a
whole contains any opportunities for local governments to save
costs, once again subtracting this figure to come up with a final
35
direct cost total.
The expectation that the CBO can master the cost implications of legal and regulatory regimes in fifty states and tens
of thousands of local jurisdictions is unreasonable enough to
129. Id. § 658c(a)(1), (2).
130. Id. § 658c(b)(1), (2). The UMRA requires the CBO to explain any determination that a submitted mandate falls below either of these thresholds.
Id. § 658c(c).
131. Id. § 658c(a)(2) (intergovernmental mandates), (b)(2) (private sector
mandates). For intergovernmental mandates, the UMRA further requires the
CBO to state the amounts of new budget authority that would be necessary to
fund compliance over a ten-year period. Id. § 658c(a)(2)(B). For intergovernmental mandates that depend on existing budget authority, the CBO must
only state what amounts are provided under the legislation in authorizations
of future appropriations. Id. § 658c(a)(2)(C). For private sector mandates, the
CBO is merely required to restate whether any authorization of future appropriations to assist compliance is contained in the legislation.
Id. §
658c(b)(2)(B).
132. Id. § 658(3) (Supp. 1996).
133. Id. § 658(3)(A), (B).
134. Id. § 658(3)(D)(i).
135. Id. § 658(e)(D)(ii).
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undermine the credibility of the estimates prepared in accordance with these instructions. But the UMRA takes this impossible exercise one significant step further, requiring the
CBO to quantify the costs imposed and the savings made possible by standard municipal practice and voluntary selfregulation. The only source for this information is the regulated community itself, which has every incentive to exaggerate the costs imposed by federal mandates and minimize the
costs that would be incurred in any event.
Significantly, the law allows the CBO to control both its
workload and its professional credibility to some extent: if the
CBO director decides it is "not feasible to make a reasonable
estimate," he or she can furnish a statement to that effect to
the committee, but must explain the reasons for the determination.'36 In a further concession to the potentially overwhelming difficulties involved in estimating costs for legislative provisions that are in a constant state of flux as* they move
through the process, the law requires the CBO to update its
estimates for legislation passed in amended form or revised37
during conference only "to the greatest extent practicable."1
The ULMRA allows individual senators to request cost estimates for amendments they intend to offer in committee or on
the floor, but again requires the CBO to comply with these requests only "to the extent practicable."138 It is tempting to
speculate that all of these escape routes were negotiated by the
CBO as its career staff began to comprehend the enormity of
the workload the statute would settle on their shoulders. Even
if it was conceivably possible, with unlimited resources, to perform the daunting task of estimating direct costs for the many
pieces of legislation that pass through the House and Senate,
the UMRA authorizes only $4.5 million annually to fund the
CBO's responsibilities under the statute. 139
Of course, the CBO is not a novice in the cost estimation
business either in general or as it applies to state and local
136. Id. § 658c(a)(3), (b)(3).
137. Id. § 658c(d). In recognition of the possibility that the OBO will find it
"impracticable" to prepare revised estimates for conference reports, the omission of such an estimate is not subject to a point of order under the UMRA's
enforcement provisions. Id. § 658d(1). However, a conference report's failure
to fully fund the direct costs imposed by a mandate is subject to a point of order. Id. § 658d(2). It is not clear how Congress will determine that a conference report falls short of full funding in the absence of a CBO estimate.
138. Id. § 658f.
139. Id. § 1516.
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governments, although its track record does not provide much
comfort to those who count on fiscal notes to change the course
of legislation. The State and Local Government Cost Estimate
Act of 1981 required the CBO to prepare cost estimates for reported bills that are "likely" to result in an aggregate price tag
of at least $200 million. 140 According to an analysis prepared
by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(ACIR), between 1983 and 1988 the CBO generated 3,554 cost
estimates on 2,821 bills approved by House and Senate committees, but only 382 of the fiscal notes prepared-or eleven
percent of the total-showed a measurable intergovernmental
fiscal impact, and only eighty-nine bills--or three percent of
the total-were estimated to impose costs over $200 million.'4 '
From a state and local perspective, it is undoubtedly true
that some estimates are better than no estimates, and that estimates are an important weapon in the crusade to make Congress more aware of the implications of proposed legislation. It
does not follow, however, that legislatures should use such
admittedly imperfect measurements as a determinative factor
in future policy-making. In fact, cost estimates are a doubleedged sword for state and local governments. Low estimates
could be used to justify passage of objectionable legislation just
as easily as high estimates could be used to stop it.
The states' own experience confirms the pitfalls of fiscal
noting. According to a 1992 report by Janet Kelly, a nationally
recognized expert on unfunded mandates legislation who advises the National League of Cities (NLC), fiscal note requirements do not work well in most of the 28 states that have
adopted this approach.'4 2 Kelly concludes that the central
cause of unreliable and therefore unconvincing cost estimates
at the state level is the necessity of using so-called "loose"
140. 2 U.S.C. § 653 (1994). In contrast to the UMRA, this law does not
prescribe rules for CBO estimates and does not impose conditions on the consideration of legislation if estimates are not prepared.
141. ACIR MIXED RECORD, supra note 30, at 62. ACIR is scathing in its
evaluation of the process that produced these results:
[E]stimates are often developed hurriedly at a relatively late stage in
the legislative process ....
CBO's cost estimates, therefore, are often based on data provided by
a relatively few state and local officials ....
Some of the statutes without estimates were significant intergovernmental regulatory measures.., for which CBO lacked sufficient
time or information to prepare a reliable cost estimate.
142. STATE MANDATES, supra note 11, at v.
...
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sampling to compile data.143 Because statistically valid random sampling is impossible as a practical matter, cost estimators rely on contacts they have developed with local governments that have the personnel and resources available to make
good estimates on an uncompensated basis. Big cities are
usually over-represented in such loose samples, further skewing their results."4 The problem of compiling a reliable "loose"
sample is compounded at the federal level, where the potential
universe of contacts is far more numerous and diverse.
One final indication of the difficulties the CBO will encounter as it implements the UMRA is the methodology used
by state and local governments to estimate costs during their
campaign for legislative relief. The preparation of mandate
studies documenting astronomical costs became a cottage industry in the three years leading up to the UMRA's passage, 4 '
culminating in the release of two national surveys prepared by
Price Waterhouse for the United States Conference of Mayors
(USCM) and the National Association of Counties (NACO)
which claimed that between 1994 and 1998, unfunded mandates will cost cities $54 billion and counties $33.7 billion. 46
Major federal environmental programs impose approximately
three-quarters of the mandates itemized in the two studies. 4 7
143. Id. at 27-28.
144. Id. at 27.
145. For a detailed bibliography of these reports, see JANET M.

KELLY, A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO STUDIES ON STATE AND FEDERAL MANDATES TO

LOCALITIES, AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES
RESEARCH REPORT ON AMERICA'S CITIES (1994). The bibliography contains

citations to 61 studies performed by or at the behest of state and local officials
in 29 states. For a description of some of the studies' key findings, see
Markell, supra note 6, at 885-904.
146.

See PRICE WATERHOUSE, IMPACT OF UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES

ON U.S. CITIES, A 314-CITY SURVEY 2 (1993) [hereinafter USCM SURVEY]
(noting cost to cities); PRICE WATERHOUSE,

THE BURDEN OF UNFUNDED

MANDATES, A SURVEY OF THE IMPACT OF UNFUNDED MANDATES ON AMERICA'S
COUNTIES 2 (1993) [hereinafter NACO SURVEY] (noting cost to counties). Although the methodology used in these surveys is highly questionable and resulted in overinflated cost estimates, the costs that federal environmental
mandates impose on local governments are high, and growing. A 1990 report
by the EPA concluded that "annualized [local government] costs under the
[full] implementation scenario are expected to increase from $19 billion in
1987 to over $32 billion by the year 2000, a 69 percent increase." U.S. EPA,
EPA-230-12-90-084, ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENTS: THE COST OF A CLEAN
ENVIRONMENT 9-4 (1990).

147. Price Waterhouse prepared the two reports on the basis of survey
forms sent to USCM and NACO members. The forms sought information
about ten mandates applicable to cities and twelve applicable to counties;
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The USCM and NACO studies garnered so much attention
on Capital Hill that both the CBO and the professional staff of
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee conducted independent audits of the studies' results. The CBO's
analysis focused on survey results concerning the Safe Drinking Water Act, one of the most expensive set of mandates
claimed by the cities and counties. The CBO found that the
Price Waterhouse analysis was based on flawed and misleading data provided by many survey respondents, including such
practices as attributing the entire cost of capital investments to
the year in which they were made rather than amortizing them
over the life of the facility; combining the actual costs of complying with existing and the projected costs of complying with
proposed rules; and adjusting future costs for price inflation at
widely varying rates.'4 8 When the CBO corrected for these and
other data errors, it found that eighty-eight percent of survey
respondents estimated drinking water costs of less than $10
per household in 1993.' 4 The CBO cautions, however, even as
corrected, the data reported in the surveys "do not reflect the
incremental cost of the SDWA ... [and] cannot be used to determine national costs because the survey was not designed to
be representative at the national level." 5 '
The audit conducted by the Senate Environment and Public Works professional staff focused on the overall methodology
used to compile the studies. In addition to reviewing the original survey forms, the staff contacted a purportedly "random"
sample of twenty-five respondents, finding numerous mistakes
in the data they submitted. 5 ' On June 14, 1994, the Committee's Chairman, Max Baucus, and Ranking Minority Member,
John Chafee, forwarded the staff report to NACO and USCM
eight of the ten and seven of the twelve were mandates imposed under such
major environmental statutes as the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387, the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (amended 1996),
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k. NACO SURVEY, supra note 146, at
1; see also USCM SURVEY, supra note 146, at 1.
148. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT: A
CASE STUDY OF AN UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATE 22 (1995) [hereinafter CBO
CASE STUDY].
149. Id. at 21.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON ENYT & PUB. WORKS, 103D CONG.,
ANALYSIS OF THE UNFUNDED MANDATES SURVEYS CONDUCTED BY THE U.S.
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS AND THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES 8-9

(Comm. Print 1994).
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with a cover letter which concluded:
[T]he Price Waterhouse surveys on unfunded mandates cannot be
used to reliably identify any unfunded federal mandates. The surveys' fatal flaw is that they are not surveys of unfunded mandates at
all, but a review of total compliance costs for federal, state, and local
requirements. There is no way to separate from the cost totals what
activities would have been conducted even without being mandates
by the U.S. Government, or how much of the costs are truly unfunded. 152

This unequivocal rejection of municipal cost estimates by
the CBO's own customers underscores the difficulty of the task
it has been assigned. Of course, the CBO would presumably
try to avoid the blatant mistakes contained in studies that
were commissioned by organizations with an avowedly political
agenda. But the studies reveal a common mind-set
municipal officials that is diametrically opposed to the among
UMRA's
direct cost approach. Unless the CBO is extraordinarily careful when it approaches local governments, it will at best receive
biased information and at worst encounter strong resistance to
the development of a more objective database.
The UMRA's requirements for the fiscal noting of regulatory mandates are similar to its congressional fiscal note provisions but lack even the pretense of enforcement. Whenever a
federal agency issues a notice of proposed rulemaking that
would impose either intergovernmental or private sector mandates costing more than $100 million annually, the agency
must draft a detailed statement containing a "qualitative and
quantitative assessment" of the anticipated costs and benefits
of the mandate, its effect on "health, safety, and the natural
environment," and, if feasible, its effect on the "national economy." 153 The statement must explain whether the mandate is
or will be funded and disclose any "disproportionate budgetary
effects ... upon any particular regions of the nation or particular State, local, or tribal governments." 154 The statement must
describe the agency's consultations with elected representatives of affected state, local, and tribal governments. 55 Finally,"
the agency must identify and consider a "reasonable" number
152. Letter from Max Baucus, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Env't. & Pub.
Works, and John Chafee, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Comm. on Env't.
& Pub. Works, to Barbara Sheen Todd, Commissioner, National Ass'n of
Counties 2 (June 14, 1994) (on file with author).
153. 2 U.S.C.A. § 1532(a)(2), (4) (West Supp. 1996).
154. Id. § 1532(a)(2)(B), (3)(B).
155. Id. § 1532(a)(5).
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of regulatory alternatives, and from those alternatives select
the "least .costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome"
choice that still achieves the rule's objectives.156 If an agency
simply fails to prepare such a statement, the omission is subject to a court challenge, but the only remedy available is 1an
57
order compelling the agency to prepare the statement.
Courts do not have jurisdiction under the UMRA either to review the adequacy of a statement or to invalidate an otherwise
valid regulation.5 8
The ongoing assault on federal bureaucrats, overregulation, and big government in general may mean that
those charged with responsibility for drafting UMRA statements will put substantial effort into the exercise. Yet in the
face of a statutory mandate instructing an agency to regulate,
or a sincere belief by the agency officials that a given regulation is a good idea, these provisions require little more than
well-written regulatory preambles and well-publicized consultations with affected interest groups, neither of which will necessarily change the content of the rule at issue.
Finally, the UMRA makes a weak attempt to grapple with
the very difficult problem of existing mandates. As noted
above, the UMRA's chief advantage as a political vehicle was
that it enabled Congress to take action on unfunded mandates
quickly, avoiding the time-consuming and punishing process of
reviewing mandates on a statute- or rule-specific basis. By
definition, this generic approach only works prospectively, deferring the specific problems that inspired the UMRA's passage
to the normal reauthorization process. Unable to resist the
temptation of scoring political points with municipal supporters of the legislation, Congress resorted to the time-honored
ploy of commissioning a study that would document the worst
offenders, presumably laying the groundwork for further legislative action. 59
The task of writing this study of all intergovernmental and
private mandates was assigned to the Advisory Commission on
156. Id. § 1535(a).
157. Id. § 1571(a)(2)(B).
158. Id. § 1571(a), (b). The subject ofjudicial review was the major bone of
contention at the conference, with Democrats and some Republicans arguing
that the UMRA should not provide a vehicle for tying up regulatory proposals
indefinitely in court. See, e.g., Hosansky, supra note 114, at 1087 (discussing
the legislative debate surrounding the UMRA).
159. 2 U.S.C.A. § 1552 (West Supp. 1996).
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Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), which has thus far been
unable to accomplish this mammoth and unmanageable assignment.160 In July 1996, the senior elected and appointed officials who comprise the Commission voted 13 to 7, mostly
along party lines, to reject a report prepared by ACIR staff that
recommended giving state and local governments more money
and more flexibility to implement federal environmental man1 61
dates.
2. Point of Order Provisions
Even where fiscal noting is performed credibly, it is in essence a consciousness-raising exercise, providing information
about a mandate's cost that the legislature can then weigh
against the substantive and political reasons for enacting it.
Because fiscal notes have been ignored so consistently at the
federal and state levels, as of 1993, sixteen states have gone
one crucial step further and enacted reimbursement provisions
that require them to pay all or a portion of the costs of intergovernmental mandates that they impose on local governments.' 62 Even these requirements have once again proven disappointing to municipal advocates: "The experience of local
governments in states with reimbursement requirements varies in details but not in theme. Basically, when the legislature
has the will to bypass a reimbursement requirement, a way
16
presents itself."
160. Id. § 1552(c), (d) (requiring a twelve month study of existing mandates), 1556 (authorizing ACIR appropriations of $500,000 for each of the fiscal years 1995 and 1996). There were virtually no limits placed on ACIR's
portfolio: it was instructed to investigate the effects of both private and intergovernmental mandates on everything from the operation of state, local, and
tribal governments to the competitive balance between subnational governments and the private sector. For a description of ACIR, see supra note 22.
161.

Draft Report on Unfunded State Mandates Rejected by FederalAdvi-

sory Commission, 27 Env't Rep. 786 (BNA) (Aug. 2, 1996) (describing the Clinton administration's assertion that the report advocates a compromise of environmental, health, and safety protections).
162.

JANET

KELLY,

ANTI-MANDATES

STRATEGIES,

REIMBURSEMENT

REQUIREMENTS IN THE STATES, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES RESEARCH
REPORTS

ON AMERICA'S

CITIES

4

(1994)

[hereinafter

ANTI-MANDATES

STRATEGIES].
163. Id. at 10. One commentator has argued that fiscal noting and reimbursement requirements are so ineffective that local governments will only
achieve real relief from unfunded mandates through the enactment of judicially enforceable constitutional amendments at both the federal and state
levels. Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the
Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, PublicInterest, and Public Services, 46
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Congress was unwilling to go as far as to promise reimbursement when it drafted the UMRA, instead adopting an enforcement mechanism that allows any member to raise a point
of order challenging legislation that does not fully fund the intergovernmental duties it imposes1" All points of order are
waivable by a simple majority vote. 65 The political will necesVAND. L. REV. 1355, 1410 (1993).
164. Members may raise points of order with respect to legislation imposing intergovernmental mandates exceeding the $50 million annual cost
threshold unless the legislation fully "funds" the mandate by providing new
budget, entitlement, or direct spending authority. 2 U.S.C.A. § 658d(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1996); see also id. § 658c(a)(1). The conference report notes that
the UMRA does not waive "any existing provisions of law that establish controls on Federal spending," including the elaborate procedure that would apply to efforts to fund a mandate with spending authority outside the normal
appropriations process. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-76, at 64 (1995); 141 Cong.
Rec. H3053, 3061 (daily ed. March 15, 1995). Lastly, the UMRA also allows
members to raise a point of order if a "bill or joint resolution" lacks a CBO fiscal note. 2 U.S.C.A. § 658d(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996). The point of order based
on the absence of a fiscal note applies to either intergovernmental or private
sector mandates, while the point of order based on the absence of funding
applies only to intergovernmental mandates imposing enforceable duties on
state, local, or tribal governments. See id. § 658d(a)(2) (establishing point of
order solely for intergovernmental mandates).
165. Section 425 of the UMRA, which establishes points of order for unfunded mandates in the House and Senate, is silent on the procedures to be
followed in asserting and resolving such motions. See 2 U.S.C.A. 658d(c)(2)
(West Supp. 1996) (advising only that if the Chair sustains a member's point
of order, the offending provisions shall be stricken from the bill or resolution).
Section 426 of the UMRA, however, prohibits the House Rules Committee
from crafting a rule that waives in advance a members right to assert a point
of order on the floor of the House, thereby ensuring that a vote will occur on
the floor and will be resolved by majority vote. Id. § 658e(a). Such waivers
have been used historically to thwart those seeking to assert points of order to
affect the outcome of a legislative debate. Cong. Gerald B. H. Solomon and
Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline of DeliberativeDemocracy in the House
and Proposalsfor Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 321, 359 (1994). Section 426
further stipulates how the point of order shall be framed to the larger body.
See 2 U.S.C.A. § 658e(b)(2) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring that a point of order
must "specify the precise language on which it is premised"). Additionally,
section 426 establishes the procedure for debate. See id. § 658e(b)(4) ("A
question of consideration under this section shall be debatable for 10 minutes
by each Member initiating a point of order and for 10 minutes by an opponent
on each point of order, but shall otherwise be decided without intervening
motion except one that the House adjourn or that the Committee of the Whole
rise....").
As for Senate procedures to resolve points of order, the Conference Report on the UMRA notes that the Senate bill applied the procedures established by section 904 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 (CBICA), Pub. L. 93-344, § 88 Stat. 331 (1974), which requires
points of order to be resolved "by a majority vote of the Members voting, a
quorum being present, or by the unanimous consent of the Senate." H.R.
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sary to override the UMRA is therefore no more-and no lessthan the will necessary to enact the mandate in the first place.
Where Congress considers authorizing legislation that imposes mandates to be funded by subsequent appropriations,
the UMRA requires that the legislation specify the annual appropriations necessary for each year, up to ten years, that the
mandate will be in effect.' 66 If subsequent appropriations are
not adequate, the federal agency or department responsible for
implementing the mandate must report back to Congress,
which will then have sixty days to either provide the money,
67

modify or nullify the mandate, or impose it without funding.1

If Congress fails to act, the mandate will either not go into ef-

fect or will immediately cease to be effective.168 This "negative
option" rule is likely to have more teeth than all of the other
provisions combined because a simple failure to act nullifies a

mandate with no political repercussions unless the omission
attracts major media attention. On the other hand, the UMRA
may give Congress the perverse incentive to pass mandates
without funding at the outset in order to insulate them from
future risk.

How likely is Congress to slip its leash, mandating again
with abandon? If, as the states' experience suggests, the outNO. 104-76, at 31 (1995). Although the Conference Committee
adopted the House bill's "similar" point of order provisions in lieu of the Senate language, in an otherwise meticulous recitation of small differences between the two pieces of legislation, the Committee did not identify the majority vote requirement as one where it intended any change from the original
Senate legislation. Id.
It is worth noting that section 904 of CBICA is not codified in the United
States Code because it is an exercise by the House and Senate of their internal rule-making authority rather than a generally applicable statutory provision. Instead, section 904 appears as a note to 2 U.S.C. § 621. In the same
vein, UMRA section 108 states unequivocally that its point of order provisions
were enacted "as an exercise of the rule-making power of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, respectively... with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change such rules... at any time, in the
same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of each
House." 2 U.S.CA. § 1515 (West Supp. 1996). As one commentator has noted,
because Congress only changed Senate and House rules, the point of order
provisions did not require a presidential signature, although Congress did
submit the UMRA as a whole to President Clinton for signature. Adam
Babich. Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54
MD. L. REV. 1516, 1546 n.124 (1995).
166. 2 U.S.C.A. § 658d(a)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1996).
167. Id. § 658d(a)(2)(B)(iii). The authorizing legislation that imposes the
mandate must also create special legislative procedures to expedite consideration of such agency reports.
168. Id. § 658d(a)(2)(B)(iii)(III).
CONF. REP.
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come depends on the exercise of political will, the long-term
outlook for new and unfunded environmental mandates is
probably bright. Nationwide polls indicate a steady and enduring concern among Americans for the health of the environment.'69 Even when pollsters link environmental protection to
otherwise unpopular concepts, such as unemployment and governmental regulation, the environment still garners majority
support.17 0 Such polls confirm the observation made by pollster
169. See, e.g., 4 of 5 in Poll Believe Pollution Threatens the Quality of U.S.
Life, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 1990, at A20 (citing nationwide poll, conducted by

Media General-Associated Press, which found that "[flour in five Americans
say pollution threatens the quality of their lives"); Bob Benenson, GOP Sets
the 104th Congress on New Regulatory Course, 53 CONG. Q. 1693, 1696-97

(1995) (describing the results of nine polls conducted by Cambridge Reports/Research International from 1982 to 1994 showing that more people
thought there was "too little" government regulation of the environment than
thought there was "too much" in every year except 1982, and also describing
the results of an annual survey conducted by Roper Starch Worldwide which

in recent years has "shown consistently that more than 75 percent of Ameri-

cans view themselves as active environmentalists or sympathetic but not ac-

tive on the environment"); Gary Lee, EnvironmentalGroups Launch Counter-

attack After Losses on Hill, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1995, at A6 (citing Mellman
Group poll in which "62 percent of respondents said Congress's priority should
be to do more to protect the environment, while 29 percent said Congress
should reduce regulations"); Richard Morin, Polls Show Public Wants
Cleanup, but Will It Pay?, WASH. POST, June 18, 1989, at H3 (citing nationwide poll conducted Opinion Research Corporation, which found that "[elight
out of 10 Americans said they were very concerned about the quality of the
water they drink" and that "[nlearly eight out of 10 were very concerned about
the quality of the air they breathe"); R. Roger Pryor, Environmental Safeguards in Jeopardy, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 1994, at 9C (citing
Times/Mirror poll which found that "82 percent of the public wants stricter
laws to protect the environment" and that "63 percent believe more federal
spending should go to the environment"); Philip Shabecoff, Poll Finds Strong
Support for Environmental Code, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1981, § 1, at 30 (citing
New York Times/CBS News Poll in which "[better than two out of three people questioned agreed that 'we need to maintain present environmental laws
in order to preserve the environment for future generations' " and in which
"[flewer than one in four felt '[wie need to relax our environmental laws in order to achieve economic growth.' ").
170. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Thunder of Debate on Owls and Jobs Rings
in Forestsas Opponents Face Off, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1993, at A22. In his article, Mr. Egan cited a 1993 New York Times/CBS News Poll in which 60%
agreed and 31% disagreed with the statement that "[wle must protect the environment, even if it means jobs in your community are lost because of it."
When the same poll was taken during the 1992 presidential election period, "a
time of public worry about the recession," 45% agreed and 45% disagreed. In
1990, "before the recession began," 56% agreed and 36% disagreed. Id.; see
also Richard L. Berke, Oratory of Environmentalism Becomes the Sound of
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1990, at B10 (citing New York Times/CBS poll,
conducted in the spring of 1990, which found that "seventy-one percent of
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Lou Harris in testimony before a congressional committee in
1981: "[The] desire on the part of the American people to battle
pollution is one of the most overwhelming and clearest we have
ever recorded1 71in our 25 years of surveying public opinion in
this country."
Of course, public opinion polls do not necessarily translate
into either the initiation or the substance of legislative activity.
A variety of other factors influence congressional decisions, including the political strength of the relevant interest groups as
well as legislators' sincere beliefs about the substance of the
public policy at issue. Members of Congress clearly share the
perception that state and local elected officials have substantial political clout and that there may well be some kind of
payback for failing to heed their concerns. This perception
placed the UMRA at the top of the legislative agenda and ensured its rapid passage. It may well translate into significant
restrictions on federal regulatory authority as new environmental mandates come up for legislative consideration.
On the other hand, state and local politicians are vulnerable to the same backlash of public opinion as their federal
Americans said they would be willing to pay higher taxes to clean up the environment; 56 percent said they favored protecting the environment even if it
meant lost jobs in their communities"); Prospects, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1980, §
3, at 1 ("According to an Opinion Research Corporation poll conducted for a
number of private business clients, over 60 percent of those polled agreed that
'cleaning the environment is important, even if it means closing down some
old plants and causing some unemployment.'"); Dale Russakoff, Poll Finds
Broad Support for Environmental Laws, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1982, at A6
(citing a poll conducted on behalf of an industrial conglomerate in which 55%
favored maintaining air pollution standards "even if some factories close as a
result"). But see EVERETT C. LADD & KARLYN H. BOWMAN, ATTrITUDES
TOWARD THE ENVIRONMENT, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER EARTH DAY 2 (1995)
("Today Americans remain committed to the goal of protecting and improving
the environment, but they no longer see an urgent problem. Thus, they are
not inclined to take many additional steps-certainly not costly ones-to improve the environment. Many other issues top their agenda."). Id. The Ladd
& Bowman report was published by the American Enterprise Institute,
Washington's best-known conservative think tank. Their assertion that support for environmental initiatives has waned is contradicted by much of the
polling information they report, although they have a legitimate point that
other issues, such as crime and the economy, are perceived as more important
by the public. In the context of specific legislation imposing a new environmental mandate, however, the issue presented to members of Congress or to
the public will be whether environmental requirements should be strengthened or relaxed, not whether we should make trade-offs between those efforts
and crime prevention.
17L It's a Depression at EPA, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1981, at A22 (quoting
testimony before Congress by public opinion pollster Lou Harris).
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counterparts. The UMRA allowed them to ventilate their anger and seek relief from environmental mandates in the context of a legislative debate that was never labeled as an attack
on environmental programs by the popular media. Launching
a direct attack on new environmental initiatives without the
political cover of the UMRA's crusade against big government
and budget-busting themes would require a great deal of courage, especially if environmentalists described the legislation as
an effort to protect people from municipal pollution." 2
In the immediate wake of the UMRA's passage, conservative Republican leaders in the House passed legislation reauthorizing the Clean Water Act that cut back sharply on regulatory requirements but, as this Article goes to press, the
legislation remains stalled in the Senate. 7 3 Another important
Republican initiative, legislation to reform the regulatory process and impose risk assessment requirements on EPA rulemakings, has suffered a similar fate. 74 The only major pieces
of environmental legislation passed by the 104th Congress required Republicans to negotiate bipartisan compromises with
environmental activists in and out of Congress. 175 While it is
too soon to determine the long-term effects of the Republican
revolution on major national environmental programs, it is becoming very clear that the revolution will be neither quick nor

172. Interestingly, local governments crusading against unfumded mandates at the state level have avoided challenging environmental mandates.
'Mhe 1992 NLC study revealed that state [municipal] leagues and county associations do not contest every mandate. They are particularly careful to
avoid divisive battles over mandates that are popular with the public (such as
some environmental mandates) .
" ANTI-MANDATES STRATEGIES, supra
note 162, at 50.
173. See House Approves Sweeping CWA Rewrite Bill, Approval Margin
Could Not Override Veto, 95 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) (May 17, 1995)
(describing the passage of the Clean Water Act in the House); Clinton pledges
to veto GOP's clean water bill, USA TODAY, May 31, 1995, at 4A (discussing
President Clinton's threat to veto the legislation); Heather Dewar, Changes in
Water Act Shaky: They May Not Live to become Law, DENV. POST, May 17,
1995, at 2A (explaining why the legislation is stalled in the Senate).
174. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (referring to the Republican's
published legislative plan for the 104th Congress).
175. See, e.g., David Hosansky, Long-Sought PesticidesBill Advances Easily after Deal, 53 CONG. Q. 2031 (July 29, 1996) (discussing political compromise that led to the passage of environmental legislation). The two laws reauthorized by the 104th Congress are the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104170, § 110 Stat. 1489, and the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j
(1994), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 110 Stat. 888.
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bloodless.17 6 In this larger context, the UMRA's point of order
provisions are likely to prove to be relatively minor procedural
impediments when measured against these more powerful,
competing political forces.
B. THE ExEcuT=E BRANCH
Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have all tried to respond to the growing strains in federal, state, and local relationships by commanding federal agencies to be more careful
regulators and by authorizing the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) to ride herd over recalcitrants. President Reagan heralded his administration's commitment to federalist
principles in Executive Order Number 12,612, which remained
in effect throughout the Bush administration.' 77 President
Clinton, anxious to distance himself from his predecessors'
regulatory policies, developed his own approach to intergovernmental relations, issuing Executive Order Number 12,875
in October 1993.178
Although there are differences in the style and the substance of the Reagan/Bush and Clinton executive orders, they

176. See, e.g., Margaret Kriz, Not-So-Silent Spring, 28 NAT'L J. 522 (Mar.
9, 1996) ("Environmentalists have held back the conservative Republican tide
that threatened to wash out 25 years of legislative success. But the fight isn't
over, and the debate may yet get a lot noisier."); John H. Cushman, Jr., G.O.P.
Backing Off from Tough Stand over Environment, Fear of Political Harm,
Congress Could Loosen Fiscal Vice on E.P.A. and Interior Department Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1996, at Al ("Republicans are increasingly worried that by imposing deep cuts on environmental programs they are doing
even deeper political damage to their party... [although] Administration officials and environmentalists can hardly claim victory yet."); Gary Lee, GOP Is
Warned of Backlash on Environment,Rolling Back Legal Safeguards, Cutting
Funds Could Cost the Party Votes, National Poll Indicates, WASH. POST, Jan.
24, 1996, at A6 ("'Attacking the Environmental Protection Agency is a nonstarter,' concluded a report by leading GOP pollster Linda DiVall, containing
the results of a national opinion survey. 'Republicans should be... emphasizing the safeguarding of reasonable and balanced environmental protection
done in a more efficient manner.'"); Dan Morgan, Bid to Curb EPA Fails in
House, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1995, at Al ("Republican moderates, who bucked
the GOP leadership, said the 227 to 194 floor vote indicated deepening awareness in party ranks of public concern over air, water and food safety.
'Republicans can read the polls,' said Rep. Sherwood L. Boehlert (R-N.Y.), who
led the GOP moderates.").
177. Federalism, supra note 17. President Bush issued a memorandum on
February 16, 1990 reminding the heads of executive departments and agencies of the importance of Executive Order 12,612. Memorandum on Federalism, 1 PUB. PAPERS 238 (Feb. 16, 1990).
178. Intergovernmental Partnership, supra note 17.
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have proved fundamentally ineffective for the same reasons.
First and foremost, environmental rulemaking was developed
in accordance with statutory instructions and deadlines. While
the orders could affect the details of a rule, they could not remove the issue from the EPA's regulatory agenda. But the
administrative structure of the orders meant they did not even
have much effect on the details of regulatory proposals. Because they imposed generic procedures applicable to the wide
range of federal regulatory activity, the orders could do no
more than require the agencies to prepare analyses of the potential effects of their decisions, in theory on the basis of consultations with state and local representatives. The OMB
could review regulatory proposals to make sure the analyses
were sufficient, but it did not have authority to turn back the
rule if agencies failed to comply with these requirements. The
orders gave the OMB another excuse to harangue regulatory
agencies about state and local concerns. They did not provide
any meaningful advice for crafting better solutions.
The heart of the Reagan order was a list of nine
"fundamental" principles designed to guide agencies and departments in formulating policies that have "federalism implications."'7 9 The principles are expressed in hortatory, vague
rhetoric, but their general thrust is captured in the fifth and
ninth entries:
In most areas of governmental concern, the States uniquely possess
the constitutional authority, the resources, and the competence to
discern the sentiments of the people and to govern accordingly....
In the absence of clear constitutional or statutory authority, the
presumption of sovereignty should rest with the individual States.
Uncertainties regarding the legitimate authority of the national government should be resolved against regulation at the national level. 180

The Reagan order instructed agencies and departments to
construe all federal statutes as not preempting state law unless the statute contains express preemption provisions or
there was some other "firm and palpable evidence" demonstrat18
ing preemptive intent. 1
The order directed each agency to designate an official to
ensure its implementation through the performance of a
"Federalism Assessment" for any proposed policy that has
179. Federalism, supra note 17, § 2.
180. Id. § 2(e), (i).
181. Id. § 4(a).
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"sufficient federalism implications." 82 The order defined
"policies that have federalism implications" as regulations or
proposed legislation that have "substantial direct effects on the
[sitates, on the relationship between the national government
and the [s]tates, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government."183 Federalism
Assessments were to include a certification that the agency
had diligently applied the nine principles, identified any inconsistencies with the principles, and assessed the additional
84
costs or burdens that the policy would impose on the states.
In July 1993, the ACIR issued a study concluding that the
Reagan order had failed dismally in its mission of controlling
regulatory federalism, largely because many agencies chose to
ignore its requirements and were never held accountable by
the OMB.18 The study found that the EPA was among the
worst offenders:
OMB reported that EPA promulgated six major final rules in 1988
and another three in 1989. Not one of the nine rules referred to E.O.
12612, and none was accompanied by a formal federalism assessment.
The absence of references to the executive order does not mean
that EPA did not promulgate any rules... that imposed significant
fiscal and administrative requirements on state and local governments. On the contrary, several of the most costly and far-reaching
rules issued during this period were clearly intergovernmental in
character. Included in this group were rules covering... asbestos in
schools;... underground storage tanks; toxic chemical release reporting; . . . national drinking water regulations for filtration, disinfection, and turbidity; and effluent guideline plans under the Clean Water Act.' 86

Of course, it remains unclear whether a Federalism Assessment, had it been performed, would have had a noticeable
effect on the outcome of the rule-making process. OMB staff
interviewed for the ACIR study could not point to a single example where the order significantly affected regulatory decisions. They attributed these failures to a review process that

182. Id. § 6(a), (b).
183. Id. § 1(a).
184. Id. § 6(c).
185. ACIR MIXED RECORD, supra note 30, at 30-39.
186. Id. at 37 (citations omitted). ACIR's frustration with the EPA's performance is understandable. The rules listed are among the most important
environmental mandates handed down to local governments in the last two
decades, imposing, by the EPA's own estimates, billions of dollars of compliance costs. Id.
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lacks teeth because it 1does
not give the OMB authority to stop
7
or rewrite regulations. 1
The Clinton executive order on federalism forswears the
heated rhetoric of the Reagan order, but it is no less vague in
its instructions to agencies and departments. The order targets the "cumulative effect of unfunded federal mandates" on
state, local, and tribal governments; it acknowledges in its
opening lines that such mandates-and the "cost, complexity,
and delay" in obtaining waivers from them in appropriate
cases-have "increasingly strained" the budgets of subnational
governments. 188 The order states that "[t]o the extent feasible
and permitted by law," no agency should promulgate a mandate unless the mandate is funded or the agency provides the
OMB with a description of its "prior consultation" with representatives of affected state, local, and tribal governments.18 9 It
further instructs agencies to develop "an effective process" for
conducting such consultations and to try wherever possible to
act favorably on waiver requests by subnational governments. 9 0
Although Executive Orders 12,612 and 12,875 were the
only ones dedicated to federalism issues, they were implemented in the context of two other executive orders designed to
accomplish broader regulatory reform, a much more significant
preoccupation of the executive branch. 191 It is beyond the scope
of this Article to analyze the larger implications of those efforts; others have already performed this task very well, at
least with respect to Reagan reform initiatives.'92 It is worth

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 33.
Intergovernmental Partnership, supra note 17.
Id. § 1(a).
Id. §§ 1(b), 2.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §

601 (1994) (Clinton regulatory reform order) and Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982) (Reagan regulatory reform order).
192. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying"the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L. J. 1385, 1429-36 (1992) (demonstrating that
Reagan regulatory reforms have made agency rulemaking significantly more
cumbersome); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking:
The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1068-71 (1986)
(arguing that the Reagan administration's regulatory approach has unwisely
centralized control of agency rulemaking in the OMB); Robert V. Percival,
Checks Without Balance:Executive Office Oversight of the EnvironmentalProtection Agency, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 127, 147-54, 15672 (evaluating the impact of Reagan administration oversight on the EPA's
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considering, however, the more limited question of whether
such broader regulatory reforms have helped or exacerbated
the unfunded mandates dilemma.
President Reagan and, to a lesser extent, President Bush
established powerful offices in the White House that were designed to give regulated industries, as well as state and local
governments, an opportunity to side-step offensive regulatory
decisions. 193 As discussed in Part II of this Article, these efforts
provoked a strong backlash in Congress that propelled the enactment of many of the environmental statutes that are now at
the heart of the unfunded mandates debate. In sharp contrast
to its two predecessors, the Clinton administration has won
high marks from public interest organizations for opening up
the OMB review process to public scrutiny, eliminating regulatory delays, fostering better cooperation between the OMB and
regulatory agencies, and considering the interests of all constituencies.1 94 Ironically, these reforms have occurred just as
Congress is in the grips of another backlash, this time in diametric opposition to the activism it embraced during the Reagan era. 195
It remains to be seen whether Congress will succeed in
passing legislation compelling radical regulatory reform. Even
if state and local lobbyists manage to persuade Congress to
give them this type of relief, however, the current atmosphere
may well doom the long-term endurance of their achievements.
One clear lesson of the Reagan era is that extreme efforts to
roll back environmental protections in the name of "regulatory
reform" eventually produce another turn of the pendulum because antipathy to big government is not the same as antipathy to strong federal pollution controls. ' 96 A second, equally
rule-making process). For a defense of the Reagan reforms, see Christopher
C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986).
193. See supra notes 64, 65, 80 and accompanying text (outlining Reagan's
"new federalist" agenda and discussing Bush's maintenance of the same).
194. See, e.g., Regulatory Planningand Review and Reauthorizationof the
PaperworkReduction Act: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. (1994) (testimony of Gary D. Bass, Ph.D., Exec. Dir.,
OMB Watch) (evaluating the reorientation of the OMB's Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs after Executive Order 12,866).
195. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (describing the conservative push to downsize government initiatives following the 1994 congressional elections).
196. See e.g., William D. Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, ENVTL. F.,
Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 25, 25 (describing the history of swings between pro- and
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troubling result of extreme reforms is
the foreclosure of oppor197
tunities to write helpful regulations.
At this stage in the development of the unfunded mandates movement, state and local officials do not acknowledge
that they need federal environmental regulations in any form.
Yet it is difficult to imagine that they would advocate the
wholesale elimination of all regulatory standards, even if they
were given the opportunity to do so. For all rational participants in the debate, the goal must be smarter regulation, not
wholesale deregulation. Obviously, drawing lines between
what is smart and what is not and crafting alternative approaches is an enormously complex and challenging task. But
it is questionable whether radical regulatory reform will simplify and streamline this effort.
C. THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court's consideration of regulatory federal198
ism requires it to evaluate whether the Tenth Amendment's
reservation of authority to the states should be read to impose
limits on the Constitution's broad grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause.199 Conservatives on the
Court, led by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, have excoriated their brethren to protect state and local governments
against excessive intrusions by a federal government ineffectively constrained via the political process."' Liberals on the
Court have issued equally impassioned warnings that the
Court has no role to play in mediating what are essentially political disputes between the states and Congress. 20 1 Both ends
anti-environmental political and rhetorical extremes).
197. Thomas McGarity has described the role played by Reagan regulatory
reforms in the "ossification" of the rule-making process, observing that radical
reforms make the search for better solutions far more difficult and timeconsuming because they polarize the debate, cripple bureaucratic initiative,
and make it impossible to replace existing regulations with new approaches.
McGarity, supra note 192, at 1391-92.
198. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
200. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
588 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (decrying inadequate protection of states'
rights afforded by the political process); National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding Congress cannot interfere
with traditional state functions).
201. See, e.g., National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is unacceptable that the judicial process should be thought superior to the political process in this arena").
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of the spectrum battle for the Court's more moderate centeruntil his retirement, Justice Blackmun, who provided the
swing vote on the Court's two most important decisions: National League of Cities v. Usery in 1976202 and Garcia v. San
Antonio MetropolitanTransitAuthority in 1985.2o3
A coalition of state and local governments 2°4 argued in National League of Cities that application of federal minimum
wage and overtime requirements would be costly enough to
disrupt the ability to provide citizens with such essential services as police and fire protection, sanitation, public health, and
parks and recreation.2 5 Without necessarily adopting the facts
as presented by the appellants, the Court held that congressional prescription of a minimum wage for state and municipal
employees "directly displace[d] the [s]tates' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions" and therefore exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.2 °6 The Court recognized that Congress had authority to prescribe minimum wage and overtime
standards for private employers, but concluded that application of similar rules to public employers crossed the constitutional "barrier" circumscribing the application of Commerce
Clause authority to the states qua states.20 7 The majority
opinion did not address the reasons why the federal government may have a compelling interest in regulating working
conditions. Instead, it focused exclusively on the impact of
such regulation on the structure of state government.
Justices Brennan and Stevens filed dissents. Justice
Brennan, writing on behalf of Justices White and Marshall,
denounced the opinion as a "catastrophic judicial body blow" to
congressional authority, and accused the majority of usurping
202. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia V.San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
203. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
204. As befit the importance of the decision, appellants in the two consolidated cases were an-unusually broad and diverse coalition including the National League of Cities, the National Governors' Conference, the states of Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, the
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, and
the cities of Cape Girardeau, in Missouri, Lompoc, in California, and Salt
Lake City, in Utah. NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 837.
205. Id. at 845-51.
206. Id. at 852.
207. Id. at 841-43, 845.
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the proper constitutional role of the political process on the
basis of "an abstraction without substance" (that is, the notion
that there is such a thing as a "traditional" state function that
deserves protection from otherwise legitimate exercises of congressional Commerce Clause authority). 0 8 The dissent decried
the implications of a double standard for public and private
sector conduct, asking rhetorically, "Can the States engage in
businesses competing with the private sector and then come to
the courts arguing that withdrawing the employees of those
businesses from the private sector evades the power of the
Federal Government to regulate commerce?" 2 9
The double standard also bothered Justice Stevens, who
wrote in his separate dissent:
The Court holds that the Federal Government may not interfere with
a sovereign State's inherent right to pay a substandard wage to the
janitor at the state capitol. The principle on which the holding rests
is difficult to perceive.
The Federal Government may, I believe, require the State to act
impartially when it hires or fires the janitor, to withhold taxes from
his paycheck, to observe safety regulations when he is performing his
job, to forbid him from burning too much soft coal in the capitol furnace, from dumping untreated refuse in an adjacent waterway, from
overloading a state-owned garbage truck, or from driving either the
truck or the Governor's limousine over 55 miles an hour. Even
though these and many other activities of the capitol janitor are activities of the State 210
qua State, I have no doubt that they are subject
to federal regulation.

Justice Stevens's choice of environmental problems to illustrate the scope of federal regulatory authority potentially
undercut by the decision probably was not coincidental. Environmental problems were much on the mind of Justice Blackmun, who explained his swing vote in a one paragraph concurrence: "I may misinterpret the Court's opinion, but it seems to
me that it adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw
federal power in areas such as environmental protection,
where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where
state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would
be essential." 211
In what may have been more than coincidence, the Court's
next best chance to opine on the implications of National
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 860, 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 872-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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League of Cities came in an environmental case. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n2 12 involved a
challenge brought by a group of strip miners and the State of
Virginia to federal environmental regulations under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.213 Taking
National League of Cities to an extreme, but arguably logical,
conclusion, appellants contended that the regulations interfered with the "traditional state function" of supervising the
use of private land." 4
As if to reassure Justice Blackmun, the Court made short
shrift of these arguments, holding that the regulations were
based on a "rational" finding that improper strip mining interfered with interstate commerce.21 In an effort to provide further guidance to the lower courts, Hodel refrained National
League of Cities's holding as a four-part test: (1) the challenged
statute must regulate the "States as States"; (2) the statute
must address matters that are "attributes of state sovereignty";
(3) it must be "apparent" that the State's compliance will directly impair its ability to fulfill "traditional government functions"; and (4) a compelling federal interest in the subject mat16
ter of the regulation may override the first three factors.
This effort to further interpret and clarify the National
League of Cities test did not ameliorate the turmoil below. National League of Cities launched a veritable tidal wave of litigation; by one estimate, 300 cases inspired by the new doctrine
wended their way through the lower courts within a period of
only a few years.217 By 1985, when the Court decided to consider yet another FLSA case, the lower federal courts had
212. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
213. Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 91 Stat. 447 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§
1201-1328 (Supp. 11 1979)).
214. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 275-76.
215. Id. at 289.
216. Id. at 287-88. The fourth part of the test is specified in footnote 29,
which explains that meeting the first three "requirements" does not mean
that a constitutional challenge will succeed because "the nature of the federal
interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." Id. at 288
n.29.
217. For a list of citations and an analysis of these cases, see D. Bruce La
Pierre, The PoliticalSafeguards of FederalismRedux: IntergovernmentalImmunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 808
n.115, 896 n.454 (1982) and D. Bruce La Pierre, PoliticalAccountability in the
National PoliticalProcess-TheAlternative to JudicialReview of Federalism
Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 580 n.9 (1985) [hereinafter PoliticalAccountability].
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compiled a mystifying lineup of decisions. As catalogued by the
majority in Garcia,activities held by the lower federal courts to
be "traditional governmental functions" entitled to protection
under National League of Cities included state and local efforts
to regulate ambulance services, license automobile drivers, operate a municipal airport, perform solid waste disposal, and
operate a highway authority.2 18 Activities held not immune
included issuance of industrial development bonds, regulation
of intrastate natural gas sales, regulation of traffic on public
roads, regulation of air transportation, operation of a telephone
system, leasing and sale of natural gas, operation of a mental
health facility, and provision of in-house domestic services for
21 9
elderly and handicapped individuals.
The newly-aligned majority recoiled from this welter of legal doctrines, observing that the increased trend toward privatization of government services made the distinction between
220
public and private "functions" collapse under its own weight.
Instead, the new majority referred future federal, state, and local disputants to the political process, noting calmly that "the
principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of
the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the
Federal Government itself."22' In 1985, in a fitting coda to the
Garcia decision, President Reagan signed into law a FLSA
amendment sought by state and local governments in the immediate wake of the decision.22 2 The immediacy of this reaction vindicates the Garciamajority's faith in the political process. It did little, however, to mollify the Garcia dissenters,
who, having had their victory snatched roughly from their
grasp, were no less passionate in their predictions of catastrophic results than the National League of Cities dissenters
had been. 223 Justice Powell, writing on behalf of Chief Justice
218. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528,
538 (1985).
219. Id. at 538-39.
220. Id. at 545.
221. Id. at 550. The seminal article suggesting this interpretation of the
Framers' intent is Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Gov-

ernment, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). For a more recent discussion of these
issues, see PoliticalAccountability, supra note 217.
222. The amendment allowed state and local governments to compensate
overtime with time off rather than pay. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 99 Stat. 787-89 (1985) (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
223. Ironically, during the period of mourning by state and local advocates
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Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, accused the
majority of abdicating its proper constitutional role by irresponsibly referring intergovernmental disputes to "federal political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, [who will be]
the sole judges of the limits of their own power." n 4 The dissenters refused to accept that the National League of Cities
"traditional functions" test was unworkable; they insisted that
while the task may not be easy, it was the Court's duty to conautonomy constitutionally
tinue to define the scope of state225
protected against federal incursion.
Since overturning NationalLeague of Cities, the Court has
revisited the "battlefield of federalism" on three relevant occasions. 6 In New York v. United States, 7 the Court held that
in the immediate aftermath of the Garciaopinion, ACIR issued a report conceding that the opinion was probably correct in its interpretation of the Constitution, but calling for a series of constitutional amendments that would restore state and local autonomy and sovereignty in relation to the federal
government. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
REFLECTIONS ON GARCIA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERALISM M-147
(1986).
224. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting). ":A]ll that stands between the remaining essentials of
state sovereignty and Congress," Justice O'Connor wrote bitterly, "is the latter's underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint." Id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 574-79 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 588-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Some commentators have argued that the abandonment of the test
and the Court's failure to replace it with any alternative mechanism amounts
to a repeal ofjudicial review of federalism questions. See, e.g., Merritt, supra
note 50, at 19-20 (noting that Garcia "raises the specter of the Court curtailing judicial review in other areas as well"); William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism,83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1724 (1985) (observing that
Garcia appears to repudiate Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803)).
226. Two other recent cases applying Garcia are important in the larger
context of the Court's ongoing dialogue concerning federalism, but are not directly relevant to the specific issues addressed here. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 470 (1990), declined to apply federal age discrimination provisions to
state judges. The case provides support to a post-Garcia theory developed by
one commentator to the effect that states and their citizens should have control over the organizational structure of state government and the processes
by which such governments make decisions. Merritt, supra note 50, at 40-42.
The case does not modify Garcia's application to municipal services provided
by both public and private entities, however. A second case, South Carolinav.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1988), affirmed the federal government's
authority to tax interest income from state and local government bonds. The
case reaffirmed the Court's reluctance to question the result reached by Congress unless it is presented with evidence of "extraordinary defects in the national political process," although the strength of this holding may be limited
to taxation issues. Id. at 512.
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Congress had overstepped its bounds to the point of
"commandeering" the legislative processes of the states when it
gave them no choice but to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program. 22 . At issue was a provision in the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act that gave the states the choice of
either finding safe disposal capacity or taking title to the waste
themselves." 9 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor invalidated the provision because neither alternative represented an acceptable exercise of congressional Commerce
Clause authority."' She hastened, however, to assure her
audience that because the statute did not involve the regulation of similar conduct by private 23parties,
the Court had "no oc1
casion to apply or revisit" Garcia.
United States v. Lopez considered the constitutionality of a
federal statute that resulted in the conviction of a high school
student for carrying a weapon to school.23 2 Led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, a conservative majority struck down the law
because Congress did not articulate why such behavior burdened interstate commerce.233 In an opinion laced with sar227. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
228. Id. at 178. This standard was first suggested in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981), where the
Court concluded that the statute at issue did not "commandeer" the states
into regulating mining. The Court reached the same result in FERC v. Mississippi,456 U.S. 742, 764 (1982), which also involved a statute that gave the
states a choice between regulating themselves or tolerating federal regulation.
229. These statutory provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C), are described
in New York, 505 U.S. at 153-54.
230. New York, 505 U.S. at 174-77.
231. Id. at 160. Justice White, writing to concur in part and dissent in
part on behalf of himself and Justices Blackmun and Stevens, expressed relief
that Justice O'Connor sent the signal that the Court "does not intend to cut a
wide swath through our recent Tenth Amendment precedents," but pronounced himself unconvinced by her effort to distinguish the New York facts.
He argued instead that the Court should defer to the political process and uphold the "take title" provisions. Id. at 201, 205-06 (White, J., concurring).
Although commentators immediately got to work divining the likely future scope of the opinion, none have argued that it marked a major departure
from the central holding of Garcia. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy:May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1001 (1995) (urging the Court to
abandon efforts to develop the "commandeering" doctrine); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REv. 633 (1993)
(urging Justice O'Connor to continue to develop her "vision of federalism" in
subsequent cases).
232. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
233. Id. at 1626 ("The Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate
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casm, the Court admonished Congress to either develop a more
convincing rationale for its federalization of crime or defer to
the states to deal with the problem.234
The Court's third and most recent effort to revive federalist doctrine involved yet another bitterly divided, five-to-four
decision holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars private
lawsuits against the states. Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Florida235 invalidated a federal statute permitting Native American
tribes to sue states in federal court for failing to negotiate
gaming compacts in good faith. In the course of forging this
reaffirmation of state immunity, the Seminole Tribe majority
overruled Pennsylvaniav. Union Gas,236 an environmental case
making states vulnerable to contribution lawsuits brought by
private parties under the CERCLA.23 7
None of these cases is likely to have a significant effect on
federal regulation of municipal activities that pollute the environment. As Justice O'Connor noted in the New York opinion,238 federal environmental statutes give the states the option
to apply for delegated authority, 23 9 and the commandeering
cases are therefore
unlikely to affect most major environmental
240
programs.

commerce.").
234. See id. at 1630-31 ("Section 922(q) [of the Gun-Free School Zones Act]
is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or
any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms.").
235. 64 U.S.L.W. 4167 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1996). Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas were in the majority, while Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer were in dissent. Id.
236. 491U.S. 1(1989).
237. The Superfund provision authorizing contribution lawsuits is found at
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). The Court recognized the nature of federal environmental
law, but held nevertheless that:
[Tihe background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in
the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when
the subject of the suit is an area ...that is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government .... [T]he Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
unconsenting States.
64 U.S.L.W. at 4175.
238. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992).
239. See supra note 15 (citing federal environmental statutes that delegate
implementation and enforcement to state governments).
240. A recent Fifth Circuit case suggests that this area is still volatile and
that Congress should craft delegation provisions very carefully. ACORN v.
Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996), involved a Tenth Amendment challenge to the State of Louisiana's implementation of provisions of the Safe
Drinking Water Act that required the states to establish programs to assist
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Lopez was probably intended as a warning to Congress to
draft statutes more carefully rather than a significant change
in the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause. Its true
import remains to be seen, however, especially if the Court
gains more conservative appointees over the next decade or
two, solidifying what is now a very fragile majority for more
ambitious expansion of states' rights. Even in that event, if
conservative justices are really determined to cut a significant
path through the thicket of precedent that reads Commerce
Clause authority expansively, they
have several decades of
241
very difficult work ahead of them.
Given the narrow vote and the lengthy and occasionally
obtuse reasoning advanced to justify the majority and two dissenting opinions, Seminole Tribe's full implications likewise
are not clear. Dissenting Justice Stevens feared the worst,
predicting that Seminole Tribe will prevent Congress "from
providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against
States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to
those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the
regulation of our vast national economy."242 The majority
blithely dismissed this dire forecast in a pair of footnotes contending that a wide range of remedies remain open to Congress, from lawsuits brought by the federal government against
states to private lawsuits enjoining state officers from violating
243
federal law.
Seminole Tribe's most obvious threat is to the current
scheme of citizen suit enforcement authorized by all of the
major environmental statutes. 2 " Citizens' suits against states
local schools in eliminating lead contamination of drinking water. Because
the Act did not give the states a choice whether to implement its requirements and did not contain the traditional default that the federal government
would regulate if the states elected not to do so, the Fifth Circuit declared it
unconstitutional. 81 F.3d 1394 ("States are not mere political subdivisions of
the United States. State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government."). Clearly, Congress and the
EPA take a significant risk-at least in the Fifth Circuit-when they cross the
line from requesting regulatory volunteers to drafting the states into involuntary service.
241. For an interesting analysis of the pitfalls of that journey, see Mark
Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1623 (1994).
242. 64 U.S.L.W. 4167, 4176 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1996).
243. Id. at 4175 nn.13-14.
244. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)
(1996) (authorizing citizen suits to enforce states' obligations under federal
environmental law); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (1996)
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are arguably eliminated by the opinion.245 In general, however,
the Court has refused to extend immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment to political subdivisions, unless they are acting as
an "arm of the state."24 6 Seminole Tribe would therefore have
no effect on most of the actors and practices discussed in this
Article.
Assuming that New York, Lopez, and Seminole Tribe represent contained instances of the Court gently fanning the
smoldering embers of federalism, rather than the beginning of
a campaign to revive NationalLeague of Cities, how would the
Court respond to a case challenging an unfunded federal environmental mandate brought, National League of Cities-style,
by a large coalition of local governments? The issues presented
by such a case not only vindicate Garcia, they underscore the
perils of resuscitating NationalLeague of Cities.
What would be the facts of an unfunded environmental
mandates challenge? Most probably, such a case would attack
regulations that prescribe highly technical and admittedly expensive requirements for the performance of such routine municipal functions as collecting garbage, providing drinking water, and treating sewage. The EPA would defend the mandates
on the basis that they were necessary to protect public health
and the environment; municipalities would argue that the
(same); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1996) (same); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1996) (same).
245. See John Cronin and Robert F. Kennedy, Losing Our Day in Court,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1996, at A25 (criticizing the Supreme Courts holding in
Seminole Tribe and its potential negative impact on enforcement of federal
environmental laws). As Cronin and Kennedy acknowledge, the suggestion in
footnote 14 of the Seminole Tribe opinion, 64 U.S.L.W. at 4175, that citizens
would still be permitted to sue individual state officials for violating federal
law under the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), may
require nothing more than revised pleadings in environmental citizen suits,
or, alternatively, it may be ignored by lower federal courts anxious to apply
Seminole Tribe's central holding. 64 U.S.L.W. at 4175 n.14. The Seminole
Tribe dissent filed by Justice Souter provides support for the second interpretation. 64 U.S.L.W. at 4205-06. A recent Ninth Circuit ruling upholds citizen
suits against individual state officials accused of violating federal environmental laws. National Resources Defense Council v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 65
U.S.L.W. 221 (Sept. 17, 1996).
246. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 700 (1978)
(holding that local governments are not covered by the Eleventh Amendment
except to the extent that they are part of the state); Lincoln County v. Luming,
133 U.S. 529, 533 (1890) (same). For a general discussion of the implications
of extending Eleventh Amendment immunity to political subdivisions, see
Melvyn R. Durchslag, Should Political Subdivision Be Accorded Eleventh
Amendment Immunity?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 577 (1994).

HeinOnline -- 81 Minn. L. Rev. 163 1996-1997

164

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:97

mandates represented an unwarranted and extremely disruptive interference in their ability to implement their essential
and traditional government role. Each side would introduce
complex technical information and expert opinion to document
the merits and pitfalls of the regulations. However energetic
the parties and however careful the lower federal courts in requiring them to prove and brief their cases, the most likely result would be a factual record that is confusing at best regarding the substance of the regulations and almost certainly
insufficient to inform the Court about the implications of invalidating them.
Although the conservative justices are intent on using any
reasonable opportunity to reinvigorate the Court's federalist
doctrine, it is unlikely that they would choose this case as a
vehicle to overturn Garcia wholesale. The more interesting
question, however, is whether the conservatives could discern a
valid Tenth Amendment claim in this hypothetical case that
would mark a midway point between NationalLeague of Cities
and Garcia. The answer is no for one fundamental and unavoidable reason: the Court cannot recognize the municipalities' claim and still uphold uniform regulation of identical public and private conduct under the Commerce Clause. The
difficulty arises not only in deciding what functions a local government "traditionally" provide, but also in drawing a rational
distinction between those functions and the same services
provided by the private sector. Given this dilemma, there is no
way to avoid a double standard that would fatally undermine
the constitutional justification for federal environmental regulations, just as Justice Blackmun feared.
Nor does the possibility of focusing on the existence of a
compelling federal interest, weighing that interest against the
burden on municipalities, help much to clarify the matter. If
the federal government has a compelling interest in regulating
the safety of drinking water sold in commerce by private parties, it must have a similarly strong interest in regulating the
same conduct by public entities. Yet balancing this interest
against the inconvenience and cost to the municipalities posed
by the regulations leads back to the same place. Unless the
Court is willing to weigh the burden on private providers of the
service-an approach with drastic implications for its analysis
of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause-any
conclusion that the municipalities' interest outweighs the federal interest will establish a dual standard of regulation and a

HeinOnline -- 81 Minn. L. Rev. 164 1996-1997

1996]

UNFUNDEDENVIRONMENTAL MANDATES

165

dual level of public health protection. In short, without radically changing its interpretation of the Commerce Clause and
its own role in reviewing regulations, the Court cannot provide
a forum for the resolution of unfunded mandates issues. Participants in the conflict must therefore look elsewhere for relief.
IV. SORTING PRINCIPLES
Today... the Federal system is in complete disarray. Congress
has lost all sense of restraint.
It is long past time to dust off the FederalistPapersand to renew
the debate commenced by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. They would
ask not only whether a proposal is a good program, but also "Is this a
Federalfunction?"
-Then-Governor Bruce Babbitt of
Arizona in a 1980 address to the
2 47
NationalGovernors'Association

Over the last two decades, Congress and the President
have expressed dissatisfaction with the federal regulatory system by either cutting funding for the bureaucracy or controlling the bureaucrats with procedural red tape. If the scope and
intensity of the movement against unfunded mandates are any
indication, however, these efforts have proven largely ineffective both in relieving intergovernmental tensions and in allocating clear responsibility for important areas of domestic policy among the three levels of government. Until and unless
such responsibilities are sorted more effectively, failed regulation may create a significant and unacceptable risk of damage
to public health and natural resources, as well as the more
subtle risk of entrenching public cynicism about government's
ability to respond sensibly to serious problems.
The best alternative to fiscal deprivation and procedural
paralysis is to craft a set of sorting principles for distributing
authority and responsibility among federal, state, and local
governments. Those principles should vary depending on the
area of public policy involved. In areas such as environmental
protection and other public health and safety regulation, programs would be shared. The federal government would concentrate on establishing a substantive framework for regulation, while state and local governments would have sufficient
247. GLENDEING & REEVES, supra note 30, at 103 (Governor Bruce Babbitt, Remarks to the National Governors' Association (Aug. 4, 1980)) (first
omission in original).
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autonomy to implement those requirements cost-effectively.
To be effective, sorting principles must have two attributes. First, their application to specific regulatory proposals
must be verifiable empirically. Regulators must be able to develop facts during the course of the rulemaking that either
support or fail to support application of a given principle. Second, federal, state, and local officials, as well as representatives of other interests affected by intergovernmental regulation, must acknowledge the validity of the principles. If a
rough consensus confirms that a principle reflects sound public
policy, its application will improve the credibility of regulation
and reduce intergovernmental tensions. This section proposes
five sorting principles and rejects three other possible candidates. The next section tests the validity of the principles by
applying them in one of the most prominent contexts for the
unfunded mandates debate: implementation of the Safe
Drinking Water Act.2 4
A. FivE SORTING PRINCIPLES
1. Transboundary Pollution
The most obvious justification for federal regulation of environmental problems is the effect of pollution that crosses
state lines, or so-called "transboundary" pollution.249 Only the
248. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j (West 1991 & Supp. 1996), amended by Safe
Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 110 Stat.
1613. Before launching into the discussion, however, it is important to acknowledge the seminal work on this subject: Richard B. Stewart's 1977 article
Pyramidsof Sacrifice?Problems of Federalismin Mandating State Implementation of National EnvironmentalPolicy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210-22 (1977).
Stewart undertook his analysis before the Supreme Court decided Garcia, before the emergence of so-called "new federalism" as a major theory dominating
the nation's political life, and well before the advent of the campaign against
unfunded mandates. Nevertheless, he insightfully described the potential factors available to sort intergovernmental responsibility. Although the following analysis disagrees with his conclusions in several important respects, it
revisits his work throughout.
249. Stewart calls the transboundary pollution problem the "spillover impact," noting that it is manifested both by physical pollution that travels
across state lines and by the degradation of nationally valued natural resources because of the local controlling jurisdiction's decisions. Stewart, supra note 248, at 1215-16. Decades before major federal environmental laws
were passed, states sued each other, as well as industry located in other
states and. individual cities, over the problems of transboundary pollution,
begging the federal courts to develop a federal "common law" of nuisance to
provide a remedy in such cases. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
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most diehard federalist would disagree that if industry within
one state can manage to export most of its pollution to another
state, the source state is unlikely to impose effective controls
and the receiving state lacks the leverage to protect itself. The
transboundary rationale applies in any situation where pollution is transported across state lines via the ambient air or interconnecting natural geology such as rivers or aquifers. If the
effects of such pollution would motivate regulation when they
occurred primarily within the boundaries of the source state,
but the impetus to regulate is thwarted by the state's opportunity to export pollution, then the rationale for federal intervention is compelling.
Many of the environmental problems caused by local government operations and challenged as unfunded mandates fall
into this category. Sewage discharges into major waterways,
for example, can have severe transboundary effects. Municipal
solid waste landfills cause contamination of underground water supplies, many of which are linked across state lines.
Those same aquifers provide potentially contaminated drinking water to large portions of the population.
Although the transboundary pollution rationale remains a
central organizing principle for federal environmental regulation, it becomes increasingly less compelling in situations
where the effects of pollution occur equally or primarily within
the state where the source is located. In such circumstances, it
is more difficult to predict that the source state will fail to
regulate. Thus, if federal regulation is to occur in this context,
it must be premised on other principles.2 50
U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (holding that the Clean Water Act effectively preempts
common law claims); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-101 (1972)
(recognizing the existence of a federal common law of nuisance in water pollution cases); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907)
(granting Georgia's request that the company, which was located in Tennessee, be enjoined from releasing "noxious gas" that traveled through the ambient air into Georgia); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 526 (1906) (declining
to enjoin the discharge of sewage from Chicago into the Mississippi River).
250. The one caveat to this generalization is localized pollution that causes
damage to natural resources that have value to the nation as a whole. William Pedersen has suggested a strong role for federal regulation in protecting
"uniquely national areas," such as national parks and wilderness regions, observing that the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program under the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492 (1994), is based on this principle. William F. Pedersen, Jr., Federal/StateRelations in the Clean Air Act, the Clean
Water Act, and RCRA: Does the Pattern Make Sense?, 12 ENVTL. L. REP.
15069, 15071 (1982). Determining when a natural resource rises to the level
of national importance is a judgment call. Given the strong national identity
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The existence of transboundary effects is measurable both
qualitatively and quantitatively in the context of a specific
legislative or regulatory decision. Because there is a broadbased consensus that the prevalence of such effects warrants
federal intervention, justifying decisions on this basis should
help to reduce antagonism among the three levels of government.2 5'
2. Economies of Scale in Regulating
Research concerning the acute and chronic effects of pollution on people and ecosystems is much more sophisticated
than it was two decades ago. Not only do scientists have a better understanding of how individual pollutants affect human
health and the environment, they are increasingly able to
measure the synergistic and cumulative effects of routine exposures. This emerging understanding of potential effects demonstrates that there is still an enormous research agenda left
to accomplish. 2 It also makes the business of developing efand mobility of Americans, an argument could be made for labeling virtually
any beautiful place a national treasure. On the other hand, there are many
resources that a broad spectrum of the public views as nationally important
resources, including many communities that promote tourism.
251. The transboundary rationale may also be useful in other contexts,
such as protecting the nation's food supply from contamination, controlling
the spread of infectious diseases, or preventing tampering with drugs commonly transported interstate.
252. The best comprehensive discussions of what we know, what we do not
know, and the implications of our emerging knowledge for effective environmental regulation are two EPA reports issued in an effort to reexamine national environmental priorities. In 1987, the EPA published an analysis by its
career staff of the environmental problems that should be on the Agency's
regulatory agenda. U.S. EPA, UNFINISHED BusINEss: A COMPARATiVE
ASSESSMENT OF ENviRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987) [hereinafter UNFINISHED
BUSINESS]. Three years later, the EPA asked its Science Advisory Board to
review UNFINISHED BUSINESS and prepare its own recommendations for the
Agency's future direction. U.S. EPA, REDUCING RISK: SETrING PRIORITIES
AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990) [hereinafter
REDUCING RISK]. Both reports emphasized the gaps in information and scientific uncertainty that must be addressed at the national level:
The basic data.., on many subjects studied in this project are surprisingly poor. The general weakness of exposure data is a special
problem because exposure is such an important determinant of risk ....
The best information available is for cancer risk. Even there, however, it was not nearly as good as one might expect .... There is no
generally applicable methodology for ecological risk assessment ....
While there are generally accepted methods for assessing welfare effects, there is a general scarcity of data and analysis in this area.
UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra, at 98-99.
The ability to assess environmental risks, compare them, and select
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fective regulation both complicated and expensive.25 3 To meet
the challenge of continuing to protect and improve the environment in a period of limited and diminishing government resources, the nation must devote its best available resources to
the assessment and prioritization of environmental risks.
In the environmental and other public health contexts,
economies of scale in regulations demand that such work be
strategies to reduce them all depend on the availability and sophistication of the relevant data and analytical tools. The weakness in Unfinished Business stems in large part from the weakness of the data
and analytical tools used, and those weaknesses still exist. If EPA's
efforts to assess, compare, and reduce risks are to improve in the future, the data and analytical tools must improve as well.
REDUCING RISK, supra, at 18.
253. Estimating the public costs of developing effective regulatory programs is a complex task that has yet to receive the comprehensive analysis it
deserves. The best indication of how expensive this work can be is the money
the EPA receives to develop regulatory proposals. The EPA's annual operating expenses totaled $7.2 billion for fiscal year 1995. U.S. EPA, FISCAL YEAR
1996 JUSTIFICATION APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES FOR COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, 1-1 (1995) [hereinafter EPA FY 1996 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION].

This total represents what the EPA spent in one year to meet its duties under
13 environmental statutes. The 1996 report of the U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Committee provides a further breakdown of what the
Agency spent to develop regulations, as opposed to tracking compliance and
enforcement, because it gives separate totals for each discrete program activity and explains what these activities entail. The report accompanying the
Committee's FY 1996 appropriations bill explains how money was appropriated for FY 1995 and breaks down the EPA's regulatory responsibilities into
two basic categories: "Research and Development" and "Environmental Programs and Compliance." In FY 1995, the Committee appropriated $350 million for Research and Development:
The Research and Development account funds all extramural Environmental Protection Agency research ....
Research addresses a
wide range of environmental and health concerns across all environmental media and encompasses both long-term basic and near-term
applied research to provide the scientific knowledge and technologies
necessary for preventing, regulating, and abating pollution, and to
anticipate merging [sic] environmental issues.
H.R. REP. No. 104-201, at 46 (1995).
A brief fiscal portrait of a single regulatory area provides further insight
into the costs of regulating. For instance, the EPA spent $165 million in FY
1995 to carry out its regulatory duties under the Safe Drinking Water Act.
This sum includes the following specific budget allocations: (1) $22 million for
the Drinking Water Research program, which "provides the scientific and
technical basis [to support] Agency rule making activities under the Safe
Drinking Water Act Amendments," and (2) $31 million for Criteria, Standards
and Guidelines programs. EPA FY 1996 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra, at 51, 5-9, 5-12. While these amounts do not sound large in the context of the
EPA's overall multi-billion dollar budget, they are very significant in the context of the limited funds available at the state level to implement such programs. See infra notes 396-399 and accompanying text.
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done at the federal and not the state level, especially where effective regulation demands the development or analysis of a
complex body of data. 54 It simply makes no sense to reinvent
the wheel fifty times with respect to problems that are prevalent throughout the nation. Deferring complex problems to the
state level may also mean that they do not get addressed because the states lack the resources to analyze them effectively.
Finally, national regulation makes it possible to target regulation on the most serious environmental-and other-risks.
Significant economies of scale are usually possible in the
development of standards that establish maximum levels of
contamination because such work requires analysis of available scientific information about the contaminant's toxicological effects. Similarly, economies of scale are achievable in the
development of technology-based standards, especially where
competing technologies are just emerging on an international
level. Where technologies are well established and achieve
comparable results from a pollution control perspective, the
need for federal regulation is acute.
The availability of economies of scale in the development of
market-based incentive approaches to regulation depends on
the market dynamics of the activity that causes the pollution.
The most significant experiment to date, marketing allowances
for emissions that cause acid rain under the Clean Air Act, required the establishment of a national market for the allowances in an effort to equalize the costs of controlling the production of sulfur dioxide across many regions. 255 It is possible
that in other circumstances-marketing of credits for water
pollution of large rivers, for instance-a regional market would
be sufficient to ensure economic viability. 6
Although it is almost always more economically efficient

254. Stewart also recognizes economies of scale in regulating, although he
gives them relatively short shrift in his justification of a strong national
regulatory system for protecting the environment. Stewart, supra note 248,
at 1212.
255. See S. REP. No. 101-228, at 315-27 (1989) (explaining how the allowance market will operate on a national scale to equalize costs and stimulate
innovation in emission-reduction strategies).
256. Of course, the creation of regional markets does not necessarily depend on federal government action. States are perfectly capable of crafting
regional compacts when they share a mutual perception of a common pollution problem. See, e.g., Patricia S. Florestano, Pastand Present Utilizationof
Interstate Compacts in the United States, 24 PUBLIUS 13, 18-25 (1994)
(discussing the use of interstate compacts).
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for the federal government to assume responsibility for analyzing a major regulatory problem than for numerous states to attempt to develop independent factual records, this principle
can be taken to illogical extremes. The federal government's
resources are also limited and should not be used to address
problems that are neither prevalent in the states nor severe in
their overall impact on human health or the environment.
Gauging the severity or prevalence of a problem at the national
level will remain a judgment call. In some cases, the fact that
a problem occurs in some states but not in others will mean
that the federal government should defer regulation to the
states. For example, the use of certain specialized agricultural
pesticides or fertilizers may result in environmental contamination that is prevalent in only a few areas of the country and
is therefore within the state government's ability to detect and
remediate. In other cases, variations in local conditions will
mean that the federal government should develop a uniform,
regulatory approach with readily available waivers or exceptions. For example, the safe design of landfills is a national
priority, although the geology where the landfill is located may
affect some aspects of such designs. The federal government
could provide uniform design standards, with waivers tailored
to specific local conditions.
The degree of complexity and level of expense required to
develop regulatory policy is verifiable and should become a
threshold consideration for federal policy-makers at both the
EPA and Congress. Because there is a widespread consensus
that solutions to the most difficult scientific and technical
problems require a pooling of our best national resources, justifying decisions on this basis should also help to reduce antagonism among the three levels of government.
3. Equity and Equal Protection
Conservative commentators have called environmental
protection a "luxury good," affordable in flush times, expendable in tough times, and presumably out of reach for poor people no matter what the state of the economy. 2 7 While only a
257. See, e.g., P.J. OROURKE, ALL THE TROUBLE IN THE WORLD 201 (1994):
Neither is a "clean environment" a political right of humans.
Rights must be free .... You have the right to bear arms. You don't
have the right to take a gun without paying for it.
Pollution control is not free ....
The environment turns out to be the "luxury good" that Cato In-
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small minority of Americans probably agree with this assessment, the unrestricted devolution of fundamental regulatory
decisions to the local level could well make it a reality. Principles of equity and equal protection demand the establishment
of baseline national standards so that Americans are not exposed to fundamentally unequal levels of environmental risk. 8
Or, put another way, it is the rare public official today who
would suggest that people should receive different levels of
protection from environmental problems depending on the
demographics of the community where they live.
The need for baseline standards is particularly acute given
the unequal distribution of environmental problems in society.
The disproportionate effects of pollution on low-income, minority communities is increasingly well-documented.2 9 If determining the level of protection became the sole province of such
communities, gross discrepancies between the exposures tolerated by poor and minority Americans and those tolerated by
stitute's Jerry Taylor said it was.
See also Michael Kinsley, Twilight Zones, NEW REPUBLIC, May 25, 1992, at 6
("There is actually a serious argument that protections for health, safety, and
the environment are luxury goods that poor people should have less of. But I
dare Jack Kemp to make it."); Making the Poor Pay for Pollution, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at A22 ("A squeaky-clean environment is something of
a luxury, one that is hard for the poor and minorities to afford ....[T]he more
disposable income the average person has, the more luxury goods like environmental cleanups he will buy.").
258. Stewart's analysis of the equal protection problem is the most dated
and wrongheaded aspect of his article. He argued that the ground swell of
public concern about the environment that arose in the late 1960s was a
"moral crusade" that could best achieve success if carried out at the national
level because the crusaders needed to demonstrate that every community was
making equal sacrifices for the good of the whole and because national implementation obscured the true costs of the crusade. Stewart, supra note 248, at
1217-18. On the other hand, he worried that centralizing such decisions at
the national level disadvantages the poor, who would have more clout if the
decisions were made at the local level and who are, in any event, forced to pay
for the improvements. The so-called "Pyramid of Sacrifice," which he said the
poor must endure, was premised on the idea that the poor receive relatively
less benefit from and do not value the morals that are the subject of the crusade. Id. at 1221-22. Stewart offers no evidence for this essentially elitist
conclusion, which is, in any event, challenged by the emergence of the environmental justice movement, among other developments.
259. See, e.g., INFORM, TOxICs WATCH 1995, at 374, 377-86 (1995)
[hereinafter ToxIcs WATCH] (listing studies that show environmental regulations' disproportionate impact on minority and poor communities); RACE AND
THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE
(Bunyon Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) (same); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice": The DistributionalEffects of EnvironmentalProtection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 792-806 (1993) (same).
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the middle and upper class would increase. Not only do lowincome communities lack the resources to devise effective
regulation, they are considerably more vulnerable to threats
that they must choose between jobs and protecting the environment. They are also overloaded with other social problems
that compete for resources and the attention of the body politic.
Of course, in the absence of federal or state funding, the
level of protection actually achieved depends on each individual community's ability to pay, no matter what the federal government decides is the ideal standard. Strict federalists might
argue that unless Washington puts its money where its mouth
is, low-income and minority communities fare no better than if
they had been left to their own devices in the first place. This
argument, however, rapidly degenerates: it is better to abandon the effort to establish baseline standards because funding
will probably not come through at either the federal or state
level. The willingness of government to fund environmental
programs, however, cannot be determined in the absence of
standards defining the protection that is necessary. The fact
that funding poses major problems for implementation is not a
reason to eschew valid standard-setting in the first place.
The effect of regulatory decisions on the disadvantaged
and vulnerable can be evaluated both qualitatively and quantitatively throughout a legislative debate or a rulemaking, and
this principle therefore satisfies the verification criterion. As
for its capacity to reduce intergovernmental tensions, the
principle is on weaker ground. There is no broad-based consensus that equity is served only at the national level. Indeed,
many states would argue that they are perfectly capable of
providing it without prodding from the federal government.
Whatever the merits of this argument in the context of individual states, some states are sufficiently weak economically
that they cannot ensure equity without federal assistance.
This claim is also suspect from an historical perspective; states'
overall track record on race relations was and is a major justification for active federal civil rights enforcement and environmental justice issues are but the latest manifestations of
these concerns. In sum, the overriding importance of equity
and equal protection warrant their use as a sorting principle
despite the possibility that they will exacerbate intergovernmental tensions.
As with the transboundary rationale and considerations of
economies of scale in regulating, these equity principles are
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also transferable to other areas of regulatory policy. The difficulty in applying them to social issues lies in defining a baseline level of minimal protection or other benefit that all people
deserve. However difficult this task, national values arguably
compel its undertaking.
The impact of transboundary pollution, economies of scale
in regulation, and the moral imperatives of equity and equal
protection justify the establishment of baseline federal standards for the protection of human health and the environment.
But some of the federal environmental regulations targeted by
local governments go well beyond establishing a national baseline, imposing burdens that simply cannot be justified on these
grounds. The next two principles turn the sorting process on
its head and serve to determine when the federal government
should defer to state and local governments to address environmental problems.
4. Local Implementation
Federal regulations should only impose requirements that
make sense in the context of specific local conditions.2 60 Even
where federal regulatory mandates are justified, local governments should have adequate flexibility to implement them in
the most cost-effective manner. Both ideas are frequently labeled as the "one-size-fits-all" problem: rigid edicts handed
down from Washington often straitjacket local initiative, infuriating municipal officials who are already under pressure to
resolve a lengthening list of difficult social problems with an
ever-diminishing public fisc.
In some instances, the best way to address the issue of local implementation is to refrain from imposing regulatory requirements. In others, a national standard is necessary, but
the regulations should include a workable, accessible system
for granting waivers or exceptions. For example, a federal requirement that municipal solid waste landfills have two liners
should not apply to landfills in arid areas where there is no
groundwater. Similarly, federal regulations may impose a requirement that local drinking water systems test for a dangerous pesticide, but should allow local systems to terminate
testing when the pesticide is not found in the water supply. In
260. Stewart calls this principle "diseconomies of scale," by which he

means the imposition of disproportionate and unnecessary burdens on a locality as a result of inflexible federal regulation. Stewart, supra note 248, at
1219-20.

HeinOnline -- 81 Minn. L. Rev. 174 1996-1997

1996] UNFUNDEDENVIRONMENTAL MANDATES

175

all instances, the federal government should refrain from micromanaging local implementation to the point where money is
wasted on expensive technologies or other compliance methods.
While the above axioms are common sensical to the point
of triteness, Part V of this Article illustrates that they are often
ignored in the drafting of federal regulations. The complex and
costly rules that result from their omission are a major cause of
the friction between federal and municipal officials. These
rules provide local governments with a raft of absurd examples
of regulatory excess that undermine the credibility of the entire
federal system.
State and local officials should be both willing and able to
help federal officials develop alternatives that provide adequate flexibility to tailor national public health and safety requirements to local conditions. A clear federal commitment to
consider such alternatives as integral parts of the rule-making
process would result in more effective regulation. It would also
go a long way toward reducing intergovernmental tension over
both new and existing requirements.
5. Local Autonomy and Freedom from Excessive Regulation
As much as local governments demand flexibility and resent micromanagement, both complaints implicitly assume
that federal regulation will occur. Yet local governments often
take their objections one crucial step further and demand
autonomy over decisions whether or not to regulate. During
the debate over unfimded mandates legislation in the 103d and
104th Congresses, municipal advocates couched this issue in
extreme terms, claiming that they should have autonomy to accept or ignore federal mandates depending on the budgetary
exigencies of their individual communities. 261 Under this scenario, environmental concerns would join a much longer queue
of all public health and social welfare problems, with municipal
26L See, e.g., Federal Mandate Reform Legislation: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. 113 (1994) [hereinafter
Federal Mandate Reform Hearings 11 (statement of Gregory S. Lashutka,
Mayor, Columbus, Ohio):
Prioritizing is a process that all local governments must go through ....
With a limited amount of funds, not every program can be implemented. Because of the civil and criminal penalties attached to unfunded mandates, local dollars must fund federal environmental programs regardless of demonstrated need or effectiveness, while the
local priorities of police and fire protection, homeless shelters, and infrastructure repair are squeezed out.
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officials setting priorities without reference to any judgment by
national or even state governments regarding the importance
or urgency of the problem.
If taken to its logical conclusion, this approach would
trump all of the other principles, effectively negating the need
for most federal regulation. Indeed, it marks such a drastic reversal from trends in American intergovernmental relations
over the last several decades that it is tempting to dismiss it
out of hand as the polemics of advocates caught up in the heat
of debate. The mayor of one of America's largest cities, however, told his local newspaper that he was prepared to go to jail
rather than comply with federal sewage treatment requirements.26 2 The vehemence of such statements suggests, at the
very least, that the federal government has failed to make a
compelling case not only for the details of the regulations it has
imposed but for its choice of problems to regulate.
To restore credibility, Congress, the EPA, and other federal regulatory agencies must demonstrate that they are conscious of the environmental and other public health and safety
requirements they have already imposed on the local governments, and that they keep these requirements firmly in mind
when evaluating the need for and the feasibility of new regulatory programs. They must also reevaluate the federal regulatory agenda periodically, discarding those requirements that
no longer seem urgent or necessary.
The proposal that Congress and the EPA actively reconsider the existing environmental agenda before adding new
items to it falls short of suggesting, as some have, that there
should be an annual cap on expenditures for all federal regulation.26 3 At the same time, the EPA and other agencies should
262. William Sposato, Mayors Attack FederalRules, RegulationsAre Causing FinancialStrain on Cities, Says the U.S. Conference of Mayors. Fearsof
Bankruptcy Are Heard, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 21, 1993, at A3.

Philadelphia Mayor Rendell told the group that he had been told he
had to spend $250 million to $500 million to meet federal rules regarding oxygen levels in the Delaware River. "They will have to get
a federal court to put me in jail before Im going to spend that...
when we have people who don't have enough to eat, who don't have a
roof over their head,' he [said]." Id. (omission in original).
263. See, e.g., CONTRACT, supra note 3, at 132.
The [Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act] requires federal
agencies to issue an annual report projecting the cost to the private
sector of compliance with all federal regulations. The cost of the
regulations will then be capped below its current level forcing agencies to (1) find more cost-effective ways to reach goals and (2) identify
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do more than convene endless advisory groups of carefully selected municipal officials to jawbone with its senior appointees
about their troubles. In the context of each specific rulemaking, an inventory of existing requirements should be used to
evaluate the relative importance of any new proposal.
B. THREE REJECTED CANDIDATES
Evaluating federal regulatory decisions on the basis of
whether they provide adequate flexibility in the context of local
conditions and whether they represent a tolerable and necessary burden on limited local resources should provide an appropriate counterbalance to their justification on transboundary, economies of scale, or equity grounds. Before completing
the discussion of potential sorting principles, three additional
candidates commonly mentioned in debates over the legitimacy
of federal environmental regulation deserve consideration. For
both practical and principled reasons, however, none are as
useful as the five principles already proposed.
1. Races-to-the-Bottom
In theory, races-to-the-bottom occur when states compete
with each other for economic development by offering industry
financial and other incentives, including relief from environmental regulation." The desire to avoid such races is a major
reason to impose uniform and inescapable standards at the
national level. Local governments, though, cannot relocate to
avoid stringent state regulation. They may exert significant
influence over state legislatures and therefore over state environmental policy, but this influence does not derive from
threats to take their business elsewhere.
The inquiry cannot end there, however, because privatization is an increasingly attractive solution to the problems local
governments face in managing municipal solid waste, accomplishing sewage treatment, providing potable drinking water,
and delivering a range of other essential services. Local governments could plausibly argue that stringent federal regularegulatory policies whose benefits exceed their costs to the private
sector.
Id.
264. Stewart refers to this principle as the "Tragedy of the Commons,"
which he describes as "the rational but independent pursuit of each decisionmaker of its own self-interest [which] leads to results that leave all decisionmakers worse off than they would have been had they been able to agree collectively on a different set of policies." Stewart, supra note 248, at 1211.
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tion will deter investors from participating in such projects.
Such arguments could trigger a race-to-the-bottom at the state
level that is functionally indistinguishable from industryinspired races. This argument raises squarely the related issues of the extent to which such races actually exist and
whether they pose serious problems for their contestants.
Recent research questions the existence of races-to-thebottom with respect to environmental regulation, showing instead that states with the strongest economies also have the
strongest environmental programs.2 65 The research was done
in the context of industry claims that aggressive regulation
chills economic development and drives firms out of states that
have such programs. The research found that there was no actual correlation between aggressive regulatory programs and
any significant problems in a state's economy.266 Those who
contend that states should weaken programs to avoid upsetting
business are therefore really resting their argument on the
threat of future behavior motivated by perception rather than
any empirical demonstration that businesses have fled in the
past.
Intense competition among states for economic development is both well-documented and, in the view of some commentators, desirable.2 67 Even if such races head toward the
265.

STEPHEN M. MEYER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ECONOMIC PROS-

PERITY: AN UPDATE 10 (1993) [hereinafter MEYER UPDATE]; STEPHEN M.
MEYER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY: TESTING THE

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT HYPOTHESIS 42 (1992) [hereinafter MEYER].
266. In his original study, Professor Meyer concluded, "[s]tates with
stronger environmental policies and programs did not exhibit hobbled economic growth or development compared to those with weaker environmental
records." MEYER, supra note 265, at 42.
In his 1993 update, Meyer writes:
[Tlhose who live and work in states that have vigorously pursued
environmental quality and are now contemplating rolling back environmental standards as a quick fix to jump-starting their economies
out of recession should reconsider. Based on the evidence there is no
reason to expect that loosening environmental standards will have
any effect on the pace of state economic growth.
MEYER UPDATE, supra note 265, at 10.
267. For descriptions of how this competition has manifested itself in recent years, see Fred R. Bleakly, Many Firms Press States for Concessions,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1995, at A2; Larry Fish, Thou Shalt Covet Thy Neighbor's
Industry, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 30, 1991, at Cl; Rudolph A. Pyatt, Jr., No
Way to Win in Economic Civil War, WASH. POST, April 12, 1993, at F3. For an
excellent exposition of the argument that competition is desirable, see Richard
L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race-to-theBottom" Rationale for Federal EnvironmentalRegulation, 67 N.Y.U.L. REV.
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bottom, the commentators argue, they at least force states to be
more efficient, delivering to the people only the level of protection that they are willing to finance. Of course, this argument
depends on the assumption that debates over whether to ease
environmental regulation to attract new business are transparently obvious to the voting public. However, public opinion
polling showing that a large majority is unwilling to accept
such a trade-off undermines this premise. 268 These results
suggest that if these debates were conducted in public, environmental regulations would not be eased. Without getting
sidetracked into this admittedly interesting theoretical debate,
a race-to-the-bottom without full public disclosure would serve
industry's interests but not the public interest. Such races
could have a profoundly negative effect on the quality of environmental protection.
For all of these reasons, regulators may find it difficult to
verify whether a race-to-the-bottom regarding environmental
regulation does or could exist.269 Investors with a wide range of
opportunities might boycott a state that created a difficult climate for the public facilities they are asked to finance. It is
also possible that strong environmental laws could encourage
investment by lowering the risk of liability for residual pollution. Unless there is data indicating that a race-to-the-bottom
has already begun, regulators seeking to predict whether a
race will occur must rely on relatively subjective evidence of its
future likelihood. Even where there is data indicating that a
number of states are changing key laws in similar ways at the
behest of regulated industries, the assertion that the trend reflects a race-to-the-bottom, as opposed to a mutual recognition
of a common problem, is problematic and has the capacity to
exacerbate intergovernmental tensions.

1210, 1244-47 (1992). Revesz contends that competition between states for
industry can be expected to produce an efficient allocation of industrial activity among the states and that if states are foreclosed from competing on environmental grounds, they will find other, perhaps even less desirable, areas in
which to compete. Id.
268. See supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text (reviewing public
opinion polls relating to the environment).
269. It is possible that the destructive effects of interstate competition may
be more susceptible to empirical analysis in other regulatory contexts, or may
become more prevalent or measurable in the environmental arena. It will always be worth considering this phenomenon as sorting continues.
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2. The Importance of Public Choice
One important argument made by proponents of interstate
competition is the assertion that the public's right to choose the
level of protection it wishes to purchase can only be effectively
served at the local level.27 ° Conversely, commentators have argued that narrow special interest groups more easily capture
state governments, especially major industries; a strong federal role is thus necessary to guarantee that the full range of
271
public interests will be considered in the regulatory process.
For the purposes of sensibly sorting the responsibility for environmental protection among the three levels of government,
does it matter who is right in the debate over which level of
government can deliver policy that best incorporates the public
interest? Or, put another way, what does public choice theory
have to offer the quest for a coherent set of sorting principles?
Traditional public choice theory breaks down when applied
to unfunded federal environmental mandates because devolving decisions to the local level would result in an irresolvable
conflict of interest within the arena for making the public
choice. Environmental mandates regulate local governments
in their capacity as polluters and involve highly technical
270. For a thoughtful exposition of this argument, see Zelinsky, supra note
163, at 1369-89 (showing how legislators use unfunded mandates to satisfy
minority interests at the expense of the general public). For a contrary

analysis, see David A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded Environmental Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 18-21 (1995) (arguing that the public understands
the consequences of unfunded federal mandates on sub-national governments
as well as it understands the consequences of funded federal regulations).
The Supreme Court has also entered the public choice debate. In his dissent to the opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
469 U.S. 528, 576-77 (1985), Justice Powell wrote:
The administration and enforcement of federal laws and regulations
necessarily are largely in the hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees may have little or no knowledge of the States
and localities that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for
which they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as accessible
and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions in state and
local governments.
271. Stewart argues that decentralized decisionmaking would severely
disadvantage national environmental groups-the only effective lobby for
strong regulation-although he also recognizes that national decisionmaking
impairs local self-determination. Stewart, supra note 248, at 1213. In this
era of enthusiasm for public choice theory, Stewart's unabashed endorsement
of a system which he believes favors one particular type of national interest
group is refreshing, if not necessarily supported by the recent history of deregulatory initiatives. For a more economically refined analysis of the issue,
see Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 105, at 115-22.
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judgments about what standards are necessary to protect human health and the environment. Devolution creates a conflict
of interest for local governments because they are the special
interests seeking a particular outcome at the same time that
they are the forum for making the choice. In such circumstances, municipal officials would have every incentive to manipulate the information that is available to their constituents
about the pollution problems they have caused.
Of course, this analysis does not answer the more difficult
question of whether regulation of local government pollution at
the state level is sufficient to avoid such conflicts. On one
hand, it is possible that municipal officials will have sufficient
clout in their state capitols to trump pure public choice. On the
other hand, public choice theorists, as well as municipal advocates, have legitimate concerns that complete removal of all
decisionmaking to the national level means that people will
never learn about the choices that are being made for them
until they are presented with the most unpleasant aspect of
the process: the tax bill necessary to pay for those decisions.
Whether the states are really ready to assume a strong role is a
further complication, especially if the federal government continues to cut the grants provided to state2 2regulators to run
their environmental enforcement programs.
In the end, public choice theory cannot provide the basis
for a compelling sorting principle because the implications of
the theory's application are both speculative and impossible to
verify empirically. Adopting the superficially appealing compromise of giving the states more authority to get decisionmaking "closer" to the people will not mollify local governments.
More to the point, it would not represent an honest application
of the theory that, in its pure form, demands that decisionmaking be located at the lowest possible level of a political system.273 In sum, to use the lexicon of public choice proponents,
the externalities involved in regulating municipal pollution of
the environment are sufficiently complicated that they can and
should trump the theory's application in this context.

272. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of
federal cutbacks on state governments).
273. Cf Zelinsky, supra note 163, at 1369-89 (showing how state governments impose unfunded mandates on municipalities).
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3. Funding
Clearly, it is the unfunded nature of federal mandates that
motivates state and local governments to crusade against
them. It is even tempting to suspect that if the federal government fully funded regulatory programs dealing with sewage
treatment or drinking water, the movement against environmental mandates would ebb significantly and eventually disappear. Nonetheless, it is crucial to avoid the next logical misstep in the analysis of unfunded mandates that municipal
advocates so often advance.
The fact that a mandate is unfunded should not determine
whether it is valid any more than the federal government's
willingness to pay for a program should determine whether it
is an appropriate policy choice. To the extent that environmental regulations are legitimate and well-justified, federal
funding may be politically necessary, essential as a practical
matter, or desirable as a policy matter. Its absence, though,
should not trump the role of the five principles in determining
intergovernmental responsibility. Most Americans would not
suggest that citizens should have only as many civil rights as
the federal government is willing to finance. Nor would they
conclude that the federal government must either compensate
the states and private industry for the costs of ensuring occupational health and food and drug safety or abandon its programs in those areas.
Of course, as discussed further in Part V of this Article, the
level of federal funding, especially for the support of federal
and state regulatory agencies, can have a critical effect on the
quality of environmental protection and intergovernmental
relations. It can also make the difference between a more effective, cooperative system and a system that relies on coercion
or the toleration of unsafe conditions. To reject funding as a
threshold sorting principle is not to dismiss its central role in
determining what is likely to happen to environmental programs in the foreseeable future.
As significant as the level of federal funding is likely to
prove in the implementation of federal and state regulatory
programs, it is worth noting that federal largesse can have
perverse effects when committed to the actual construction of
environmental infrastructure. These effects may not only
waste money, but actually decrease the quality of environmental protection provided at the local level. In studies of federal environmental projects such as wastewater treatment
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plants, the CBO found that large grants meant that local governments had little incentive to oversee projects carefully, to
choose the best technology available, or to plan sensibly for
their long-term needs.2 74 Federal expenditures did not lead to
use of local resources for enhanced environmental protection;
instead, "fiscal substitution" occurred, and local revenues devoted to wastewater treatment fell in direct proportion to
available federal revenues.27 5 The presence of funding also
lessened incentives to avoid environmental problems in the
first place: "When drinking water treatment is funded at the
local level, expanding municipalities have an incentive to proorder to delay the need for addimote water conservation in
276
tional treatment capacity."
The ultimate reason to reject funding as a sorting principle
is a practical one, however: the lack of funding for mandates is
likely to remain a fact of life for the foreseeable future because
it is difficult to imagine a return to the glory days of the late
sixties and early seventies when federal largesse motivated
subnational governments to sacrifice their authority over a
broad array of social programs. Conditioning the federal role
in environmental protection on the provision of full federal
funding could mean virtually abandoning federal regulation of
municipal activities that affect the environment.27 7
The one clear exception to the above conclusions is that, as
a matter of principle, federal funding should be provided when
it is necessary to help poor communities meet baseline standards, especially in cases where the state in which those communities are located also lacks the resources to supplement local revenues. In such circumstances, the absence of federal or
state funding means that federal baseline standards become a
dead letter in the law, effectively negating efforts to ensure
equity and equal protection.
The final section of this Article applies the sorting princi274. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, EFFICIENT INVESTMENTS IN
WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANTS, at xii (1985); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE NATION'S PUBLIC WORKS, at xvi (1988).
275. CBO SAFE DRINKING WATER MEMORANDUM, supra note 67, at 13-14.

Between 1972 and 1977, federal funding of wastewater treatment plants rose
from $1.4 billion to $7.3 billion while parallel local expenditures fell from $5.4
billion to $0.9 billion. Id. at 14.
276. Id. at 13.

277. See, e.g., Clinton and Congress:Coming to Terms Over Infrastructure,
GOVERNING, Jan. 1995, at 73 (discussing recent reductions in federal infrastructure programs).
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ples to one of the most controversial and important arenas for
the unfunded mandates debate: federal regulation of the
drinking water supply.
V. THE SORTING PRINCIPLES APPLIED: FEDERALISM
AND TE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT
Yes, we would all like to eliminate every risk there is in our communities. But in a world of limited resources, we have to make choices.
Federalunfunded mandates not only avoid the responsibility of making choices, they impose choices that cost lives at the local level....
The extremely conservative levels of testing necessary to comply with
the Safe Drinking Water Act, and other pieces of environmental legislation, increase the cost of compliance substantially.... Given the

choice between a policeman on every corner and eliminating a contaminant that may never affect them, I have no doubt what my citizens would choose. But it is not a choice over which I or my citizens
have any say.
- Gregory S. Lashutka, Mayor,
Columbus, Ohio28
For most Americans, turning the tap is an Act of Faith. But if our experience is any guide, that Faith is severely shaken.... When you
play around with drinking water quality you are playing with fire,
perhaps the only instance where water can start fires, metaphorically
speaking, rather than put them out. A water supply is a long lever,
with the weight of the community's health at the other end. Small
changes in water treatment are magnified as large movements in
health status.
-Dr. David Ozonoff, Chairman,
Departmentof Environmental
Health, Boston University School
279
of PublicHealth

No contemporary environmental problem cuts to the quick
of public anxiety more than the safety of our drinking water,
and no problem better illustrates the implications of the current breakdown in relations between the three levels of government. The American people count on clean drinking water
and expect government to provide it. Yet members of Congress

repeatedly cited Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)280 require278. Federal Mandate Reform Hearings I, supra note 261, at 112
(protesting unfunded federal mandates in the Safe Drinking Water Act).
279. The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1995: Hearings on S.
1316 Before the Sen. Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 104th Cong., 102-03
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 SDWA Hearings](testimony of Dr. Ozonoff).
280. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1994), as amended by Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 110 Stat. 1613 (1996).
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ments as among the most onerous and unnecessary federal
mandates during the floor debate over the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995.281
This disjunction between public concern and congressional
polemics would be both unremarkable and unimportant if the
federal system that regulates drinking water was in fundamentally decent shape. But the UMRA debate occurred in the
context of evidence that the system is on the brink of collapse,
with widespread violations the norm and significant threats to
public health increasingly common. Indeed, it is not an overstatement to suggest that a catastrophe could await us if we do
not respond quickly and effectively to the gathering crisis in
this crucial regulatory program. In 1990, the EPA's Science
Advisory Board, a blue ribbon panel composed of many of the
nation's best-known environmental and public health experts,
issued a report suggesting regulatory priorities for the Agency
that ranked drinking water as one of the top four risks presented by environmental contamination:
Drinking water, as delivered at the tap, may contain agents such as
lead, chloroform, and disease-causing microorganisms. Exposures to
such pollutants in drinking water can cause cancer and a range of
non-cancer health effects. This problem poses relatively high human
health risks, because large populations are
282 exposed directly to various agents, some of which are highly toxic.

This disconcerting conclusion is supported by several independent scientific studies. According to researchers from the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC), tap water contaminated by
bacteria and other pathogens sickens 940,000 Americans annually; 900 of this number ultimately die from these exposures. 283 Because intestinal problems are under-reported at
281. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 109

Stat. 48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.A.). During the
UMRA debate, members of Congress repeatedly mentioned these requirements in justifying their support for the legislation. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC.
H1003 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Browder) (complaining that
the states must test for pineapple pesticide residues in drinking water even if
such products were never used in their regions); 141 CONG. REC. S1407 (daily
ed. Jan. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hutchinson) (explaining that Plano,
Texas must test for pineapple pesticide residues in drinking water when there
are no pineapples in Plano); 141 CONG. REC. S1349 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Gorton) (asserting that drinking water monitoring requirements are burdensome on the people of Washington State).
282. REDUCING RiK, supra note 252, at 14 (detailing health risks from
polluted tap water).
283. John S. Bennett et al., Infectious and ParasiticDisease, in CLOSING
THE GAP: THE BURDEN OF UNNECESSARY ILLNESS 102-14 (Robert W. Amler
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the federal level and many doctors may not associate such illness with bad water, experts say that the actual incidence of
284
waterborne diseases may be ten times higher.
Beyond the acute effects of bacterial contamination,
chemical contamination of drinking water in the United States
is increasingly well-documented.
In a recent analysis of
drinking water contamination in the United States, an EPA
risk assessment expert noted that approximately 1.5 trillion
gallons of contaminants enter the soil each year as a result of
industrial waste disposal, agricultural uses, and domestic refuse disposal. These contaminants pose a direct threat to
groundwater drinking supplies.285 Inorganic chemicals such as
arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, nitrite/nitrate, and sulfate
are of particular concern because they cause health effects that
range from cancer to neuropathy to a diarrhea that is especially harmful in infants.2 86 In addition, a 1980 survey of
drinking water found more than 400 separate organic chemicals, including such toxic substances as trihalomethanes,
trichloroethylene (TCE), and carbon tetrachloride.287 Other
surveys have discovered potentially dangerous levels of such
potent carcinogens as the pesticides 1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP) and ethylene dibromide (EDB), both of which
have been banned for all or most uses in America.288
Despite this evidence of threats to public health, regulatory efforts at the federal and state levels are increasingly dysand H.B. Dull eds., 1987).
In the spring of 1993, the City of Milwaukee suffered the largest waterborne disease outbreak ever recorded in the United States. More than
400,000 people fell ill following exposure to the intestinal parasite cryptosporidium; 44,000 visited health care facilities and 4,400 were hospitalized.
Post mortems blamed a combination of factors, including operator error, bad
weather, and the lack of federal standards for this particular strain of microbial contaminant. See, e.g., Ruth L. Berkelman et al., Infectious Disease Surveillance: A Crumbling Foundation, 264 SCIENCE 368 (1994) (suggesting explanations for the system's failure); Velma Smith, Disaster in Milwaukee, EPA
J., Summer 1994, at 16 (citing illness statistics).
284. Joan Rose et al., Waterborne Pathogens:Assessing the Health Risks, 7
HEALTH & ENV'T. DIG. 2 (June 1993); see also U.S. EPA, Surface Water
Treatment Proposed Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 42178, 42183 (Nov. 3, 1987)
(estimating that as many as 25 waterborne illnesses may occur for every one
that is documented).
285. Charles 0. Abernathy, Retrospective on Drinking Water, in WATER
CONTAMINATION &HEALTH 7 (Rhoda G. Wang ed., 1994).
286. Id. at 7-8 (listing harmful inorganic chemicals).
287. Id. at 8 (listing harmful organic chemicals).
288. Id. at 8-9 (showing the presence of banned chemicals in the drinking
water supply).
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fimctional. In the summer of 1995, the EPA issued its 1994
annual drinking water compliance report. A cover memo accompanying the report noted grimly:
The report reveals several significant trends, the most important of
which is the continuing drop in compliance by community water systems. In FY 1994, the compliance rate dropped to 66%, the lowest
level in nine years. A total of 19,568 systems serving 64 million persons reported over 88,000 violations .... [Tihe most common violation remains violation of the coliform monitoring and reporting requirements-the
basic rule of the program and one directly related to
289
public health.

This Article's final section examines the regulatory crisis
that provoked the unfunded mandates movement by analyzing
the history, current status, and future of the Safe Drinking
Water Act. It then applies the sorting principles proposed in
Part IV to these problems, suggesting three alternative scenarios for reform. The first scenario could be described as the
"cooperative federalism" solution. It relies not only on the consolidation of regulatory priorities and the devolution of federal
authority to the states, but also on significantly increased
funding at all three levels of government. The second scenario,
which could be described as the "coercive federalism" approach,
suggests how minimal regulatory controls could be maintained
even if adequate funding is not forthcoming. Finally, there is
the scenario mentioned in the title of this Article: a revolutionary rollback of regulatory protections that puts public health at
both imminent and long term risk. A brief history of American
efforts to ensure a safe water supply will set the stage for an
exploration of these alternatives.
A. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL DRINKING WATER REGULATION
Federal efforts to regulate drinking water safety date back
to the turn of the century when Congress established the Public Health Service Hygienic Laboratory to investigate waterborne infectious and contagious diseases. 2 0 The Public Health
Service (PHS) first began to set standards for drinking water in
1914; the standards were revised periodically, as scientific
289. Memorandum from Robert J. Blanco, Director, Drinking Water Implementation Division, Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water and Frederick F. Stiehl, Director, Enforcement Planning, Targeting, and Data Division, Office of Compliance to Distribution 1 (July 26, 1995) (on file with
author).
290. Thomas J. Douglas, Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974-History and
Critique 5 ENvTL. AFF. 501, 504 (1976).
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knowledge of the potential threats of chemical and microbial
contamination improved. 9 1 These standards were generally
effective in eliminating waterborne diseases for the next several decades, despite large expansions of the population and
increasing contamination of the water supply as a result of industrial development.292
In 1970, a PHS study suggested that the quality of the water supply had deteriorated significantly, the incidence of waterborne diseases had steadily increased, and the physical and
technical capacity of more than half the nation's drinking water systems were in substantial doubt.2 93 This alarming news
led to the passage in 1974 of the Safe Drinking Water Act and
the designation of the EPA as the lead federal agency to set
standards and ensure compliance.294 The legislative battle was
hard-fought because many members of the water supply industry feared the intrusion of the federal government into an
arena that had never involved either rigorous regulation or
punitive enforcement.2 95
291. Id. at 504-05. These "Drinking Water Standards" (DWS) required
systems supplying interstate carriers to test water to ensure compliance. Although such systems were only a small minority of those operating in the
country at the time, the standards were used as a reference by most states
and public water systems. Id. For a more detailed description of the historical evolution of the standards, see EDwARD J. CALABRESE ET AL., SAFE
DRINKING WATER

AcT,

AMENDMENTS, REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS

3-14

(1989).

292. Douglas, supra note 290, at 505-06 (describing the early success of the
Public Health Service).
293. Id. at 505-07 (describing the subsequent deterioration of the water
supply). The PHS study was entitled the "Community Water Supply Study"
(CWSS) and involved a survey of 969 water supply systems. The CWSS found
that only 59% of these systems delivered water that satisfied the DWS guidelines; 56% had physical deficiencies; the majority had no rules in place to prevent cross-connection between drinking water and sewage lines; and threefourths of system operators lacked minimal technical training. These problems not only persist to this day, but arguably have grown worse, and they
must temper any temptation to blame the current crisis solely on the overregulation supposedly caused by the 1986 amendments. WATER HYGIENE DIV.,
U.S. EPA, COMM. WATER SUPPLY STUDY: ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SURVEY
FINDINGS (1971) (previously printed as BUREAu OF WATER HYGIENE, U.S.

PHS REP. (JULY 1970)).

294. Pub. L. No. 93-523, § 88 Stat. 1661 (1974) (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. § 300f-300j (1994), as amended by Safe Drinking Water Act Amend-

ments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 110 Stat. 1996).
295. Douglas, supra note 290, at 509-18. This "public health" culture,
which views the relationship between the regulators and the regulatees as an
informal, cooperative affair, persists to this day and complicates efforts at the
state level to enforce the law aggressively.
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The basic regulatory framework established by the 1974
Act remains in effect: the EPA must establish standards for
common drinking water contaminants; the states are authorized to implement the standards; and drinking water suppliers
are required to notify their customers in the event of significant violations.296 In retrospect, this system was doomed to
poor performance because federal and state regulatory agencies are chronically underfunded. In this weakened condition,
state agencies are increasingly unable to deal with a proliferation of small drinking water systems that have severe compliance problems.29 7 But the EPA's persistent failure to issue new
drinking water standards distracted attention from these arguably more serious concerns. By 1986, EPA inaction convinced Congress that ambitious reforms were necessary:
The Safe Drinking Water Act is... simple in theory. In fact, Congress expected the program to fall quickly into place .... It is now 12
years later and the Safe Drinking Water Act once again comes to the
floor of the Senate with most of the original promise unfulfilled. The
act has failed miserably. Seven hundred different organic, inorganic,
biological, and radiological contaminants have been detected in the
drinking water supplies of the United States. And yet today after 12
years under the Safe Drinking Water Act we have standards for only
23 contaminants and two-thirds of those were established by the
Public Health Service in the 1960's long before anybody had even contemplated a national environmental protection agency. A miserable,
296. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-1 (EPA standard-setting), 300g-2 (state delegation),
300g-3 (state enforcement), 300g-4 (state authority to grant variances), 300g-5
(state authority to grant exemptions), and 300g-3(b) (public notification)
(1994), as amended by Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-182, § 110 Stat. 1613. At this stage in the program's development,
every state but Wyoming has achieved delegated enforcement authority, or
"primacy." U.S. EPA, STRENGTHENING THE SAFETY OF OUR DRINKING WATER:
A REPORT ON PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES AND AN AGENDA FOR AcTION, EPA
810-R-95-001, at 15 (1995).
The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 do not change this
framework, although they modify the terms of how standards are set, programs delegated, and public information is released. See, e.g., P.L. 104-182,
§§ 102-104, § 110 Stat. 1617-24 (1996) (standard-setting); § 112, § 110 Stat.
1632-33 (1996) (state delegation); 88 115-117, § 110 Stat. 1640-44 (1996) (state
authority to grant variances and exemptions); § 114, § 110 Stat. 1636-40
(1996) (public notification).
297. In justifying passage of the 1986 amendments, for example, Senator
Moynihan noted on the floor that reports by the General Accounting Office
(GAO) demonstrated that the EPA and some states were guilty of lax enforcement, with 64,000 reported violations of drinking water standards in
1984 alone. 132 CONG. REC. 6284 (daily ed. May 21, 1986), reprinted in SEN.
COMM. ON ENV'T AND PuB. WORKS, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE SAFE DRINKING WATER AcT AMENDMENTS 1983-1992, at 127
(1993) [hereinafter SDWA HISTORY].
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discouraging, disturbing record-that is the legacy of the drinking
water program at the Federal level of government. "I

The heart of the 1986 amendments is the requirement that
the EPA dramatically expand and quicken the pace of the
standard-setting process.299 The law borrowed a list of eightythree contaminants from Advanced Notices of Proposed Rulemaking published by the Agency a few years earlier, requiring
that final standards be set for all of them on a staggered
schedule ending on June 19, 1989.300 Following this first wave,
the EPA was required to formulate new standards for an additional twenty-five contaminants every three years.30 ' The EPA
was also told to issue regulations concerning filtration and
disinfection within eighteen and thirty-six months of enact-

298. SDWA HISTORY, supra note 297, at 100-01 (statement of Senator
Durenberger). In this atmosphere of righteousness, the conference report was
approved by astonishingly wide margins: the Senate vote was 93 to 0 and the
House vote was 382 to 21. Id. at 141, 156-57. Both the politics and substance
of the legislative debate were affected by the backlash against the Reagan deregulatory agenda. In 1982 and 1983, OMB budget analysts blocked issuance

of several EPA-proposed drinking water regulations. BNA ENV'T REP., SAFE
DRINKING WATER AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1996: A BNA SPEcIAL REPORT 3
(SEPT. 12, 1986). According to Robert Bedell, OMB deputy administrator of
information and regulatory affairs, the regulations were held up because
[olur view is that there should be federal regulatory intervention only in the
case of a market failure and then only if the state and local governments are
unable to or possible unwilling to deal with the problem." Id. This early articulation of federalist principles not only fell on deaf ears in Congress, but
intensified the commitment to expanding the federal role:
The greatest problem with implementation of the program established by the Safe Drinking Water Act is the failure of EPA to issue
standards .... The vital need for such standards is exemplified by
the fact that a number of States have been forced to expend their
limited resources to develop standards in the absence of Federal
regulations. National drinking water standards are the cornerstone
of the Safe Drinking Water Act and their establishment is most appropriately a Federal responsibility.
SDWA HISTORY, supra note 297, at 309.
299. The 1986 amendments also include lengthy and controversial new provisions regarding the protection of groundwater, but these requirements are beyond the scope of this discussion because they primarily involve implementation
issues between the EPA and the states. 42 U.S.C. § 300h (1994), as amended by
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 110 Stat.
1613.
300. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b) (1994), as amended by Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 110 Stat. 1613. The Advanced
Notices of Proposed Rulemaking appeared at 47 Fed. Reg. 9352 (1982) and 48
Fed. Reg. 45502 (1983). The EPA was permitted to substitute up to seven new
contaminants for those that appeared on the original lists.
301. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3).
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ment, respectively.3 °2 The amendments banned the use of lead
pipes, solder, or flux outright and commanded the EPA to issue
a regulation defining when operators of drinking water systems must notify the public that applicable lead levels have
been exceeded.30 3
Recognizing that it had unleashed forces that could prove
overwhelming to the regulated community, Congress headed
off in two opposite directions. On one hand, it expanded the
criteria for variances and exemptions, giving the states conditional authority to ease the compliance burden.30 4 On the other
hand, it strengthened the civil penalties available for violations
of the Act and, for the first time, established criminal penalties
for particularly egregious violations.30 5
302. Id. § 300g-l(b)(7)(C) (filtration requirements), -1(b)(8) (disinfection
requirements).
303. Id. § 300g-6 (outright ban on lead, solder and flux).
304. Id. § 300g-4 (variances), -5 (exemptions). The states were authorized
to grant variances on the basis that the "raw water sources which are reasonably available to the systems" cannot meet federal standards. However, a
variance was only available on this basis if the system had already tried
available pollution control technology and it had not worked. Alternatively,
states could grant a variance on the basis that it was unnecessary for a system to employ certain treatment technologies because its raw water source
was uncontaminated. States were allowed to grant exemptions to drinking
water systems if "compelling factors (which may include economic factors)"
render the system "unable" to comply with federal standards and the granting
of an exemption will not result in an "unreasonable risk" to health. Beyond
these tough substantive standards, the states were required to follow detailed
procedures to ensure public notice and comment on their decisions and to
place the systems receiving variances on a schedule for reaching full compliance. These provisions have proved sufficiently burdensome that a recent
study by the Congressional Budget Office found that state regulators had issued no variances and only fifteen exemptions nationwide between January
1990 and March 1994. CBO CASE STUDY, supra note 148, at 36.
The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 revise the standards

for granting variances and exemptions, especially with respect to small systems. To obtain a variance, the small system must show that it cannot afford
to comply under criteria established by federal or state regulators. The possibility that a small system could be consolidated or restructured must be
considered in determining whether the requirement is truly unaffordable.
Pub. L. No. 104-182, §§ 116, 117, § 110 Stat. 1640-44 (1996). It remains to be
seen whether state regulators will implement these new procedures more
readily at the state level.
305. Id. §§ 300g-3 (civil penalties), 300i-1 (criminal penalties). The Act
provides for the assessment of $25,000 in civil penalties per violation per day.
Thus, a fine of $250,000 per day is theoretically possible for a system that is
committing ten separate violations. The Act authorizes a five year prison
term for a person who tampers with a public drinking water system. A person
who only "attempts to tamper, or makes a threat to tamper" faces a three year
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In all major respects save one, the track record of implementing the 1986 Act was a depressing reprise of the problems
that have plagued the program since its inception. The key difference was that the EPA at last leapt into action, completing
work on seventy-eight of the initial eighty-three standards
within a remarkably short timeframe.3 06 But in the absence of
either fundamental reforms to the structure of the industry or
a dramatic expansion of state regulatory resources, this frenetic activity at the federal level provided the catalyst for a
further breakdown in compliance.
The federal drinking water program regulates 200,000
public water systems providing piped water to some 243 million Americans. H°' Approximately 60,000 of the 200,000 total
are "Community Water Systems" that serve the same populations year-round.3 °8 The rest are operated by institutions like
schools, factories, hospitals, campgrounds, or motels that either serve people for only a portion of the day or serve transient populations. 9 About eighty percent of the population
are supplied by Community Water Systems that serve at least
10,000 people. 310
According to the EPA, these systems
"generally possess substantial revenue bases, low rates due to
economies of scale, management sophistication, engineering/planning knowledge, and financial capabilities."31' Another
7.2% of the population are supplied by more marginal but generally viable medium-sized systems serving 3,301 to 10,000
people. 31 2 An estimated 8.4% of the population are supplied by
prison term. Enforcement of these provisions has been sporadic. See infra
notes 320-330 and accompanying text.
306. S. REP. No. 104-169, at 9 (1995). As the report notes, the EPA modified the original list of 83 contaminants to replace seven entries with alternative chemical contaminants.
307. U.S. EPA, PUB. No. 810-R-93-001, TECHNICAL AND EcoNoMIc
CAPACITY OF STATES AND PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS TO IMPLEMENT DRINKIONG
WATER REGULATIONS 4 (1993) [hereinafter EPA TECHNICAL REPORT]. The
1986 Act covers any "public water system" that has at least fifteen service
connections or regularly serves at least twenty-five individuals. 42 U.S.C. §
300f(4). In contrast, the 1974 Act covered only 40,000 public water systems.
Douglas, supra note 290, at 527.
308. EPA TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 307, at 4.
309. Id. Of the 140,000 "noncommunity" public water systems, 25,000 are
"nontransient," serving locations such as schools and workplaces, while another 115,000 are "transient," serving locations such as campgrounds and hotels. Id. at 4-5.
310. Id. at 7.
311. Id. at 5.
312. Id. at 6-7; see also id. at 70 ("Many aspects of financing capacity are

HeinOnline -- 81 Minn. L. Rev. 192 1996-1997

1996] UNFUNDEDENVIRONMENTAL MANDATES

193

"small" systems that serve 501 to 3,300 people, while another
2.3% of the population are supplied by "very small" systems
serving twenty-five to 500 people. 3 These "small" and "very
small" systems "do not possess substantial revenue bases" and
"their ability to comply with drinking water regulations is limited."314 Indeed, one close observer of the drinking water industry noted that their viability is so precarious that they are
abandoned, given away, and even won and lost in poker
games.3 15 According to an EPA analysis, the proliferation of
small systems is the direct result of regulatory vacuums at the
federal, state, and local levels:
Prior to enactment of the Safe Drinking Water Act and especially its
1986 Amendments, regulatory and treatment requirements were
minimal. For the most part, all that was needed was a well, a pump,
a tank, and perhaps a chlorinator .... The most significant cost element was the initial cost of constructing
a distribution system, in
316
which there are no economies of scale

While the EPA is understandably focused on the importance of its own regulatory standards, this analysis leaves unstated the more remarkable fact that many state and local governments fail to impose even minimal requirements concerning
financial viability and technical competence on people providing such a potentially dangerous service to the public.
The impossible task of chasing these disparate entities is
assigned to state regulatory agencies that are falling further
and further behind the steepening federal standard-setting
and enforcement curve. In 1993, the EPA estimated that state
funding was half the level necessary to implement existing
regulations, with several new regulations about to go into effect.317 The funding crunch means that state regulators are
unable either to enforce the law effectively or to provide the
the same in these [small to medium] systems as for larger systems," but they
are "less able to maintain their infrastructure than their larger counterparts").
313. Id. at 6-7. Forty percent of "small" and "very small" systems are publicly owned. Id. at 83. Twenty-five percent are owned by mobile home parks.
Id. Fifteen percent are owned by homeowners' associations. Id. Fifteen percent are investor-owned. Id. Five percent are owned by a category the EPA
characterizes as "other." Id.
314.

Id. at 5.

315. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1993: Hearings on S. 1547
before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 103d Cong. 50
(1993) (statement of Velma Smith, Director, Ground Water and Drinking Water Project, Friends of the Earth).
316. EPA TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 307, at 79.
317. Id. at i.
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variances and exemptions that would tailor ambitious federal
requirements to local conditions.31 8 These problems are so severe that several states are threatened with loss of primacy, returning responsibility for implementing 31the
program to an
9
EPA staff clearly alarmed by the prospect.
The predictable legacy of this unfortunate confluence of
factors is widespread, chronic, and intractable noncompliance.
In 1990, the GAO reported that the number of violations reported to the EPA was "considerably understated" because water system operators did not know how to perform tests or deliberately falsified them3 20 or because states overlooked (or
excused) noncompliance. 321 Perhaps most troubling of all, the
GAO found that federal and state regulators tried to cope with
the growing enforcement crisis by adopting informal policies
that excuse certain regulatory violations.32 2 This ad hoc decisionmaking only served to encourage scofflaw attitudes that
further undermine the overall credibility of the program. 323 By
1992, the GAO drew an even starker picture of the true situation in the field:
Funding shortages at the federal, state, and water system level have
been and continue to be a major contributor to the program's prob318. See CBO CASE STUDY, supra note 148, at 35-36 (noting that variances
and exemptions intended to ameliorate harsh application of regulatory requirements are rarely used by states).
319. See EPA TEcHNICAL REPORT, supra note 307, at ii ("Unfortunately[,]
public health protection is the first victim of failed state primacy, since the
EPA is not staffed to run effective programs at the State level."); see also
GAO, DRINKING WATER: WIDENING GAP BETWEEN NEEDS AND AVAILABLE
RESOURCES THREATENS VITAL EPA PROGRAM, GAO/RCED Doc. No. 92-184, at
2 (1992) [hereinafter GAO 1992 WIDENING GAP REPORT] (noting that the federal government is considering whether to revoke primacy in several states).
320. GAO, DRINING WATER: COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS UNDERMINE EPA
PROGRAM AS NEW CHALLENGES EMERGE, GAOIRCED Doc. No. 90-127, at 4, 17
(1990) [hereinafter GAO 1990 COMPLIANCE REPORT]; see also id. at 22 (stating
that the incidence of falsified results is unclear because states do not "actively
seek out the problems"). The GAO recommended that the EPA encourage
"efforts to detect and deter" falsification. Id. at 23.
321. Id. at 4.
322. See id. (noting that states adopted policies "suspending or restricting
certain EPA monitoring requirements").
323. Id. at 28. The GAO wrote:
On one hand, states or EPA regions may present a compelling case
why such policies may be warranted. On the other hand, EPA is tolerating state and regional policies that directly conflict with existing
requirements. Whether or not the policies are justified, our primary
concern is that the present situation undermines a program that relies primarily on adherence to published regulatory requirements.
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lems. Increasingly, states have indicated that they are unable to
implement core elements of their programs effectively, much less
324 the
new and more stringent requirements of the 1986 amendments.

Scofflaw attitudes were becoming systemic, with no end in sight.
In 1993, the GAO completed an analysis of states' efforts to
implement so-called "sanitary surveys," a crucial regulatory
tool that involves periodic inspections of drinking water systems by state inspectors. 325 These surveys are the primary
method for evaluating compliance other than drinking water
system self-reporting. 326 The GAO found that forty-five states
omitted one or more of the fourteen key components recommended by the EPA when they conducted the surveys. 321 Even
when the surveys uncovered violations, state regulators did not
take effective action to follow up: the GAO reported that eighty
percent of the 200-survey sample disclosed serious deficiencies
in the operation of public water systems, with sixty percent of
those citing the same problems identified in previous surveys.328 These disturbing statistics are almost certainly only
the tip of the iceberg. At least twenty-six states did not conduct surveys every three years as recommended by the EPA,329
and more than half of the sanitary survey inspectors nationwide lack any formal
training on how to conduct a review and
330
report the results.
By 1996, Congress was ready to act in response to these
revelations, after struggling for three years to forge a compromise between conservative Republicans, liberal Democrats,
state and local governments, private operators, and environ-

324.
325.

GAO 1992 WIDENING GAP REPORT, supra note 319, at 2.
GAO, DRINKING WATER: KEY QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM is
FLAWED AND UNDERFUNDED, GAO/RCED Doc. No. 93-97, at 2 (1993)
[hereinafter GAO 1993 FLAWED QUALITY ASSURANCE REPORT]. States are required to conduct sanitary surveys in order to obtain and maintain primacyauthority to administer their own drinking water programs. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 142.10(b)(2) (1995).
326. See GAO 1993 FLAWED QUALITY ASSURANCE REPORT, supra note 325,
at 10 (noting that test results are reported to the state, which determines
whether the system is in compliance with EPA regulations).
327. Id. at 3. Among the items routinely omitted were evaluations of operator qualifications and the condition of distribution systems. Id.
328. Id. at 4. The most frequently observed deficiency was failure to prevent cross connections that mix potable and contaminated water. Id. States
reported that such measures were inadequate for twenty percent of the large
water systems and fifty percent of small systems. Id.
329. Id. at 15-16.
330. Id. at 23.
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mentalists.33 1 President Clinton signed a comprehensive rewrite of the law on August 6, 1996, hailing it as a "model for
responsible reinvention of regulations."33 2
As indicated by passage of bipartisan reauthorization legislation, the legislative debate achieved consensus on several
crucial points. Participants agreed that Congress should repeal the requirement that the EPA regulate twenty-five new
contaminants every three years.333 They urged Congress to
authorize more money to support state programs and to assist
small systems.3 3 4 However, these points of consensus mask
335
other, more significant differences.
The drinking water industry, led by a few vociferous and
331. See, e.g., Allan Freedman, GOP's Hopes Running High for Drinking
Water Bill, 54 CONG. Q. 1953, 1953, 1955-57 (1996) (discussing the continuing
struggle among various factions in the attempt to pass drinking water legislation). For a description of similar but unsuccessful efforts in the 103d Congress, see Bob Benenson and Catalina Camia, Safe Drinking Water Bill Stalls,
Puts Cities on the Spot, 52 CONG. Q. 2869, 2869 (1994).
332. Text of Clinton Statement on Signing of Safe Drinking Water Act, U.S.
Newswire, Aug. 6, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 5623165. The new law is entitled
the "Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996," Pub. Law No. 104-182, §
110 Stat. 1613 (1996).
333. See 1995 SDWA Hearings, supra note 279, at 75 (statement of Carol
Browner, Administrator, EPA) (calling the regulation requirement "overlyburdensome"); see also id. at 94 (statement of E. Benjamin Nelson, Governor,
Nebraska, representing the Nat'l Governors' Ass'n) (stating that the program
is "arbitrary and nonsensical in crucial respects"); id. at 111 (statement of Jeffrey N. Wennberg, Mayor, Rutland, Vermont, on behalf of the Nat'l League of
Cities and the Natl Ass'n of Counties) ("Under current law, regulated contaminants are chosen by a process that makes about as much sense as selecting Nobel Laureates with an MTV 1-900 poll.").
334. See id. at 75 (statement of Carol Browner, Administrator, EPA) ("[A
State Revolving Fund] is critical to helping States assist communities in upgrading and installing treatment facilities to ensure that they can provide safe
drinking water to the public."); id. at 96 (statement of E. Benjamin Nelson,
Governor, Nebraska, of the Nat'l Governors' Ass'n) ("One of the most important features of this bill is the authorization of $1 billion annually for the capitalization of State Revolving Funds."); id. at 97 (statement of Erik D. Olson,
senior attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council) ("We appreciate the bipartisan negotiations that lead to the development of this bill ....
[We are
pleased with the bill's authorization of a multi-billion dollar State Revolving
Fund for drinking water system upgrades and related purposes."); id. at 112
(statement of Jeffrey N. Wennberg, Mayor, Rutland, Vermont, on behalf of the
Nat'l League of Cities and the Natl Ass'n of Counties) (discussing the necessity of funding for local and state governments to ensure adequate resources
for providing safe drinking water).
335. See, e.g., Margaret Kriz, Cleaner Than Clean?, 26 NAT'L J. 946, 946-47
(1994) (explaining that these disagreements were exacerbated by the unfunded
mandates movement that produced an "abrupt change in the political climate"
and polarized environmental and municipal interest groups).
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articulate municipal officials, contends that the EPA program
failed because of over-regulation, misguided standard-setting,
and federal insistence on chasing elusive problems that do not
pose real risks. 336 The environmental community believes that
regulation is insufficiently aggressive and argues that only expansion of federal regulatory initiatives will succeed in
straightening out a very dangerous situation.337 Enduring,
long-term reform will require federal, state, and local officials
to confront and override positions held dear by all these participants.
Municipal advocates are certainly right that the current
system for regulating drinking water is so overloaded with
regulatory standards that compliance is not just elusive but
impossible for a significant minority of drinking water suppliers. Over time, such conditions provoke a dangerous lethargy
among the regulated community. If it is impossible to comply
with some of the rules, so the thinking goes, why bother complying with any of them? A related manifestation of regulatory
overload is that federal and state regulators are susceptible to
a debilitating ennui. Overwhelmed by their responsibilities,
they find it difficult to undertake effective enforcement efforts.
With so many new rules to learn, there is not energy left to
launch prosecutions of water systems that violate the old ones.
The campaign against unfunded mandates exacerbates these
trends by repeatedly citing examples of regulatory standards
that appear nonsensical to lay persons, including members of
Congress. By defining the problem as one of unfunded federal
over-regulation, municipal advocates manage to obscure the
growing evidence that noncompliance with health and safety
standards is becoming life-threatening in many locations.
The recently enacted reauthorization legislation is an ambitious, if at times garbled, effort to reach a compromise be336. See 1995 SDWA Hearings,supra note 279, at 105 (statement of Donald Satchwell, on behalf of the American Water Works Ass'n) (The present
standard setting process is technology driven and can result in driving standards far below health protection benefit levels at very high cost .... ."); id. at
111 (statement of Jeffrey N. Wennberg, Mayor, Rutland, Vermont, on behalf
of the Nat'l League of Cities and the Nat'l Ass'n of Counties) ("The current
system of standard setting, as defended by some Washington-based environmental special interests, has not only failed to protect the public health, it has
in fact put it at greater risk").
337. See id. at 98 (statement of Erik D. Olson, senior attorney, National
Resources Defense Council) ("We are fundamentally opposed to the bill's provisions that would delay the court-ordered deadlines, and weaken the standards for arsenic, radon, and disinfection of groundwater. .).
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tween all of the Safe Drinking Water Act's constituencies. It
removes the burden of regulating on a schedule 338 and it affirmatively requires the EPA to weigh costs and technological
339 It
feasibility before it promulgates any new requirements.
also authorizes the appropriation of up to $1 billion annually
for state and local drinking water programs.3 40 But the legislation does little to require that the EPA review existing regulations, and it includes only modest efforts to tackle the core
problem of small system viability, or "capacity."34 1 Finally, the
new law imposes a lengthy list of new mandates on federal and
state regulators, including: (1) the regulation of contaminants
such as arsenic, radon, sulfates, and disinfection byproducts;
(2) issuance of standards for the recycling of filter backwash;
(3) formulation of guidelines for drinking water system operator certification; (4) development of a national occurrence database; (5) administration of a multi-billion state revolving fund;
(6) formulation of guidelines for and review of state programs
to assess the status of drinking water sources; (7) issuance of
guidelines for state water conservation plans for small systems;2 and (8) the development of new standards for bottled water.

34

If any of these reforms are to prove effective, they must be
carried much further by federal and state regulators who will
face the same political resistance that delayed congressional
action for so long. Further, the success of all such efforts will
338. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, §
102, § 110 Stat. 1613, 1617-20 (1996); § 104, § 110 Stat. at 1623-25.
339. Id. § 103, § 110 Stat. at 1621-22; § 104, § 110 Stat. at 1623-25.
340. Id. § 130, § 110 Stat. at 1662-72.
341. See id. § 104, § 110 Stat. at 1624 (requiring review and, if appropriate,
revision, of national primary drinking water standards at least every six years);
113, § 110 Stat. at 1633-34 (offering amnesty from enforcement as an incentive
to small systems to restructure or consolidate); § 119, § 110 Stat. at 1646-50
(threatening to withhold funds unless states develop a "strategy" for capacity
development); § 125, § 110 Stat. at 1653 (requiring review of no fewer that
twelve existing monitoring requirements within two years of the date of enactment); § 130, § 110 Stat. at 1667 (authorizing use of limited funds for restructuring and consolidation of existing water systems).
342. See id. § 107, § 110 Stat. at 1626 (regulating disinfection byproducts); §
109, § 110 Stat. at 1626 (requiring regulation of arsenic, sulfate, and radon); §
110, § 110 Stat. at 1630-31 (requiring standards for recycling filter backwash); §
123, § 110 Stat. at 1651-52 (requiring development of operator certification
guidelines); § 126, § 110 Stat. at 1958-59 (requiring development of a national
occurrence database); 130, § 110 Stat. at 1662-71 (administration of funds); §
132, § 110 Stat. at 1672-74 (source water); § 134, § 110 Stat. at 1678-79 (water
conservation plans); § 305, § 110 Stat. at 1684-85 (bottled water standards).
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depend on the levels of financing made available to implement
the program by deficit-conscious federal and state legislatures.
Congressional appropriations committees have shown little
inclination to increase the EPA's budget, after cutting it by approximately ten percent in 1996.14" Even more important, it is
far from clear that state legislatures will augment federal
grants and loans with sufficient funding of their own?" As
history demonstrates all too clearly, the statute only provides a
general framework for federal and state regulators and municipal owners and operators. The achievement of real success
in protecting public health cost-effectively is a far more complicated proposition.
B. THE SORTING PRINCIPLES APPLIED
To establish a more effective and balanced regulatory system, three fundamental reforms are necessary: a revised process for standard-setting, systematic efforts to eliminate nonviable systems, and the establishment of site-specific compliance
programs that allow federal, state, and local officials to tailor
regulation to local conditions and priorities. The cumulative
result of these reforms would be a regulatory program of
shared responsibility among the three levels of government.
The federal government's primary role would be to set
standards for the purity of drinking water delivered at the tap.
Because it is technically difficult and expensive to determine
which contaminants are most prevalent in drinking water
supplies and what levels of such contaminants are relatively
safe, it makes sense to centralize such efforts. Not only do
states and municipalities lack the resources to formulate comprehensive standards, the likely result of local attempts to take
over this function would be widely disparate levels of protection for different portions of the population, with the weakest
standards likely in the poorest communities. As important as
it is to set new standards for emerging threats, however, the
first step must be to develop more sensible priorities among
existing standards.
Under a reformed system of shared responsibility, the
states would retain responsibility for enforcing federal stan-

343. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing the recent congressional battles over the EPA's budget).
344. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (describing the steady decrease in state funding for environmental regulation).
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dards, using sanitary surveys and other available regulatory
tools. But such efforts are unlikely to achieve significantly
higher levels of overall compliance among smaller systems unless there are extensive changes in the structure of the industry, including both public and private suppliers. The only way
to accomplish those changes is for the states to undertake a
systematic effort to coax or, if necessary, push nonviable systems out of business. A reformed program would also give local
governments the opportunity to assume more responsibility for
determining how to set regulatory priorities on a system-bysystem basis. Working under the supervision of state regulators, drinking water systems could apply for interim exemptions from some applicable standards so that they could devote
resources to their most urgent problems.
With adequate funding, all of these reforms could be carried out in the mode of cooperative federalism. With less
funding, their implementation would follow the coercive federalism model. Without reform and without funding, the country risks a revolution in regulatory protections with potentially
dire consequences for public health.
1. Standard-Setting and the Cutback of Current Regulation
A strong federal role in establishing standards for drinking
water safety is justified by the first three sorting principles
proposed in Part IV of this Article: controlling the effects of
transboundary pollution, achieving regulatory economies of
scale, and ensuring equity and equal protection for all Americans.
Transboundary pollution has a clear, if not yet quantified,
effect on the integrity of drinking water sources. As Congress
noted in justifying passage of the 1974 Act, "water in the hydrologic cycle does not respect State borders." 45 In the absence
of uniform, minimal federal standards, drinking water resources affected by activities in more than one state would deteriorate as the states adopted disparate levels of protection or
failed to control the wide range of industrial activity that
threatens interlocking ground and surface waters.
Economies of scale can be achieved at the federal level because the development of sound science to support regulation
of drinking water contaminants is extraordinarily expensive
and clearly exceeds the capacity of the individual states, now
345. H.R. REP. No. 93-1185, at 8 (1974).
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or in the foreseeable future. This scientific challenge is difficult enough to demand the devotion of the nation's best intellectual resources to a coordinated research program.
Regulators face four distinct and costly challenges. First,
they must analyze the toxicological effects of hundreds of
chemicals that may infiltrate drinking water. There are remarkable research gaps in our understanding of such effects,
even for common and widely-used chemicals. 34 6 It will clearly
require a national effort to even begin to address this gap in a
systematic and cost-effective manner. Second, regulators must
develop a more comprehensive database documenting the occurrence of contaminants in drinking water. Seven major national "occurrence" studies have been conducted since 1969, but
the EPA describes them as providing only a "snapshot" measurement of contamination that "may not be representative of
average water quality over time."347 Compilation of better,
more comprehensive data to guide standard-setting will require a national effort.34 8 Surveys conducted by individual
drinking water systems-or even individual states-cannot
substitute for national studies as the basis for selecting contaminants that must be regulated. Third, regulators must determine what technologies are available to eliminate regulated
contaminants, since it makes little sense to impose standards
that are technically impossible to meet.349 This task involves
maintaining a comprehensive understanding of worldwide
state-of-the-art technologies, their costs, their advantages, and
their disadvantages. Fourth, the activities involved in actually
conducting a modern rulemaking are very expensive: data
must be compiled, rule proposals drafted, public comments
considered, public hearings conducted, and legal or legislative
346. According to industry reports submitted to the EPA, nearly six trillion
pounds of some 72,000 chemicals are either manufactured in, or imported to,
the country annually. ToxIcs WATCH, supra note 259, at 76. A 1984 analysis
by the National Research Council estimated that we have compiled health and
safety data on only 20% of such chemicals. Id. at 76 n.c.
347. EPA TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 307, at 8-9.
348. The Safe Drnking Water Act Amendments of 1996 require the EPA to
establish a national occurrence database within three years of the date of enactment, in consultation with the EPA Science Advisory Board, the National
Academy of Sciences, the states, and other "interested parties." Pub. L. No.
104-182, § 126, § 110 Stat. 1613, 1658-59 (1996).
349. The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 continue to expand existing requirements that the EPA compile information about such
technologies, taking into consideration the size of the water system that must
employ them. §§ 104-105, 111.
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challenges to the rule defended. Given the difficulty most
states have had in mustering resources to enforce existing
standards, it is difficult to imagine them developing the capability to run ambitious rule-making programs.
Finally, considerations of equity and equal protection justify federal regulation. It is becoming increasingly clear that
too many Americans suffer widely divergent exposure to
drinking water threats. As discussed above, those living in local jurisdictions that have allowed small, nonviable systems to
proliferate are threatened by significantly more severe exposure to contamination than citizens served by large, well-run
systems. This disparate treatment is unfair and, if the track
record of many state and local jurisdictions is any indication,
can only be rectified by rigorous standard-setting at the federal
level.35 0
While a strong federal role is clearly justified, the current
regulatory system flaunts the equally important principles that
federal regulation must tailor requirements to local conditions
and avoid counterproductive overburdening of local resources.
There is a dangerous and growing gap between the output of
the national regulatory process and the ability of water system
operators to comprehend, much less implement, such requirements. This gap cannot be dismissed as a mere matter of laziness or bad attitude at the local level. Although critics of the
Act attribute these problems to an unduly stringent process for
setting health-based standards, a more important cause is the
statutory schedule requiring the EPA to regulate twenty-five
new contaminants every three years. 5 ' Although the 1996
350. See supra notes 317-324 and accompanying text (demonstrating the
consistent failure of local entities to enforce regulations against small nonviable systems).
351. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3) (1994) (establishing a schedule for the EPA
standard-setting). As for the standard-setting process itself, the original statute directed the EPA to regulate any contaminant that "may have any adverse
effect on the health of persons and that is known or anticipated to occur in
public water systems." § 300g-l(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added). In contrast, the
recently-enacted Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 repeal these
criteria and instead instruct the EPA to set standards (1) if a contaminant
"may have an adverse effect" on public health; (2) "the contaminant is known
to occur or there is a substantial likelihood that the contaminant will occur
with a frequency and at levels of public health concern"; and (3) in the "sole
judgment of the [EPA] Administrator, regulation of such contaminant presents a meaningful opportunity for health risk reduction." Pub. L. No. 104-182,
§ 102, § 110 Stat. 1613, 1617-21 (emphasis added). The 1996 Amendments
further instruct the EPA to prepare a cost/benefit analysis when proposing all
future standards and to publish a determination whether the benefits of the
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Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments repeal this requirement,35 2 dozens of these standards have already been set. 5 3
A close examination of the rationale the EPA has offered
for some of these regulatory decisions provides a vivid illustration of the perils of regulation-by-quota. Throughout the Federal Register notices that justify its decisions, the EPA has
struggled with a fateful combination of limited information
about the toxicological effects of many contaminants and almost no reliable information about their prevalence in the
drinking water supply. Too often, it has plowed ahead and
regulated anyway, even in situations where there is no reliable
data to justify even minimal monitoring requirements.35 4 In
some cases, the EPA has regulated contaminants produced in
such small amounts that it is difficult to understand how they
could ever be defined as a nationally significant problem.
Consider the following example, which resulted in promulgation of a maximum contaminant level (MCL)355 and monitoring

requirement in 1992:
Beryllium is a light, grayish white metal .... Total consumption of
beryllium for 1987 was estimated at 315 tns ....
standards do--or do not-justify its costs. §§ 103-104. While it remains to be
seen whether these changes will have a significant effect on the EPA's regulatory policies or output, it is easy to imagine how these provisions could be interpreted to justify either an aggressive or a conservative approach to such
decisionmaking, especially given the subjectivity of the terms used and the
"sole judgment" language.
352. § 102.
353. By 1995, the EPA had issued standards for 78 of the 83 contaminants
on the initial list. See supra note 306 and accompanying text (describing the
flurry of EPA standard-setting following the 1986 amendments to the Safe
Drinking Water Act).
354. To their credit, EPA officials recognized these flaws, commenting in a
1993 report to Congress:
Congress' mandate to regulate 83 specific contaminants identified in
the SDWA's 1986 amendments, plus an additional 25 contaminants
every 3 years, limits the Agency's ability to concentrate on establishing and implementing national standards for only the highest priority
contaminants ....
In some cases, contaminants have been forced
onto regulatory schedules that out pace [sic] EPA's ability to develop
needed technical information. Some regulations have unquantified
benefits, yet impose significant costs. New approaches for selecting
contaminants and developing regulatory responses need to be a central component of SDWA reform.
EPA TEcHNIcAL REPORT, supra note 307, at iv.
355. A "maximum contaminant level" is the statutory and regulatory term
used to describe health-based standards that establish a ceiling on the
amount of a contaminant that is allowed to be present in drinking water provided to the public. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4) (1994), amended by Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 110 Stat. 1613.
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There is little information available on the environmental fate of beryllium and its compounds ....
Because of the limited amount of information available, it is not possible to describe overall human exposure to beryllium, or to assess
the relative contributions of various sources. It can be noted, however, that ... the intakes from drinking water and air by the overwhelming
majority of the population would appear to be quite
356
small.
Even where the EPA has information indicating that con-

taminants capable of causing adverse health effects are generated in relatively large quantities, it frequently lacks any reliable information about the contaminant's infiltration into
drinking water: "EPA estimates that 37 million pounds of
[adipates] were produced in the U.S. in 1985 ....
No national,
regional or State data are available that describe the occurrence of [adipates] in drinking water from ground or surface
357
water sources."
Finally, the EPA has chosen to regulate even where existing data indicates that a contaminant probably does not pose a
significant threat to drinking water:
Endrin... is [a] pesticide first introduced into the United States in
1951 .... Most uses of endrin were canceled by 1980 ....
In the National Screening Program for Organics in Drinking Water (NSP) survey conducted by EPA from 1977-81, finished drinking
water samples were collected from 12 ground water and 3 surface
water supplies. None... contained concentrations of endrin in ex-

356. National Primary and Secondary Drinking Water Regulations; Synthetic Organic Chemicals and Inorganic Chemicals, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,370,
30,378 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141-43) (proposed July 25, 1990)
[hereinafter Synthetic Organic and Inorganic Chemical Regulations]. The
MCL for beryllium appears at National Primary Drinking Water Regulations,
Subpart G, 40 C.F.R. § 141.62(b) (1995).
357. Synthetic Organic and Inorganic Chemical Regulations, supra note
356, at 30,384. The MCL for adipates appears at 40 C.F.R. § 141.61(c). A
comparable example is endothall:
EPA estimated total domestic usage [of endothall] in 1982 to have
been approximately 1.5 million pounds .... Natural pond and lake
studies have shown that endothall is rapidly decomposed by soil and
aquatic microorganisms .... It is usually cleared from soil and water
within 30 to 60 days, and often within a considerably shorter time ....
...There are no data available on the levels of endothall in drinking
water or air.
Synthetic Organic and Inorganic Chemical Regulations, supra note 356, at
30,390. The MCL for endothall appears at 40 C.F.R. § 141.61(c).
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cess of the minimum quantifiable concentration. 358

Regulating in such circumstances serves only to convince
local governments that the federal government has lost all
sense of proportion. In response to municipal complaints, the
EPA has attempted to scale back monitoring for such contaminants so that it imposes relatively low costs. 359 In the current
anti-regulatory atmosphere, though, the relatively low cost of
compliance does not assuage protests by those who believe that
its imposition is absolutely unwarranted. Beyond the body
blows that such regulatory decisions deliver to the overall
credibility of the program, there is the equally pressing concern
that they preoccupy regulators who have far more urgent
things to do. As the GAO has documented, federal and state
regulators have lost their grip on the daily performance of all
types of drinking water systems.36 ° Until and unless this dangerous state of affairs is rectified, they cannot afford to squander energy on voluminous rulemakings that seek to remedy
minor or non-existent problems.
However easy it is to ridicule the current rule-making
process, it is far more difficult to design an effective cure. Over
the last three years, the legislative debate has focused on
whether Congress should reduce EPA discretion by superimposing elaborate cost/benefit analysis as the quid pro quo for
future EPA decisionmaking.361 Proponents of this approach,
358. Synthetic Organic and Inorganic Chemical Regulations, supra note
356, at 30,391. The MCL for endrin appears at 40 C.F.R. § 141.61(c). Or consider this example:
The major source of environmental contamination by HEX [hexahlorcyclopentadiene is the aqueous discharge from production facilities, with small concentrations present as contaminants in commercial products made from it. However, HEX is not frequently found in
the environment and, even when present, it is rapidly degraded.

Therefore, current environmental exposure is extremely low. Some
isolated cases of site contamination due to disposal of HEX wastes
have been reported but no data are available on occurrence and exposure from drinking water, food or air.
Synthetic Organic and Inorganic Chemical Regulations, supra note 356, at
30,394. The MCL for HEX appears at 40 C.F.R. § 141.61(c).
359. The EPA estimated that the total monitoring costs for the contaminants mentioned here, as well as 18 others, would be some six million dollars
a year, largely because it intended to limit the frequency of required monitoring. Synthetic Organic and Inorganic Chemical Regulations, supra note 356,
at 30,434.
360. See discussion supra notes 320-330 and accompanying text (describing
the widespread failure of regulators to obtain drinking water system compliance).
361. As noted supra note 351 and in the accompanying text, the Safe
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including the most vociferous municipal campaigners against
unfunded federal mandates, clearly hope that imposition of
such requirements would stem the rule-making tide by forcing
the EPA to develop a far more comprehensive record before
taking action. It is far from clear, however, that this approach
will either solve the legitimate problems identified by municipal advocates or succeed in restoring and maintaining the
safety of the drinking water supply.
As discussed at length in Parts IV.B and IV.C of this article, forcing Congress and the EPA to compile elaborate analyses of regulatory costs and benefits has the potential to complicate and congeal the regulatory process, but it is unlikely to inspire more sensible regulation. If copious cost/benefit analysis
returns us to an era of EPA paralysis, municipal frustration
will be temporarily relieved. But this outcome will not restore
public confidence that the worst threats to the drinking water
supply are being addressed, especially if another catastrophe
like the 1993 incident in Milwaukee occurs. 362 In that event,
we may well see another swing of the pendulum and the renewal of legislative activism, a prospect that municipal officials
should rightfully dread.
Complicating future rulemaking also does nothing to address the problem of burdensome and poorly justified regulations that are already on the books. In fact, complex new procedures could have the unintended effect of compounding these
problems because they would inevitably stymie EPA efforts to
review and reform existing requirements. Aware of this pitfall,
the 1996 Amendments include requirements that the EPA review and, if necessary, modify existing requirements in accordance with the new standard-setting criteria.3 6 3 The new law
also instructs the EPA to review the monitoring requirements
for at least twelve contaminants within two years after the
date of enactment.3 ' But these relatively soft mandates will be
Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 respond to these concerns by requiring the EPA to conduct cost/benefit analyses as a predicate to all future rulemaking, while leaving the decision how to respond to these analyses to the
Agency's "sole" discretion.
362. For a description of the Milwaukee incident, see supra note 283 and
the sources cited therein.
363. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, §
104, § 110 Stat. 1613, 1624-25 (1996) (requiring review and, if appropriate,
revision, of national primary drinking water standards at least every six
years).
364. § 125 (requiring review of no fewer that twelve existing monitoring
requirements within two years of the date of enactment).
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meaningless unless federal regulators decide to make them a
by
priority, and they may well find themselves overwhelmed
3 65
the 1996 Amendments' lengthy list of new projects.
An inappropriate emphasis on cost also has the potential
to shred the delicate net of existing health protection by dragging future federal standards down to the least common denominator of what is affordable by small drinking water systems. If the EPA and the states consider costs without facing
the problem of system viability, the vast majority of Americans
who are served by medium to large-sized systems would only
get the benefit of the standards that are affordable by systems
that should be out of business.
Congress has tried to grapple with this problem by setting
up a two-track system for standard-setting, directing the EPA
to establish different standards for small systems than for
larger ones where appropriate. 366 In a further effort to ensure
that small systems receive special treatment, Congress has expanded the process for granting temporary variances from
regulatory standards at the state level.3 6 Once again, however, it will be up to federal and state regulators to ensure that
protests about costs by smaller systems do not infect their
consideration of appropriate standards for larger systems, especially if state
regulators avoid using variances, as they have
68
in the past.
More enduring reform of the standard-setting process has
3 69
already begun with the elimination of regulatory quotas.
But meaningful reform cannot end there. The EPA must also
undertake a systematic reevaluation of existing requirements
and eliminate those which are not based on reliable national
occurrence data or clear evidence of adverse health effects.

365. See supra note 341 and accompanying text (enumerating the new
mandates contained in the 1996 amendments).
366. § 104 (establishing different cost/benefit considerations for large and
small systems); §§ 105, 111 (establishing special treatment standards for
small systems); § 125 (providing special monitoring relief for small systems).
367. § 116.
368. As noted supra note 304, state regulators have virtually ignored the
variance and exemption opportunities afforded by current law, probably because of the elaborate procedures involved and their chronic underfunding. It
will take far more than new statutory provisions to change this mindset and
bring this dead letter of the law to life.
369. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, §
102, § 110 Stat. 1617-1621 (repealing schedule and establishing new criteria
for issuing standards).

HeinOnline -- 81 Minn. L. Rev. 207 1996-1997

208

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:97

This second step will occur only if Congress both encourages
the EPA to undertake it and gives the Agency enough funding
and political support to conduct a sensible retrospective review.
At the same time, the EPA must devote adequate resources to
the development of a national occurrence database to support
its future rulemaking. The EPA recognizes the importance of
this work and has already begun such an effort. 70 Once reliable information is available, it will be possible to base regulatory decisions on the dual propositions that the federal government should not act unless a problem is nationally significant, but must act decisively when it is.
2. Ensuring System Viability
The EPA and the states regulate industrial sources of
pollution where and how they find them. If regulation has the
effect of driving non-viable, "dirty" firms out of business, regulators may rejoice privately but they can never afford to appear
satisfied publicly. To suggest that the federal or state regulatory role should include overt efforts to drive small entities out
of business is not just a controversial proposition, but a radical
one. Nevertheless, the only outcome more difficult to foresee is
how the integrity and vitality of federal and state drinking water programs can be restored without a concerted campaign to
eliminate nonviable small systems. In the context of providing
a service that can have such severe effects on public health, the
choice is either to find radical alternatives to current regulatory approaches or to risk lowering public health standards to
the least common denominator of the national drinking water
supply's weakest links.
Because small drinking water systems lack economies of
scale in both technology and administration, they incur an estimated sixty-eight percent of total compliance costs. This inefficiency places a disproportionate burden on approximately
twenty-six million customers. 71 The differences in economies
of scale and the resulting per capita burden are startling: according to an EPA analysis, the incremental costs imposed by
federal drinking water requirements varied from a two percent
increase for customers served by the largest systems (a $3 an370. EPA TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 307, at 12. The 1996 Safe
Drinking Water Act Amendments elevate this project to a statutory mandate.
§ 126 (requiring compilation of a national occurrence database within three
years of the date of enactment).
371. EPA TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 307, at 4-6.
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nual increase per household) to a fifty-five percent increase for
customers served by the smallest systems (a $145 annual increase cost per household).3 72 Small and very small systems
are also plagued by severe problems in obtaining funding for
necessary capital improvements and operating expenses and
struggle constantly with escalating regulatory violations. 373 In
1994, ninety percent of the 19,568 Community Water Systems
that violated SDWA requirements were small or very small
systems.3 74
Perhaps the most amazing aspect of this unfortunate
situation is how largely unnecessary it is. The EPA estimates
that about half of all small systems are located within Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas and therefore have the
"potential" for restructuring, either by interconnection or
through sharing management expenses and expertise with
larger municipal systems.3 75 An additional thirty percent of
small systems "appear to be viable and do not need to restructure," but the remaining twenty percent "do
not currently ap376
pear viable and are unable to restructure."
While federal and state regulators clearly understand the
importance of eliminating nonviable small systems, assigning
the government responsibility for actually accomplishing this
change will require adjustments not only in attitude but in the
division of responsibility among all three levels of government.
To date, the EPA has confined itself to serving as the research
arm of the viability effort, leaving the difficult jobs of crafting
and enforcing effective standards to the states. The Agency
has produced a series of materials explaining how the viability
of such systems might be measured and improved, all of which
372. Id. at 66. Customers served by the largest systems paid a projected
total of $145 per household for drinking water, while those served by the
smallest systems paid a projected total of $409 per household.
373. Id. at 70-75. Those small and very small systems that are privately
owned are especially hard-pressed because they cannot gain access to publicly
subsidized sources of financing, such as bond pools and revolving loan funds.
374. U.S. EPA, EPA 812-R-95-001, THE NATIONAL PUBLIC WATER SYSTEM
SUPERVISION PROGRAM, FY 1994 COMPLIANCE REPORT 23 (1995) [hereinafter
EPA FY 1994 COMPLIANCE REPORT]. Because small systems make up 87% of
all Community Water Systems, id., it is not surprising that they make up an
almost proportionate number of systems in violation. The real issue, however,
is whether we are prepared to tolerate such a high rate of noncompliance and
whether this rate will increase even more as new requirements go into effect
and systems that exist on the edge of viability are pushed over the brink.
375. EPA TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 307, at 87, 91.
376. I&at 91.
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are undoubtedly enlightening to state regulators. None, however, provide either the incentive or the political cover state
regulators need to buck often overwhelming resistance to consolidation.37 7 As one national expert in the area has observed:
The true "basket cases" are those that have defaulted on their SDWA
compliance responsibilities and simply can no longer hold things together ....
This is every state regulator's nightmare: you issue an
order on Mom & Pop's water company and the only response they are
capable of making is to hand you the keys to the water system. That
puts you
in the same category as the people who foreclose on family
378
farms.
The sorting principle of equity and equal protection argues
for establishing enforceable standards to determine viability at
the federal level. In the absence of federal standards, systems
that are incapable of providing water that is safe to drink will
serve too many Americans. The political pressure brought to
bear at the state level and the states' slowness to respond to
the deepening viability crisis suggests that in the absence of
federal intervention, American drinking water systems will
never achieve a uniform, minimally acceptable level of protec-

tion.

379

While the EPA can establish a baseline for determining vi-

ability, it will have great difficulty implementing such standards even-handedly at the local level. To accomplish that
challenging goal, state and local governments

must enlist

wholeheartedly in the effort, with state agencies serving as enforcers and local governments actively cooperating as alternative suppliers in the restructuring effort. The need to achieve
this cooperation, as much as any other single factor, underscores the importance of reforming the standard-setting process to restore the credibility of the program in the municipal
community.
There are two possible scenarios for dealing with the

377. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, EPA 570/9-90-004, IMPROVING THE VIABILITY OF
EXISTING SMALL DRINKING WATER SYSTEMS (1990) (exploring strategies for
assisting nonviable systems); U.S. EPA, EPA 570/9-91-035, RESTRUCTURING
MANUAL (1991) (delineating options for restructuring failing small systems
and potential methods for state intervention).
378. John E. Cromwell Ill, Generic Elements of a State Viability Initiative
1 (1994) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
379. A few states have developed programs for assessing the viability of
new systems and for tracking the status of existing systems; the most prominent are Connecticut, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Washington. EPA
TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 307, at 95-96 (detailing some of the viability
initiatives currently in place at the state level).
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problem of small system capacity. First, Congress could establish a federal loan program for small systems, delegate administration of the program to the states, and require state administrators to condition loans on demonstrations that applicants
are in fact viable. The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments
of 1996 take exactly this approach. The Act conditions state
use of federal aid on a demonstration of the local recipient's viability or capacity.8 0 Further, the new law earmarks ten percent of state revolving funds specifically for capacity development, as well as the support of state regulatory, source water,
and operator certification programs. 381 Unfortunately, the intense demands for these other uses of the money may mean
that small system consolidation programs will get short shrift.
Apart from the possibility that the funding authorized by the
legislation could be so limited that it will have only a minimal
impact, using financial incentives to motivate consolidation
may well prove too indirect a strategy, especially in the case of
very small systems that lack the sophistication to participate
in a federal funding program.
The second scenario would require states to undertake aggressive initiatives to ensure viability as a condition of maintaining their authority to run their own drinking water programs.
Current regulations require merely that states
establish and maintain an "activity to assure that the design
and construction of new or substantially modified public water
system facilities will be capable of compliance with the State
primary drinking water regulations."382 Given all of the other
problems that beset state programs, -this vague language has
failed to elevate viability to the level of effort it so clearly deserves. What is needed is a clear mandate that makes the issue of new and existing capacity a top priority for state pro380.

Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, §

130, § 110 Stat. 1613, 1662-72 (prohibiting financial assistance to nonviable
drinking water systems). The Amendments permit a state to loan money to an
otherwise nonviable system for the purpose of upgrading its capability or consolidating. Id.
381. I& (allowing states to use up to four percent of their total grants to support their regulatory programs and up to an additional ten percent to provide
further support for their regulatory programs, to administer source water protection programs, to develop and implement a capacity development strategy,
and to establish an operator certification program). The Act distributes grants
according to a formula that takes into consideration each state's needs, as determined by an EPA survey. Id.
382. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations Implementation, Subpart B-Primary Enforcement Responsibility, 40 C.F.R. § 142.10(b)(5) (1996).
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grams and, if the states do not undertake a meaningful effort,
returns the program to the EPA to implement.
The 1996 Amendments go halfway toward implementing
this approach. The new law requires the states to formulate
standards for determining the capacity of new drinking water
systems or risk losing twenty per cent of their annual grants.3 83
If state regulators receive adequate funds to implement these
changes, they could make a significant difference over the longterm. If, on the other hand, they do not receive an adequate infusion of funding up front, the penalty Congress has chosen
will only compound the problem.
Further, prospective standards, even if aggressively implemented, do nothing to address the serious problems posed
by existing, nonviable, small systems. Undoubtedly overwhelmed by the politics of taking on the towns and private operators that run these systems, Congress settled for a halfhearted provision that requires the states both to compile lists
of small systems with significant rates of noncompliance and to
develop "strategies" for improving their viability. The states
have four years to accomplish these ambitious goals or risk
losing between ten and twenty percent of their federal grant
3 84

funding.

If the EPA invokes this fiscal penalty, it will further compound the crisis in state regulatory programs by withholding
money from states that have ceased to care rather than transferring authority to federal regulators. The EPA is likely to
recognize the implications of this dynamic and reduce its demands on the states, much as it has done in the past. The new
law's message that federal and state regulators should set
standards for small systems on a different-and less protective-basis than applies to medium and large systems is likely
to compound these trends. The result will be very little progress toward compelling consolidation and eliminating nonviable small systems unless the regulators themselves discover
the will to do so.
More enduring reform will require federal and state regulators to recognize the urgent need to apply capacity standards
to existing systems, while systematically finding alternative
383. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, §
119, § 110 Stat. 1613, 1647-50 (1996).
384. Id. The law instructs the EPA to penalize non-complying states by withholding 90% of a state's grant in fiscal year 2001, 85% in fiscal year 2002, and
80% in each subsequent fiscal year. Id.
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water supplies for people served by the least viable. To be effective, a state viability initiative must include "takeover"
authority: the state must be prepared to assume responsibility
for providing drinking water to customers until it can establish
an alternative arrangement. 8 5 Additional federal funding
would make viability initiatives more politically palatable to
the states, especially in cases where the state economy is so
depressed that the state lacks the resources to support such efforts.
3. Challenge Regulation
The systematic pruning of regulatory requirements and a
concerted effort to drive nonviable systems out of business will
go a long way toward restoring stability to the drinking water
programs at both the federal and state levels. These changes
will not happen overnight, however, and they will not provide a
total solution. Inevitably, federal and state regulators must
face and bridge a growing gap between the costs of necessary
pollution control and the resources now committed at the local
level, a gap that one estimate places as high as $17 billion
through the year 2000.386
More than ninety-five percent of public drinking water systems rely on direct customer charges to finance their opera-

385. EPA TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 307, at 96 (discussing the importance of takeover authority and its application in the state of Connecticut).
According to the EPA, this ultimate fall-back authority can be very expensive
to exercise. Id.
386. APOGEE RESEARCH, INC., AMERICA's ENVIRONMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE: A WATER AND WASTEWATER INVESTMENT STUDY 6 (1990). This
and similar estimates are based on necessarily speculative forecasts regarding
the funding capacity of drinking water systems, the amount of federal and
state aid that might be available, the capital investment needed to repair aging infrastructure, and the cost of complying with regulations that have not
yet been issued. Id. at 6, 9. For an analysis of future regulatory costs and
how they could affect the average household, see EPA TECHNIcAL REPORT,
supra note 307, at 44-69. See also CBO CASE STUDY, supra note 148, at 13-14
(estimating average household costs for drinking water given compliance with
current Safe Drinking Water Act standards). The CBO concluded that 86% of
households should incur annual costs of less than $20 to meet current regulatory standards, although some four percent of households served by small systems could face annual costs in excess of $100 and one percent could face annual costs in excess of $300. The CBO further found that proposed new
regulatory requirements would significantly increase compliance costs, and
could triple such costs for households served by small systems. Id. at ix-x, 1324.
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tions.3 87 To repair aging drinking water delivery system infrastructure, to utilize state-of-the-art technologies, and to
achieve the levels of public health protection required by the
law, local drinking water system operators must require their
customers to pay significantly higher costs. System operators'
willingness and ability to take such action depends in turn on
how persuasively they can articulate the need to spend more
money within the context of their local communities. Americans are not accustomed to paying much for water supplies.
The combined total of water and sewer charges is the lowest
utility expense incurred by the average household, falling below cable television and telephone service and costing approximately one-fourth of electricity costs. 388 The imposition of
major new costs will require a profound adjustment in public
attitudes and expectations. It could also prove politically
volatile, especially for local elected officials.
One possible solution is to give large, viable drinking water systems the opportunity to conduct comprehensive audits of
their short- and long-term deficiencies. The audits would then
be used to develop tailored compliance plans for remedying
those deficiencies within an acceptable period of time. As an
incentive to participate in the self-audit program, state regulators would be authorized to grant a temporary amnesty from
enforcement of monitoring, reporting, and technology requirements, provided that fundamental health-based standards
were met in both the short and long-term.
This type of program would represent the ideal application
of the fourth sorting principle proposed in Part IV above because it would mean that local conditions become the driving
force for future regulation. Site-specific audits and long-term
strategic plans should ensure that no money is wasted on requirements that are not absolutely necessary in a systemspecific context. Audit results would also give local officials the
opportunity to explain in detail to their customers how they intend to improve the safety of the drinking water supply. The
program would shift the content of the current debate from the
wisdom of generic federal regulation to actual local needs.
387. CBO CASE STUDY, supra note 148, at 32 (comparing local cost estimates of compliance with current regulations with estimated municipal fiscal
capacity).
388. EPA TECHNIcAL REPORT, supra note 307, at 65-69 (reporting the percentage of household income spent on water and sewer costs in comparison
with other utilities from 1980-1991).
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Obviously, the adoption of site-specific compliance plans
poses the real danger that federal and state regulators will be
duped into tolerating serious violations of essential standards
in exchange for elusive municipal promises of future improvement. Defining an irreducible level of protection that must be
provided throughout the audit period would undoubtedly pose
a challenge to regulators' resources and ingenuity. Unlike
many other environmental programs, even one-time incidents
of suppliers exceeding certain drinking water standards can
have catastrophic effects. To prevent this destructive outcome,
administrators must carefully craft regulatory amnesties to
give adequate incentive without suspending the baseline of
protection needed to avoid damage to public health.
At the same time, it is ridiculous to suggest that only total
compliance with all applicable standards is acceptable, given
the widespread noncompliance we currently tolerate.38 9 Regulators supervising self-audits must first separate essential
from non-essential requirements and must then weigh the
benefits of concrete long-term improvements against the toleration of interim, limited harm. At this stage in its development, the federal program developed by the EPA under the
Safe Drinking Water Act contains a critical mass of core regulatory standards that can establish this baseline, as well as
enough additional requirements to allow regulators to offer a
convincing trade. To be anything more than a few pilot projects, however, site-specific compliance planning requires better
funding of state bureaucracies. Indeed, adequate funding is
the quid pro quo for successful implementation of all of these
proposed reforms.
4. Information Disclosure
The Safe Drinking Water Act has long required operators
of public drinking water systems to send their customers periodic notice of violations they have committed and exemptions
or variances they have received.3 90 As the program's track record attests, these provisions have had little effect on escalating
noncompliance. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration, environmentalists, and their allies in Congress made it a top pri389. See infra notes 404-405 and accompanying text (comparing the number of violations reported in 1994 with the number of enforcement actions the
EPA took).
390. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c) (1994), amended by Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 114, § 110 Stat. 1613, 1636-41.
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ority to expand these notification provisions. As a result of
these efforts, the 1996 Amendments require annual "consumer
confidence reports" that would list the status of all regulated
contaminants in a system's drinking water supply.39 1 Indeed,
EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner characterized these
provisions as the "single most effective action we can take to
protect the environment," predicting that the public would be
more willing to pay for testing and pollution control once they
knew more about actual levels of contaminants in their drink392
ing water.
Given all the problems that plague her agency's implementation of the drinking water program, Browner's statement appears naive, even quixotic. After all, it is not as if consumers
served by the inadequate water systems can easily vote with
their feet, taking their business elsewhere. Arming consumers
with information will only prove immediately useful to those
affluent enough to afford the cost of bottled water.
Browner, however, faces some very difficult political realities: one of the most effective ways to stave off future attacks
on her agency's budget and legal authority is to motivate a
public backlash that will pressure local officials out of their
complacency and their often successful efforts to vilify federal
and state regulators. From that perspective, she rightfully
hopes that information disclosure will serve the important
functions of restoring a grass roots constituency for aggressive
regulation and persuading the public that it must make necessary infrastructure investments.
The two flaws in this plan are the difficulty of designing effective notifications, especially for the less educated, less affluent consumers who are most vulnerable to the problems caused
by polluted water,393 and the long time necessary for effective
disclosure to have a direct effect on regulatory policy. If the
meaning of the notice is unclear, disclosure will not only be ineffective, but could inspire further distrust of government. As
tempting as it is to grasp this superficially popular solution in

391. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, §
114, § 110 Stat. 1613, 1636-41.

392. John H. Cushman, Jr., Bill Would Give Water Customers Pollution Notice, Wide Bipartisan Support, Federal Proposal Would Have Contaminants
Listed and TheirEffects Explained,N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1996, § 1, at 1.
393. For an excellent discussion of these difficulties, see Clifford Rechtschaf-

fen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under California'sProposition
65, 23 ECOLOGY LAW Q. 303, 320-40 (1996).
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an era when so-called "command and control" regulation is increasingly unpopular, it is unlikely that information disclosure
will motivate enough change to justify its elevation over other,
more important reforms.
C.

COOPERATION, COERCION, OR REVOLUTION

The key distinction between the cooperative, coercive, and
revolutionary scenarios is money, specifically money for the
implementation of federal and state regulatory programs. Under this Article's proposed changes, more money for more bureaucrats means faster and better revamping of existing regulations, extensive changes in the structure of the drinking
water industry, and the widespread adoption of facility-specific
regulatory alternatives. Less money means the maintenance of
extensive regulatory requirements on the books, the continued
proliferation of small systems, and the possibility that an outbreak of waterborne diseases in a major American city will
once again send the pendulum whipping back to an era of federal regulatory activism.
Because leaders of the unfunded mandates movement
have forged expedient political alliances with industry groups
crusading against big government and excessive regulation,
they have thus far missed this crucial point.39 4 Instead, they
have delivered what they think is a clever ultimatum to federal
lawmakers: either give us more money or eliminate the mandates that cost money. In the aftermath of the 1994 Republican electoral revolution, this ultimatum synchronized with the
mood of Congress. Yet it is one thing for Congress to enact
laws like the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 95 that place procedural impediments in the path of future regulation and quite
another for Congress, federal and state regulators, and local

394. In 1994, this alliance was dubbed the "unholy trinity" by a despairing
environmentalist and the label has stuck. General Policy: Draft Memo Outlines Groups' Strategy for Superfund, CWA, Drinking Water Bills, 24 ENV'T
REP.(BNA) 1967, 1967 (1994). The three elements of the trinity are unfunded
mandates relief, regulatory reform through the application of comparative
risk assessment and cost/benefit analysis, and compensation for government
"takings" of private property. Conservative commentators argue that the alliance could accomplish a comprehensive rewrite of major federal environmental laws, although it has not yet made much progress toward achieving
that goal. Ann Reilly Dowd, EnvironmentalistsAre on the Run, FORTUNE,
Sept. 19, 1994, at 91.
395. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. Law No. 104-4, § 109
Stat. 48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.A.).'
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officials to craft lasting and effective changes to the existing
regulatory system.
1. Cooperation
Under the cooperative model of reform, federal and state
agencies would be funded to the point where they could offer a
consistent and reliable regulatory presence, not only for purposes of enforcement but also to provide desperately needed
technical assistance. The EPA would receive adequate funding
to conduct the research that is so desperately needed to reveal
both what contaminants are prevalent in national drinking
water supplies and what risks these substances pose to public
health and the environment. The Agency would complete work
on several pending proposals that deal with key environmental
threats. It would also develop a test for measuring drinking
water system viability and persuade state agencies to apply it
in the field. Finally, the EPA would continue its efforts to coax
and cajole state legislatures to fund their own regulatory efforts adequately, backing this pressure up with the threat that
primacy will be withdrawn and returned to federal enforcers
who are capable of assuming this responsibility in isolated and
dire cases.
The need for expanded state funding to achieve cooperative reform is even more acute. Adequate resources at the
state level would permit sanitary surveys to assume their
rightful place as the centerpiece of state implementation. Surveys would be conducted regularly and thoroughly. Any system displaying deficiencies would be placed on a tight schedule
for resuming compliance. The second priority for state regulators would be a systematic effort to encourage and, if necessary, compel system consolidation, a draining and difficult task
that is critical in the long-term. Their third priority would be
to offer large, demonstrably viable municipal drinking water
systems the opportunity to design facility-specific long-term
compliance plans.
How much money is necessary to support this level and
quality of effort? Unfortunately, this critical question cannot
be answered with much precision. The current congressional
debate is so distorted by budget-cutting fervor that it does not
produce a reliable picture of what resources are really necessary to accomplish more enduring reform. Further, because
some of the priorities discussed above have never been proposed in these terms before, no estimates of how much it would
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take to implement them are available. Nonetheless, one can
make two basic observations about the costs of a cooperative
approach. First, although the reform of federal regulations will
reduce compliance costs over the long-term, effective reform of
the Safe Drinking Water Act will require a substantially increased, up-front investment of both federal and state regulatory resources. Second, the most acute need for resources is at
the state level, where the EPA has documented shocking resource shortfalls. In 1993, the EPA estimated that state
drinking water programs were experiencing a $162 million
shortfall in total funding needs of $304 million.396 The EPA
has tried to turn this situation around through patient reeducation on a state-by-state basis, a prospect made far more arduous by the low397priority state legislators assign to drinking
water regulation.
The 1996 Amendments authorize annual appropriations of
$1 billion for state drinking water revolving funds through
2003, but it is far from clear whether these amounts will actually be appropriated.39 The Amendments authorize states to
spend up to fourteen percent of their annual grants-or $140
million total-for their own regulatory programs, but ten percent funding for new initiatives regarding capacity development, operator certification, and source water protection. 399 In
sum, the prospects for dramatic increases in funding may well
396. EPA TEcHNIcAL REPORT, supra note 307, at 103 (comparing estimated funding shortfalls in 1993 with shortfalls in 1988). This estimate of
funding shortfalls was based on a Resource Needs Model developed by the
EPA and the Association of State Drinking Water Administrators. The model
takes a comprehensive inventory of all the activities performed by state
agencies, prices each activity on the basis of data that reflect national,
"aggregate" conditions, and then gives the states an opportunity to replace
these data with state-specific resource estimates. Id. The 1996 Amendments
commit $100 million yearly to federal grants for state public water system supervision programs. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-182, § 124, § 110 Stat. 1613, 1653.
397. In its 1993 report to Congress, the EPA noted that a 1992 survey by
the National Conference of State Legislatures listed a balanced budget, education, and health care as the top priorities for state legislative leaders, and
that "f[elnvironmental issues such as drinking water did not come close to being top priorities with these officials." EPA TEcHNIcAL REPORT, supra note
307, at 104 (analyzing the reasons for funding shortfalls in state drinking water programs). For a description of the efforts the EPA has already made to
change attitudes at the state level, see id. at 110.
398. § 130, § 110 Stat. at 1662-72. Political pressure to balance the federal
budget during the same period may overwhelm the renewed commitment to environmental programs ostensibly demonstrated by passage of the Amendments.
399. Id.
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depend on changing attitudes at the state level, at the same
time that the federal government eagerly devolves responsibility for additional domestic programs.
2. Coercion
The alternative to well-financed cooperation is underfinanced coercion. Under this model, the EPA and state regulators would be compelled to leverage scarce resources by bringing high profile enforcement actions, inspiring compliance
through the threat of public exposure and disgrace. Although
they have not yet reached this point, if current budget trends
continue, federal and state regulators will be forced to abandon
any systematic effort either to write new regulations or to
monitor and counsel compliance with existing requirements.
Instead, they will be forced to focus limited resources on the
pursuit of only the most life-threatening and widespread instances of noncompliance. It is far less expensive to bring a
handful of punitive actions against a well-selected sample of
drinking water system operators than to implement the law in
a more comprehensive and even-handed manner.
The Safe Drinking Water Act authorizes the EPA to extract penalties of up to $25,000 for each day on which a supplier commits a single violation of drinking water regulations.
Such penalties can multiply astronomically when several violations occur over long periods of time. 00 The Agency may also
issue administrative orders mandating immediate compliance
and enforce those orders in federal court; in some cases, orders
requiring immediate compliance can prove a more expensive
proposition than straight civil penalties." 1 Federal law imposes criminal penalties for the filing of false statements with
the government and this provision has been used to prosecute
violators of the Safe Drinking Water Act's various reporting
requirements. 2 Finally, the Act and its implementing regu400. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(g)(3) (1994), amended by Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 113, § 110 Stat. 1613, 1634-36.
The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 did not significantly
change any of these enforcement authorities, although the new law establishes a new procedure for granting a temporary amnesty to small systems
accused of a violation which come forward with a convincing consolidation
plan. § 113, § 110 Stat. at 1634-36.
401. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(g)(1).
402. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 988 F.2d 1036, 1037 (10th Cir.
1993) (upholding a conviction under the federal criminal code, 18 U.S.C. §
1001, for filing false reports under the Safe Drinking Water Act and its im-
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lations require states that obtain primacy to demonstrate that
they have
given their regulators equally effective enforcement
403
tools.
In comparison to the numbers of violations reported, these
powerful authorities are rarely used by federal and state
regulators. In fiscal year 1994, for example, 19,568 community
water systems self-reported 98,290 violations, but state regulators brought only a total of 1,491 enforcement actions and the
EPA brought a total of 4,051 against community water systems
and other types of systems, combined.4 ° Close to 3,000 of the
EPA actions were mere notices of violation; the Agency issued
only 309 final administrative orders and filed only forty-four
complaints seeking penalties in federal court. °5
There are several possible explanations for this weak track
record. In the face of severe resource constraints, federal and
state regulators have placed far more emphasis on churning
out new regulations than enforcing those already on the books.
The regulated community, especially small drinking water systems, has besieged them with complaints and inquiries. Federal and state regulators have also found it very difficult to
prosecute municipal officials or small drinking water system
operators, in light of the political clout of the former group and
hapless ineptitude of the latter. Because they are not in the
mode of emphasizing enforcement, federal and state regulators
find it discouraging to contemplate protracted litigation
against even the most intransigent and culpable violators. A
renewed emphasis on aggressive enforcement would require
not only a reordering of resources and development of new
skills and capabilities, but also a fundamental psychological
adjustment.4 °6
plementing regulations, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g, 300g-1(b)(1), 300(f)(3) and 40
C.F.R. §§ 141.13, 141.22, 141.31).
403. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (1994), amended by Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, §§ 112, 113, § 110 Stat. 1613, 163336; National Primary Drinking Water Regulations Implementation, Subpart B
- Primary Enforcement Responsibility, 40 C.F.R. §§ 142.10-142.11, 142.16
(1995).
404. EPA FY 1994 COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 374, at 20-22, 68

(reporting national trend data on the status of compliance and enforcement of
safe public drinking water regulations during fiscal year 1994).
405. Id. at 68.
406. For an excellent discussion of the problems that arise in enforcing
environmental laws against public facilities, see Marcia R. Gelpe, Pollution
Control Laws Against Public Facilities, 13 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 69, 74-80
(1989).
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What violations should be a priority for reinvigorated enforcement efforts? Quality is surely more important and effective than quantity: rather than chase a slew of relatively minor
violations to the inconclusive point where a small penalty is
imposed administratively, regulators would have more impact
if they prosecuted a few high-profile violations of the most important microbial and chemical standards to the point where
the courts imposed severe penalties.
In addition, citizens may take the law into their own
hands, pursuing the more egregious violations in circumstances where they believe that the government will fail to protect them. The Safe Drinking Water Act authorizes citizens'
suits against drinking water system operators currently in
violation of the law, and allows courts to award attorneys' fees
and costs to parties who prevail in such actions. 0 7 To date,
citizens have brought only a handful of such suits. 4°8

Private

407. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994), amended by Safe Drinking Water Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 129, § 110 Stat. 1613, 1660-62. At least 60 days
before filing suit, the citizen must provide notice to the EPA and the state in
which the violation occurs. Citizens' suits may not proceed if federal or state
regulators are "diligently prosecuting" their own civil actions against alleged
violators. Id. § 300j-8(b). The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996
do not change these provisions, except with respect to federal agencies and
departments. See § 113, § 110 Stat. at 1634-36 (omitting any changes to citizen suit provisions covering non-federal parties); § 129, § 110 Stat. at 1660-62
(modifying such provisions as they apply to federal agencies and departments).
408. See, e.g., Vernon Village, Inc. v. Gottier, 755 F. Supp. 1142, 1151-53
(D. Conn. 1990) (confirming the right of the resident of a trailer park to bring
a citizens' suit alleging violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act). But see
ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1394-95 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing a district court decision confirming community organizations' right to file citizen
suit to enforce the lead provisions of the Safe Drinking Water Act, and holding
that 42 U.S.C. § 300j-24(d) is unconstitutional under the tenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3110 (U.S.
July 22, 1996) (No. 96-174); Mattoon v. City of Pittsfield, 980 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st
Cir. 1992) (dismissing citizens' suit brought by residents of city in which outbreak of giardiasis occurred because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate ongoing
violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act). The Supreme Court's decision in
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 5663 (1987), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 890 F.2d 690 (4th
Cir. 1989), which requires plaintiffs to demonstrate ongoing violations, is a
significant barrier to citizens' suits. However, in the situation hypothesized
here of severe budget shortfalls and chronic noncompliance, plaintiffs should
be able to overcome this impediment. Environmental advocates in Congress
tried to amend the Safe Drinking Water Act to overturn Gwaltney; municipal
lobbyists vigorously opposed the proposal and it was not included in the final
legislation. Drinking Water: Citizen Suit ProvisionDropped; SDWA Reform
Bill Scheduled for Markup, 1994 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) 180 (Sept. 20, 1994).
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enforcement is likely to increase, however, as it becomes more
and more clear that regulators are unable to address the most
pressing problems.
While coercive enforcement is clearly less desirable than a
cooperative and comprehensive regulatory approach, it has the
potential to maintain minimal regulatory compliance, especially if state regulators muster the political will to pursue selected violators with a vengeance. But there is undoubtedly a
fine line between the coercive model and a revolutionary rollback of fundamental protection. Where that line lies may not
be apparent until it has been crossed.
3. Revolution
What would the revolution look like? One of its major
characteristics would be the collapse of state primacy programs. This particular development has already begun. In
1994, the EPA warned nine states to improve their programs
by meeting federal deadlines for the implementation of new
regulations or face the loss of primacy:. 9 California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, South Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Thus far, all of the states pulled back
from the brink, but many are clearly getting to the point where
the loss of primacy would come as a relief to state officials buffeted by budget shortfalls and the devolution of other important federal programs.
The takeover of even a few state regulatory programs
would likely prove overwhelming to the EPA. Because the Act
permits citizens' suits against the EPA when the EPA misses
the deadlines for fulfilling its regulatory quotas,4 10 federal
A second impediment to the use of citizens' suits to enforce federal environmental laws is the Supreme Court's recent decision in Seminole Tribe of
Floridav. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1132-33 (1996). This case precludes suits
seeking an injunction against a state agency when Congress has enacted a
remedial scheme specially designed to enforce the right sought, but it is unclear whether courts will construe it to apply to a suit against a local government.
409. The crisis in state primacy programs has been brewing for several
years. In a 1992 press account of a meeting between then-EPA Administrator
William Reilly and several state governors who had requested an opportunity
to surrender control of their drinking water programs, a senior EPA official,
James R. Elder, described the situation as a "crisis" and warned that the program could "fall flat on its face" unless the government took effective action.
Drinking Water: Reilly to Meet with Governors to Consider "Crisis" Over
Funding,State PrimacyIssues, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 645 (1992).
410. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994), amended by Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 129, § 110 Stat. at 1660-62.
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regulators have no choice but to continue to commit resources
to writing new regulations even as their ability to implement
existing requirements all but collapses.
The deterioration of federal and state programs would
cause an increase in violations, to the point where scofflaw attitudes become prevalent even among the large water systems
that have the financial capacity to meet regulatory goals. No
operator would consciously risk providing contaminated water
to the public. Rather, the danger is that the potential for lax
management and human error would multiply significantly in
an atmosphere where enforcement of complicated regulatory
requirements appears nonexistent.
All of these problems would invariably produce an increased incidence of waterborne diseases, as well as continued
exposure to chemical contaminants that cause chronic, longlatency health effects. In the best-case scenario, the acute effects on public health caused by the collapse of regulation
would become obvious sooner rather than later, and federal
and state regulators would at last be motivated to take more
definitive action. There are two other possibilities: contaminated drinking water supplies would cause deaths, and in reaction the EPA would try frantically to rebuild a credible federal regulatory system; alternatively, the damage caused by
contaminated water would be subsumed in statistics that obscure the link between the illness and its cause, and the public
would never realize the price it had paid.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Framers of the Constitution never contemplated the
advent of the modern regulatory state. They did foresee constant tension among the three levels of government and incorporated mechanisms to relieve it into the design of American
government. The primary arena for mediating this tension is
not the courts' interpretation of the Constitution, but rather
the political and administrative processes that are the source
of such disputes. Politicians and bureaucrats at all levels of
government must either renegotiate the most disruptive federal rules or risk a breakdown in intergovernmental relationships that will make all of them look foolish, impotent, or
worse.
Unfunded mandates are the most pointed recent example
of intergovernmental tension, exacerbated several-fold by the
absence of federal funding. Mayors and other municipal offi-
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cials have legitimate grievances concerning both the goals and
the details of the federal environmental programs that regulate
municipal services. However, in their effort to get a quick fix
for their problems, they have couched the debate in intemperate rhetoric that rails against big government without ever acknowledging that a central target of their protest-national
environmental programs-enjoys overwhelming popular support.
The Reagan era provides a troubling illustration of the
ramifications of confusing the message by obscuring the grievance. Like the current mandates movement, the Reagan administration adopted devolutionary themes and demonized the
federal bureaucracy as a justification for changes sought by its
far less popular corporate supporters. This extreme approach
inspired an equally extreme reaction, directly causing the current crisis in the regulatory state. Those seeking to uphold the
Reagan legacy see only this side of its history and urge resolution of the crisis by dismantling federal regulations as quickly
and comprehensively as possible. Yet, they never explain how,
in the aftermath of this revolution, the country can accomplish
the social imperative of ensuring the safety of the air we
breathe, the food we eat, and the water we drink. If the public
debate is again distracted by tirades against big government,
and we avoid the effort it will take to craft more enduring reforms, the environmental progress of the last quarter century
could be squandered.
Over the next few years, we must face the challenge of
sorting the appropriate roles of federal, state, and local governments in protecting human health and the environment
from municipal pollution. If we do not sort such responsibilities and reform the current regulatory system appropriately,
two damaging scenarios will occur. The responsibility for
regulating the environmental consequences of local government activities will devolve hastily and without restriction to
state and local governments ill-equipped to assume it. Simultaneously, we will experience revolution in the worst sense of
the word: a rapid withdrawal of essential regulatory standards
without any effective alternative controls. Both scenarios
could have potentially cataclysmic effects on public health and
natural resources; the inability to reconstruct effective regulatory strategies once the current system is dismantled would
compound these effects.
It is the thesis of this Article that there are two acceptable
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alternatives to the devolution or revolution scenarios described
above. One solution is a return to the cooperative federalism
that dominated national politics between 1930 and 1960. Cooperative federalism requires the establishment of uniform
national health or technology-based standards that leave state
and local governments adequate flexibility to avoid wasting resources on unimportant problems and reduce unwarranted
federal interference in local implementation. Its success is
predicated on adequate funding of federal, state, and local governments to permit each to assume its appropriate role. The
second, far less desirable but still viable alternative could be
described as coercive federalism, an approach which by default
dominates too many major environmental programs. Coercive
federalism would retain the federal role in establishing uniform national standards, but would abandon any real effort to
plan and implement comprehensive regulatory programs. Instead, it would rely on selective enforcement and imposition of
stiff penalties to motivate compliance.
Several fundamental principles must govern the sorting of
government responsibilities under either a cooperative or coercive federal approach. The federal government should regulate transboundary pollution that crosses state lines. The existence of significant economies of scale in the formulation of
regulatory standards also militates a federal response. Where
differences in the level of regulatory control would harm vulnerable groups such as people of color, the poor, children, or
the elderly, federal regulation should receive much more careful consideration. On the other hand, the federal government
should forego regulation unless a compelling case is made that
the problem is both significant and national in scope. Federal
agencies and Congress should consider the cumulative burden
they have imposed on state and local governments before issuing new regulatory standards and should periodically cull requirements that are no longer a priority. Subnational governments should retain full authority to craft alternatives to
restrictive federal standards when cost-effective solutions depend on the consideration of local environmental conditions
such as geography, geology, and the nature and scope of contamination. If used strategically, federal funding can make
mandates more palatable politically, but should never be used
to determine the legitimacy of a mandate that is otherwise
justified by the sorting principles.
Finally, the country must recognize that until and unless
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it commits itself to fund regulators adequately, both protection
and reform will be impossible. Beneath the surface of every
angry anecdote is the frustration that bureaucrats could not,
would not, and did not solve the problem. Placing them under
further siege, without the resources to regulate not only less
but smarter, will not help counties, cities, and towns--or their
citizens-over the long-run.
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